金融学毕业论文外方翻译中国独立的货币政策汇率制度和资本帐户

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1、浙 江 工 商 大 学 金 融 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文-17.外文翻译外文翻译之一Monetary Policy Independence, the Currency Regime,and the Capital Account in ChinaAuthor：Eswar S. PrasadNationality: AmericaSourse and Type: Paper presented at the Conference on Chinas Exchange Rate Policy Peterson Institute for International Economics Ht

2、tp:/unjobs.orgJournal time: October 19, 2007， P7-13Chinas currency policy has of course received the most attention of late. Whether the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate is part of a deliberate mercantilist strategy to promote export-led growth has been the subject of intense debate. On the one

3、hand, China has had a relatively stable exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar since 1995. This policy was sustained even through the Asian crisis when the temptations for devaluing the currency were great. On the other hand, during this decade the exchange rate has been kept from appreciating on

4、ly by massive intervention in the exchange market. In tandem with sustained high export growth and a burgeoning current account surplus that nearly hit 10 percent of GDP in 2006, this has been seen as prima facie evidence of a grossly undervalued currency. As discussed in more detail below, one of t

5、he principal concerns is that the lack of exchange rate flexibility not only reduces monetary policy independence, it also hampers banking sector reforms. The inability of the PBC to use interest rates as a primary tool of monetary policy implies that credit growth has to be controlled by blunter an

6、d non-market-oriented tools, including targets/ceilings for credit growth as well as “non-prudential administrative measures”.Chinas approach to exchange rate poliy and capital account liberalization may be indicative of a desire to maintain stability on the domestic and external fronts while openin

7、g up to trade and financial flows. And the large stock of foreign exchange reserves resulting from these policies may serve as insurance against vulnerabilities arising from a weak banking system.But there comes a point when the policy distortions needed to maintain this approach could generate imba

8、lances, impose potentially large welfare costs, and themselves become a source of instability.To begin with, why is the exchange rate regime of such importance? After all, the exchange rate is just a relative price. Moreover, economic models tell us that macroeconomic fundamentals will eventually wi

9、n out in terms of what really matters- the real exchange rate rather than the nominal exchange rate. That is, if the nominal exchange rate doesnt adjust in response to changes in fundamentals, relative price levels will adjust. But a combination of policies such as financial repression and a closed

10、capital account can delay this adjustment for a significant period. While this can boost export competitiveness by keeping the exchange rate undervalued, there can be subtle indirect costs, in terms of both economic welfare and reduced policy flexibility in responding to various shocks. What are the

11、 costs of an inflexible exchange rate? The schematic diagram below lays out some of the connections, although this should of course be recognized as a heuristic diagram that ignores many of the complexities in the relationships depicted here. The main point is that an inflexible exchange rate, while

12、 not the root cause of imbalances in the economy, requires a large set of distortionary policies for its maintenance over long periods. It is these distortions thatthrough multiple channelshurt economic welfare and could, over time, shift the balance of risks in the economy.Lack of Exchange Rage Fle

13、xibility Complicates Macro Policy and ReformsMaking the Right ConnectionsAn independent interest rate policy is a key tool for improving domestic macroeconomic management and promoting stable growth and low inflation. As the Chinese economy becomes more complex and market-oriented, it will become ha

14、rder to manage through command and control methods as in the past. And, as it becomes more exposed to global influences through its rising trade and financial linkages to the world economy, it will also become more exposed to external shocks. Monetary policy is typically the first line of defense ag

15、ainst macroeconomic shocks, both internal and external. Hence, having an independent monetary policy is important for overall macroeconomic stability. Monetary policy independence is, however, a mirage if the central bank is mandated to attain an exchange rate objective. Capital controls, which prev

16、ent money from moving in an out of an economy easily, do insulate monetary policy to some extent. But capital controls are notoriously leaky (the unofficial flows into and out of China itself are ample testimony to this) and tend to become increasingly less effective over time. Thus, a flexible exch

