在环境政策中的公平效率均衡证明来自规定的选择权 外文翻译

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1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文：The Equity-Efficiency Trade-off in Environmental Policy: Evidencefrom Stated PreferencesThe design of environmental policy raises several equity issues, in particular the distribution of the benefits and costs of policy, At the same time, the pursuit of equity objectives may be i

2、n conflict with the pursuit of altogether separate policy objectives. In particular, it has often been argued that there is a trade-off in environmental policy-as there appears to be in many other areas of public policy-between equity and economic efficiency, which brings these equity issues firmly

3、to the attention of environmental economics.Where such a trade-off exists, the question arises how best to address it, but there does not seem to be a straightforward answer. One apparent solution, often relied upon in economics more generally, is to abstract from equity issues to focus on attaining

4、 allocate efficiency. But this argument rests on a number of restrictive and ultimately unrealistic assumptions about redistribution. Thus there may in general terms be a trade-off between equity and efficiency. More fundamentally, it is impossible to perfectly separate equity and efficiency conside

5、rations in welfare economics .Just as equity cannot be ignored, notions of what is equitable, “fair” or “just” appear to be intrinsically subjective, Even if they are in some way objective, it is certainly true that context matters. Across different areas of public policy, a wide variety of distribu

6、tive principles are applied, so that it is often difficult to identify the commonalities and put them to much practical use. This suggests it is then important to know something about public preferences over the equity-efficiency trade-off. Such an approach can be supported by a number of theories i

7、n moral and political philosophy. Thus, in this paper we use a simple choice experiment to elicit individual preferences over equity-efficiency trade-offs in the context of two environmental problems of different scales: (1) the mitigation of local air pollution from traffic emissions and (2) the mi

8、tigation of global climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We gain insights into public preferences over the key policy design issues-notably the equity-efficiency trade-off-and what factors determine the differences in these from one person to the next.Our central conclusion is that eq

9、uity matters to people as much as efficiency does in the design and delivery of environmental policy. As much as there exist popular preferences for cost-effective policies, preferences over the distribution of costs carry similar weight. In terms of the nature and direction of these distributive pr

10、eferences, two key themes emerge. The first is that the polluter ought to pay for the delivery of an environmental improvement. With respect to how property rights are allocated between the polluter and the pollute, the balance is clearly tipped toward the pollute, such that the polluter pays. The s

11、econd is that income-ability to pay-should also be considered in distributing the compliance costs of pollution control policy.Equity and efficiency in environment policy It is almost inevitable that policies and projects with environmental impacts will have distributional consequences, which we cou

12、ld very generally define as any relative change in a broad notion of income or wealth between two or more individuals. There are many dimensions to these distributive effects, including income, location in space and time, and ethnicity. In this paper, we are interested in the allocation of the oppor

13、tunity cost of environmental protection. In particular, we focus on the interplay between principles guiding the allocation of cost between producers of pollution and victims of pollution, and the principle of payment in proportion to ability to pay. Moreover, we are interested in the trade-off that

14、 may well exist between these distributive principles as a whole and the overall efficiency of environmental policy.The allocation of cost between producers of pollution and victims of pollution was classically constructed as a problem of liability and the initial allocation of property rights by Co

15、ase (1960). The polluter pays principle (PPP) assigns property rights to the victims of pollution. It has proven to be highly influential in the drafting of environmental legislation at the national and international levels. The diametric opposite of the PPP is the beneficiary-pays principle (BPP).

16、Under this principle, the beneficiaries of an environmental improvement should pay for it. Examples of the BPP can be found in international environmental agreements, although few examples can be found in national environmental policy, Nevertheless, the principle that people should pay in proportion

17、 to the benefits they obtain from public-service provision is accepted and established in other areas. Aside from the allocation of property rights between producers and victims of pollution, one of the foremost distributive concerns in environmental policy has been that policies could be regressive

18、, such that low-income groups pay a disproportionate share of the opportunity cost. This may in particular be true of policies that increase the cost of household energy, and in such cases burdens might also be allocated according to ability to pay. We will generally refer to this as the ability-to-

19、pay principle.In practice, there is much evidence to suggest that a balance is sought-that a trade-off is made-in the implementation of these principles. For example, Tobey and Smets (1996) argue that a barrier to implementation of the PPP in agricultural policy has been a desire to protect the inco

20、mes of family farms, who are the polluters in this case. Moreover, there is also much evidence to suggest that a trade-off is made between the overall efficiency of environmental policies and the distribution of their benefits and costs. For example, while it is widely understood that the opportunit

21、y cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions can be minimized by choosing a policy instrument that raises revenue to offset other taxes, in practice the instrument that is chosen does not tend to raise much revenue, if any. Rather, polluters are excused from paying a unit charge on all their emission

22、s, as pollution allowances are mostly allocated for free.Yet economists have tended not to concern themselves with distributive effects. A familiar argument is that distributive effects can be ignored, because redistribution is already achieved by a complete, nondistortionary system of lump-sum taxe

23、s and transfers. But this argument rests on a number of restrictive and ultimately unrealistic assumptions about redistribution. More fundamentally, it is not possible to perfectly separate equity and efficiency considerations in welfare economics. It is a basic result of the theory that an efficien

24、t allocation of resources is not unique. In order to make choices between competing allocations where it is impossible to make some individuals better off without making others worse off, it is necessary to apply potential compensation tests of the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovszky type. Not only do the resul

25、ts of such tests typically depend on the initial allocation of property rights, they can readily be shown to exemplify an implicit social welfare function and an implicit utility function, together determining the marginal social welfare of a unit of consumption to different individuals. Put another

26、 way, one interpretation of the standard practice in separating efficiency and equity is that it merely imposes one possible implicit weighting of the costs and benefits accruing to the individuals affected by the policy. One could be forgiven for being left uneasy by the current state of practice.

27、Even if not, pragmatism might suggest that, since distributive effects often have the capacity to command significant political attention, economics deserves to play a more constructive and active role in arbitrating the discussion.It remains for us, however, to make a case for using evidence of pub

28、lic preferences to inform decisions over the equity-efficiency trade-off, and for using stated-preference methods-specifically a choice experiment-to that end. Taking the more general problem first, the case for using evidence of public preferences can be made either on a positive or a normative bas

29、is. The positive approach abstracts from underlying philosophical debates to simply ask how distributive problems have been resolved in reality. At the root of this approach could be the argument that notions of what is equitable, “fair” or “just” are fundamentally subjective in nature (Mackie 1977)

30、. This is disputed by many philosophers who believe that ethical judgments have an objective character, but even those who make this claim tend to do so with the proviso that in practice each and every distributive problem has its own context, and that any underlying objective principles of allocati

31、on can be discovered only after these numerous contextual factors are stripped away (Wiggins 2006). This, at the very least, is why empirical studies of principles of justice actually applied in different policy contexts have uncovered substantial variation.The normative case does not necessarily fo

32、llow from the positive one. As Hume (1739-1740) famously cautioned, prescriptive statements about what ought to be do not necessarily follow from descriptive statements about what is. Nevertheless, a number of philosophical theories maintain that popularly held beliefs must be taken seriously, if th

33、e principles of justice that such theories develop are to be at once plausible and useful. “The people who are going to use them must be able to justify them to one another using only commonly accepted modes of reasoning”(Miller 1999). Thus some sort of reflective process is required, which exposes

34、popularly held notions of what is just in any given context to general principles of justice, and this process should ultimately seek to reconcile them. Varieties of this basic idea have been put forward by, for example, Habermas (1990), Hare (1971), Miller (1999), and Rawls (1971).We see ourselves

35、as contributing to a wider reflective process like this, where the academic contribution includes, but is certainly not restricted to, a range of methodologies to elicit public preferences. One methodology would be to look at precedent, in the form of existing policies and social arrangements, as fo