17、ange rate is a prerequisite for an independent monetary policy. However, opening the capital account ahead of introducing greater flexibility in the exchange rate could pose serious problems in the future. History is replete with examples of countries that opened up the capital account while things

18、looked good, even while keeping their exchange rates fixed, and were then subject to large exchange rate depreciations when they were subject to sudden stops and/or reversals of capital flows. Marvin Goodfriend and I have argued that China should adopt an explicit inflation objectivea long-run range

19、 for the inflation rate and an explicit acknowledgement that low inflation is the priority for monetary policyas a new anchor for monetary policy . An inflation objective, coupled with exchange rate flexibility, would work best to stabilize domestic demand in response to internal and external macroe

20、conomic shocks. Indeed, focusing on inflation stability is the best way for monetary policy to achieve broader objectives such as financial stability and high employment growth. Over time, the inflation objective would provide a basis for currency flexibility. Thus, exchange rate reform will be seen

21、 as a key component of an overall reform strategy that is in Chinas short- and long-term interests.Two related points are worth noting. Independent interest rate policy requires a flexible exchange rate, not a one-off revaluation or a sequence of revaluations. A flexible exchange rate buffers some o

22、f the effects of interest rate changes, especially in terms of offsetting the temptation for capital to flow in or out in response to such changes. A one-off revaluation can solve this problem temporarily, but could create even more problems subsequently if interest rate actions in a different direc

23、tion become necessary, or if investor sentiment and the pressures for capital inflows or outflows shift. This is why the focus on a large one-time revaluation to atone for past sins doesnt get us anywhere,either in terms of the policy debate or in terms of effecting reforms that really matter. Anoth

24、er crucial point is that exchange rate flexibility should not be confused with full opening of the capital account. An open capital account would allow the currency to float freely and be market-determined. But the exchange rate can be made flexible and the objective of monetary policy independence

25、achieved even if the capital account is not fully open. Indeed, as noted above, there are good reasons why it is preferable to move more gradually on capital account opening than on exchange rate flexibility. A free float with an open capital account is a useful long-term objective, but is not a hig

26、h priority in the short run.中国独立的货币政策，汇率制度和资本帐户作者：普拉萨德国籍：美国出处及类别：在彼得森国际经济研究所关于中国人民币汇率政策的会议上提交的论文Http:/unjobs.org发表时间及页码：2007年10月19日，P7-13中国的货币政策当然是最近以来最受瞩目的。维持固定汇率是否是部分重商主义者蓄意的战略以促进出口导向型增长，一直受到激烈的辩论。一方面，自1995年以来中国一直采取相对美元较为稳定的汇率。甚至在亚洲（金融）危机时期人民币有巨大的贬值诱惑时这项政策也仍然维持。另一方面，这十年期间汇率一直保持升值，而仅仅通过大规模干预外汇市场。随着

27、出口的持续高速增长和经常帐户盈余的不断膨胀，在2006年几乎达到国内生产总值的10%，这一直被视为严重低估货币的初步证据。 正如下文更加详细的讨论，（我们）关注的主要问题之一是：汇率灵活性的缺失不仅降低了货币政策的独立性，而且阻碍了银行业的改革。中国人民银行无法把利率作为一个主要的货币政策工具，这意味着，信贷增长将由粗放和非以市场为导向的工具所控制，包括信贷增长的目标/上限以及“非审慎的行政措施”。中国对汇率政策和资本帐户自由化的方式可能表明了一个愿望，即在贸易开放和资本流动时维护国内、外的稳定。而由此带来的大量的外汇储备积累可能是作为由脆弱的银行体系造成的漏洞的保险。但有一点，当扭曲的政策需