36、r instance Elster (1992) does. Economists would understand this to be a revealed-preference approach. Another is to survey in some way public opinion, which should also be familiar ground for many environmental economists, given their ever more routine use of stated-preference techniques.In this pap

37、er, we opt for a stated preference approach. While stated-preference methods are generally used to elicit overall willingness to pay, or to accept compensation, for a change in the provision of some environmental good, we propose a different purpose. We propose to use them to lean about preferences

38、over competing principles of equity, and over the trade-off between equity and efficiency. The choice experiment is particularly useful in this context, because of its natural ability to model trade-offs between attributes, based on Lancasters (1966) characteristics theory of value. Legitimate quest

39、ions can be raised of whether choice experiments are suited to the task of eliciting ethical preferences over social decisions, since they are commonly used to measure the preferences of individuals (as indeed they are in this paper), to a greater or lesser extent in a setting intended to replicate

40、consumer choice. Sen (1970, 1992) highlighted the dichotomy between ethical preferences over social decisions on the one hand and ethical preferences over personal behavior on the other, whereby, roughly speaking, self-interest and agent relative ethical positions may be permissible in the latter ca

41、se, but more difficult to justify in the former. This is related to concerns that individual preferences expressed as. In order to account for these concerns, we design a particularly simple choice experiment that emphasizes the principles of justice underpinning various policies on offer. Such an e

42、ssentially individual choice setting, nevertheless placed within wider and ongoing popular debate, has important analogues in real life (e.g., voting at the ballot box in elections). Future research could take further account of these issues by administering a similar choice experiment in a group se

43、tting.Little comparable research has been conducted in the environmental literature to date, although there are precedents to note. Atkinson, Machado, and Mourato (2000) used contingent ranking to model trade-offs between competing principles to share the compliance costs of an environmental improve

44、ment policy. However they did not explore the equity-efficiency tradeoff. Similarly Saelen et al. (2008) use a choice experiment to estimate the curvature of a standard iso-elastic utility function for preferences over risk, inequality, and time, all in the specific context of climate-change policy

45、(also see Cameron and Gerdes 2007). This could have broad significance for a class of models in welfare economics but is specific to climate change and in other respects addresses a narrower set of questions than those we pose here. Finally, we should note Spashs use of contingent valuation, combine

46、d with psychometric questions, to analyze how philosophical beliefs determine willingness to pay for environmental goods.Source: Simon Dietz, Giles Atkinson, 2010. “The Equity-Efficiency Trade-off in Environmental Policy: Evidence from Stated Preferences”. Land Economics, Vol. 86, no. 3, August, pp.

47、423-443.译文：在环境政策中的公平效率均衡：证明来自规定的选择权环境政策的构思引起若干的公平问题，特别是利益和成本分配上的政策。同时，完全独立的政策目标可能引起追求公平目标的冲突。尤其是，均衡的环境政策能否适用于许多其他领域的兼顾公平与经济效率的政策是经常被争论的，由此使这些公平问题引起环境经济学的强烈关注。那些权衡问题是存在的，问题是要去解决它，但是看起来没有一个明确的答案。一个表面上的解决方法是常常根据经济学，更普遍的解决方法是，把公平问题集中于实现分配效率的抽象化上。但是这个论证存在一些限制，最后关于重新分配是一个不切实际的假设。因此，可能存在着一个关系使这个权衡兼顾公平和效率。更

48、重要是在环境经济学中不可能完美的去兼顾公平和效率。正如公平是不容忽视的，“公平”或“合理”能否从本质上主观的去理解，即使他们是一些客观的方法，也肯定能解决这些环境问题。各种不同的分配原则是根据是不同领域的政策来应用的，所以往往很难识别它们的共同点，也很难把它们运用到实际上来。有一个很重要的建议是了解一些关于公平效率权衡的政策选择权。这种做法理论上能够带来大量的道德和政治哲学上的支持。因此，在本文中我们使用一个简单的选择试验去验证个人喜好在上下文中两个环境问题中的公平效率权衡的不同尺度：（1）减轻当地交通排放量的空气污染，（2） 通过减少温室气体排放量缓和全球气候变化。我们在关键的政策设计问题上

49、加深了政策选择权的理解-值得注意的是公平效率权衡-与什么因素决定了个人之间理解的差异。我们的主要结论是在环境政策的设计和交付中公平问题和效率对人们一样重要。就像存在具有成本效益的政策的普遍选择权，费用分配的选择权有着相似的重要性。从这些性质与喜好的分布走向中看出，存在着两个关键问题。首先是污染者应当支付对环境改善的费用。关于污染与污染者之间如何分配产权，公正的对污染费用进行平衡，就像谁污染谁治理。其次是收入支付能力也应考虑遵从成本分配污染控制政策。环境政策中的公平与效益政策和项目对环境费用分配的影响几乎是可避免的，通常，我们可以解释为两个或更多个人之间的收入或财富相对变化。有许多因素影响这些分

50、配，包括收入，空间和时间的位置和种族划分。在这篇论文中，我们深入研究的是环境保护的机会成本的分配。特别是，我们重点关注生产者和受害者对污染的影响以及支付能力和成本分配原则之间的相互作用。此外，我们对这些分配的原则和整体与环境政策之间的整体效率平衡进行了深入研究。科斯 (1960)对污染的生产者及污染受害者之间的责任分配问题以及产权的初始成本进行了分配。污染者自付的原则 (PPP) 分配给污染受害者的财产权利。这已经被证明在国家和国际层面上对于环境立法及起草相关法律是十分重要的。PPP 的直接反面是受益人自付 (BPP)。根据这一原则环境改善的受益人应该支付相关的费用。可以在国际环境协定中找到关

51、于BPP 的例子，虽然可以在国家环境政策中找到这几个例子，不过，原则上人们就应所接受的利益和建立提供公共服务等方面的比例进行分配。除了对污染的生产者和受害者之间的产权分配，在环境政策中首先关注的是其中一个分配政策可能是退化的，这样低收入群体支付的机会成本不成比例。这可能特别适用于增加农村家庭能源费用政策,在这种情况下的责任的分配也可能根据支付能力去付出代价。我们通常将其称为按能力支付原则。实际上，有很多证据表明平衡是一种寻找权衡分配的原则。例如托比和施密特（1996）认为，在农业政策中实现PPP 的障碍是那些想要保护家庭收入的农场。此外，也有很多证据表明，有一个权衡在环境政策的整体效率与收益和

52、费用的分配之间。例如，普遍的认为减少温室气体排放在一定程度上可以减少因政策的改变而引起的税收增加，从而降低机会成本。在实践中不倾向于选择增加很多的税收，即便有。相反,污染环境的单位可以免除费用支付所有他们的排放,污染津贴大多是分配免费。但经济学家往往不关心分配的影响。一个常见的论点是分配的影响可以忽略，因为重新分配已经取得的整笔款项税和转让的完整。但此论点取决于很多限制，因此停留在若干假设上，最终重新分配是不切实际的。更重要是不可能完全独立的公平和效率考虑到福利经济学。这是一个基本的理论分析的结果，一种有效的资源配置并非是独一无二的。为了选择之间很可能使一些人不做其他更好的竞争分配，有必要应用

53、卡尔希克斯类型的潜在赔偿测试。不仅仅是这些试验结果时典型的取决于初始分配产权，他们可以轻易地显示一个潜在的例子来阐述社会福利函数和一个隐式具有实用功能之外，在一起确定不同个体单位边际社会福利消费。换句话说，一种解释是分配效率与公平的标准惯例是它受到政策影响征收的个人成本和收益的费用增加了。这是能够被理解的。即使不理解，实用主义可以建议，因为分配的效果常常有能力命令关注重大的政治经济学，讨论扮演一个更有建设性的和积极的角色。这是留给我们使用提出充分的理由通知公众的偏好的证据的决定交易公平与效率，使用选择权的方法-特别是一个选择实验-为此目的。基本采取一般性的主张，可能在积极或规范的基础上使用的公