28、要维持时，这种方式会产生不平衡，潜在地强加了巨大的福利代价，自己也成为不稳定的根源。首先，为什么汇率制度如此重要？毕竟，汇率只是一个相对的价格。此外，经济模型告诉我们，宏观经济基本面最终取决于真正重要的-实际汇率，而非名义汇率。也就是说，如果名义汇率不跟随经济基本面的调整而调整，（则）相对价格水平就会调整。但是政策的结合如金融压抑和封闭的资本帐户可以在一定时间内延迟这种调整。虽然通过保持低估的汇率可以提高出口竞争力，（但）在应付各种冲击时会产生微妙的间接成本，以经济福利和政策灵活性的减少的形式。 不灵活的汇率将会带来哪些代价？下面的示意图列出了一些联系，尽管这应当被认为是启发式图，因为这里的描

29、述忽略了许多复杂的关系。主要的一点是一个非灵活性的汇率，而不是经济中不平衡的根源，需要大量的扭曲性政策来长时间的维护。正是这些扭曲-通过多种渠道-损害经济福利并可能随着时间的推移转移经济中风险的平衡。汇率缺乏灵活性使宏观调控政策和改革复杂化资源分配不当，出口，投资带动不平衡增长国内宏观管理更困难利率政策不独立风险1. 短期通胀和经济过热2. 中期通货紧缩+新增不良贷款3. 资产价格泡沫4. 如果贸易顺差加大，将受到贸易制裁非灵活的汇率经常项目巨大盈余，更多的资本流入金融业改革更复杂建立正确的联系更好的宏观经济管理货币政策具有独立性均衡稳定的增长金融业发展和改革灵活的汇率安全的资本账户开放 一个

30、独立的利率政策是改善国内宏观经济管理、促进稳定增长和低通货膨胀的一个重要工具。随着中国经济变得更加复杂、更加以市场为导向，和过去一样通过指挥和控制的方法去管理将变的更加困难。通过贸易的增加和与世界经济加强金融联系，使它更容易受到全球影响，也将更容易受到外部冲击。货币政策通常是对宏观经济冲击的第一道防线，包括内部和外部冲击。因此，拥有独立的货币政策对于整个宏观经济的稳定性是非常重要的。 如果中央银行的任务是实现汇率目标，那么货币政策的独立性却是一种幻想。资本管制可以防止资金自由地在一个经济体进进出出，在一定程度上为货币政策（起到）隔绝（作用）。但资本管制有明显的渗漏（非官方的流入和流出中国本身就

31、充分证明了这一点），而且随着时间的推移往往变得越来越不那么有效。因此，灵活的汇率机制是建立一个独立的货币政策的先决条件。然而，开放资本帐户先于引入更具灵活性的汇率可能对将来会造成严重问题。历史上有许多国家开放资本帐户，看上去情况很好，甚至同时保持了固定汇率，当受到资本突然停止和/或逆转时，汇率就会面临大幅的贬值。 马文古德弗兰德和我都认为中国应采取一个明确的通货膨胀目标-在长期范围内的通货膨胀率和对低通货膨胀率是货币政策优先选择的明确认识-作为一种新的货币政策支柱。通货膨胀目标，再加上汇率的灵活性，将是稳定国内需求来应对内外部宏观经济冲击的良方。事实上，强化通货膨胀率稳定是货币政策实现更广泛目

32、标的最好方式，如金融的稳定和高就业增长。随着时间的推移，通货膨胀目标将为汇率的灵活性提供一个基础。因此，在我国的短期和长远利益中，汇率改革将被看作全面改革战略的一个关键组成部分。两个相关点是值得注意的。独立的利率政策需要一个灵活的汇率，而不是一次性重估或一系列地重估。一种灵活的汇率可以缓冲一些利率变化的影响，特别是在抵消由这种变化引起的资本流进流出诱惑。一次性重估可以暂时解决这个问题，但如果利率开始必然性地朝着另一个方向变动，或如果投资者对资本流入流出的情绪和压力发生转变，那么就会随之引起更多的问题。这就是为什么专注于一次性重估来弥补过去的罪孽不让我们到达某种地步，无论是政策辩论的形式还是实行

33、改革的形式都不起作用。 另一关键点是，汇率的灵活性不应该与充分的资本账户开放相混淆。一个开放的资本帐户将允许汇率自由浮动并由市场决定。即便资本帐户没有完全开放，利率仍然可以实现灵活，货币政策独立性目标仍然可以实现。事实上，如上所述，为什么使资本帐户的进一步逐渐开放更合适，而不是汇率的灵活性。资本账户的自由流动是一个有益的长期目标，但从短期来看没有一个高的优先性。外文翻译之二Financial Liberalization and Monetary Policy Cooperation in East AsiaAuthor：Hwee Kwan Chow, Peter N. Kriz, Rober

34、to S. Mariano and Augustine H. H. Tan Nationality: Singapore Sourse and Type: SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper,Series Http:/unjobs.orgJournal time: May 2007,P2-3,5-7,21It is well recognized that strong domestic financial markets can play a key role in economic growth and development. Sound

35、 financial institutions and well-functioning markets facilitate the mobilization and efficient allocation of savings, thereby improving productivity and contributing to growth (Levine 2004). This is particularly important for East Asia in view of the high saving rates of the regional countries. The

36、limited development of local financial markets and their small fragmented nature have also led to a large part of Asian savings being intermediated outside the region. Surplus savings have mostly been channeled to the US and the funds return to Asia through US direct and portfolio investment. Foster

37、ing domestic financial markets and regional financial integration is important because it not only facilitates the intermediation of Asian savings within the region, but also attracts foreign investment in instruments denominated in the domestic currency. Such alternative sources of funding would re

38、duce East Asias reliance on foreign currency borrowing and concomitantly, the risk exposure of the region to maturity and currency mismatches.However, as the countries in East Asia deregulate their financial sectors and develop their capital markets, a key issue that confronts policymakers is the gr

39、eater complexity of risks that is injected into the financial system. In particular, capital account liberalization heightens the speed and magnitude of international spillovers and may potentially increase the vulnerability of individual countries to external financial shocks. Many studies have fou

40、nd empirical evidence that financial development and in particular, financial openness can increase a countrys vulnerability to crisis (see inter alia Rajan 2005 and Kaminsky and Reinhart 2003). In fact, considerable blame for the past financial cum currency crises has been placed on improper sequen

41、cing of liberalization.Over the past quarter century, the combination of a fixed exchange rate with an open capital account, has proven lethal in small open economies, particularly in emerging markets with weak financial systems and regulatory institutions. The fault seems to point to policies that

42、opened the capital account prematurely while keeping the exchange rate rigid. Such a combination has often led to massive capital inflows that have overwhelmed nascent financial systems, prompting consumption and asset boom-bust cycles. When we further combine a fixed exchange rate and premature ope

43、ning of the capital account with a weakly structured and regulated domestic financial sector, currency crisis quickly turn into financial crisis and perhaps to full-blown economic and political crisis. Such a scenario plagued Latin America throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It took the crisis of 1997-9

44、8 to demonstrate that Asia was also not immune to these same policy inconsistencies.Sufficiently liberalized and developed domestic financial sectors are necessary to absorb and allocate capital inflows to their most efficient uses. Flexible exchange rates allow necessary international relative pric

45、e adjustments and help allow asset markets to clear (Obstfeld 2004). Without exchange rate flexibility, economic adjustments will take place in terms of the price level, output or employment, or asset market volatility (Frankel and Rose 1995). Unless domestic financial sectors are sufficiently devel

46、oped and exchange rates sufficiently flexible, capital account liberalization is premature and effectively neutralizes the stability benefits of fixed exchange rates. That this does so at a time when the domestic financial infrastructure can ill-afford massive surges and reversals in liquidity and f

47、inancing, has prompted a number of economists to remind policymakers and professional economists alike of the dangers of the open-economy trilemma.Fully-open capital accounts require both domestic financial liberalization and exchange rate flexibility. This paper advocates the optimally cascading of

48、 financial liberalization that is consistent across three dimensions: extent of domestic financial liberalization; the degree of exchange rate flexibility; and the scope of capital account liberalization.2.1 Optimal Sequencing Under optimal sequencing, liberalization occurs sequentially. Let Ai A1 ,