54、共选择权。从基础的哲学辩论，只是问如何分配问题主要是在现实中如何得到解决。这种方法的根源可能是论点、概念的合理，“公平”或“公正”从根本上是主观的性质（麦凯，1977）。这许多人相信道德判断有一个客观的特征，但即使是那些制造这种说法的也不会这样做,实际上每个分配的问题都有特定的环境,任何潜在的目标性原则分配后才会发现这些众多的因素都所剩无几（威金，2006）。最起码,就是为什么实证研究主义原则的实际应用于不同的政策环境揭露了高度变异的原因。不一定需要遵循标准的规范。休姆 （1739-1740)提出了规定的陈述应该是什么并不一定需要遵照描述性的陈述的著名观点。然而，许多哲学理论认为,普及的理论必

55、须予以严肃对待，如果正确的原则,这样的理论发展是有用的。“那些打算用他们必须能够证明它们彼此公认的模式只利用推理”（米勒，1999）。因此某种反映过程中所暴露出需要举行一般是在概念的任何特定情况下一般原则的公正，而且这一过程从根本上应该寻求能够使他们和解。关于这种方法提出了基本理念，例如，哈贝马斯（1990）、哈瑞(1971)、米勒(1999)和罗尔斯（1971）提出。我们把自己看作是有助于扩大这种方法的范围，凡学术贡献包括其他的文献，肯定不限制为一系列的方法体系，以便于公众的选择权。一种方法就是看看在现有政策和社会的安排的实例不会埃尔斯(1992)的形式的先例。经济学家们会明白这是一种显示首

56、选项的方法。另一种是在一些方式公众舆论，也应该熟悉当地许多的环境经济学家的调查给予他们以往任何时候都更多日常使用表示首选项技术。在这份文件中，我们选择的一种表示选择权的方法。虽然说选择权的方法通常用来征求总愿意支付，或接受赔偿提供一些环境的良好的变化，我们建议不同的目的。我们建议使用它们来精益首选项有关的平等，竞争原则和公平和效率之间的平衡。选择实验是值的在这种情况下特别有用，因为模型基于兰开斯特的 (1966) 特征理论的属性之间权衡其自然的能力。合理的问题可以提出的选择试验是否适合于该任务的对社会的决定争取伦理的首选项，因为它们通常用于衡量个人选择权（假如他们确实符合条件），以设置中的或多

57、或少打算复制消费者的选择。强调道德首选项对社会决定一方面与道德首选项对个人行为，另规定，大体说来，自身利益和代理的相对道德位置可能会允许在后者的情况下，但更难证明前二分法。这被有关表示为一个使用者的个人喜好可能是一份不适当的指南，公共政策选择的问题。为了解决这些问题，我们设计一项特别是简单选择实验强调公正的基础上提供的各项政策的原则。然而放在更广泛的和正在进行的大众辩论的实质上是个人的选择通过设置，这样一个在现实生活中有重要的类似物 (例如在选举中投票)。未来的研究可以通过管理组设置一个类似选择实验采取进一步考虑这些问题。虽然有先例可援，但到目前为止，环境文献中只进行小小的有相似例子的比较研究

58、。阿特金森、马查多和莫瑞塔（2000）使用模型权衡之间共享的一项改善环境政策的法规遵从性成本的竞争原则。但是他们并不探讨公平效率进行权衡。相似于塞勒等人（2008）用于选择实验标准 iso 弹性实用程序函数的选择权的曲率估计风险和不平等，同时在特定的环境政策中的改变（金马伦和杰迪，2007）。对这一类环境经济学的模型具体到气候变化和在其他方面的一个更狭窄变化，可能有广泛的意义。最后，我们应该注意到史派萨的偶然性估价，结合心理因素,去分析理论上按个人意愿支付确定环境的费用。出处: 西蒙.迪亚兹,贾尔斯.阿特金森，在环境政策中的公平效率均衡：证明来自规定的选择权，土地经济学，第86卷（3），2010（8）：423-443.