49、 An represent the ith of n different stages of domestic financial sector liberalization. Let Bi B1 , Bn represent the ith of n different degrees of exchange rate flexibility. Here, one can think of B1 as a pegged bilateral exchange rate and Bn as a fully floating exchange rate. Finally, let Ci C1 ,

50、Cn represent the ith of n different stages of capital account liberalization. A strict interpretation of optimal sequencing suggests the following conceptual framework: That is to say, first, a domestic financial sector liberalization program must be developed and implemented, i.e. all n phases of A

51、 are completed. Once domestic financial sector liberalization is fully completed, only then should the degree of exchange rate flexibility be increased. Since it generally recommended that smaller degrees of flexibility should precede full floats, the exchange rate flexibility dimension of financial

52、 liberalization is complete when all n degrees of B are permitted. Finally, once the domestic financial sector is liberalized (i.e., A has gone from A1 to An) and the exchange rate is fully flexible (i.e., B has gone from B1 to Bn) then and only then, should steps be taken to liberalize the capital

53、account, C. As with domestic financial sector liberalization, capital account liberalization has its baby steps (something closer to C1) like FDI or long-term investments for infrastructural purposes, its more advanced like the full liberalization of short-term portfolio flows to its most fully libe

54、ralized and controversial phases, the allowance of short-term speculative flows, such as those from hedge funds (something closer to Cn). In practice, sequencing is subject to considerable leakage. As markets grow and domestic financial sectors develop, there will be some degree of capital flow acro

55、ss borders even with the best of capital controls. But at the same time, the costs of capital controls enable disparities in productivity and competitiveness between global and insular markets to persist. Global markets are fiercely competitive and offer the truest test of productivity. It is highly

56、 unlikely that domestic financial sectors might develop the same quality and character of global financial markets on their own. 2.2 Optimal Cascading In contrast to optimal sequencing, the conceptual framework of optimal cascading requires decisions regarding the extent of domestic financial libera

57、lization, the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the extent of capital account liberalization are taken simultaneously. Let the ith phase of a liberalization program be given by (Ai , Bi , Ci), then the design of an optimal cascading program can be represented by the following rubric: During na

58、scent stages of domestic financial development, rigid exchange rates and heavy capital controls are essential and will minimize the odds of boom-bust cycles and financial crisis. However, as the domestic financial sector matures, countries should make attempts to increase exchange rate flexibility a

59、nd allow for longer term and stable capital inflows that serve to increase productivity, technology transfer and competitiveness.In latter stages, domestic financial sector liberalization will need both increased exchange rate flexibility, to help with risk management and price stability, as well as

60、 later-stage capital account liberalization, such as capital outflows for the purpose of portfolio diversification and the establishment of foreign banking branches and non-bank financial institutions. The internationalization of financial services which opens the domestic sector to foreign financia

61、l institutions frequently results in capacity building. Importantly, the commercial presence of foreign service providers normally increases the pressure to strengthen supervisory and regulatory framework. Once such a liberalization program is fully mature, the degree of exchange rate flexibility ca

62、n be increased further. Mature domestic financial systems will be able to utilize exchange rate volatility to help adjust to shocks, smooth consumption, and help maintain price stability. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect that domestic financial liberalization can ever fully mature witho

63、ut exposure to global financial markets and capital flows, particularly in countries without a long history of private financial banking and established access to offshore banking. In addition, deeper capital account liberalization will require increased exchange rate flexibility and liberalized dom

64、estic financial markets. Chinas liberalization program represents the classic case of optimal cascading. From 1994 until late 2005, the yuan was pegged to the US Dollar at a fixed rate of 8.28RMB to US$1. Citing underdeveloped domestic financial markets and legal institutions, the Chinese central ba

65、nk argued unambiguously that its banking system was not ready to handle a flexible yuan. While the yuan remained fixed to the US dollar, China did not completely restrict capital flows. China has been the recipient of considerable FDI capital flows and other types of capital flows that have leaked in through the considerable presence of foreign branch operations and outsourcing operations. Most recently, the Chines