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1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译题 目 大学生创业融资渠道研究 专 业 财 务 管 理 一、外文原文原文：Entrepreneurial Financing The financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacer

2、bating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup fi

3、nancing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for

4、 use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem.This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same

5、 level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred eq

6、uity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to which Barry

7、 refers. By directly revealing the projects quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaledthe traditional solution to the adverse selection problemcostly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more info

8、rmation to convey. In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive i

9、n entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet, for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to p

10、ool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneursand thus to serve as a credible signaltend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance

11、of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority

12、of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-li

13、ke) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to scre

14、en out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation

15、, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venture capital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical lite

16、rature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project ri

17、sk or exit strategy.In part, the literatures reliance on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presen

18、ce of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems

19、 from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of pub

20、licly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and

21、 Lukin study a similar environment but split the firms claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public tra

22、ding. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial fina

23、nce markets since the assumption that drives their resultslosses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelastic demandhas no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1

24、with probability , where G, B is an indicator of project quality, and 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = 1 + (1 ). It is assumed that K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that i

25、s, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is va

26、lid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.

27、 The net present value of projects, V V K, is assumed to satisfyEVG V K 0 EVB V K. (1)Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfy(EG V K) + (1 )(EB

28、V K) 0, (2)where is the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investo

29、r may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As

30、 mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that can evaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equ

31、ilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor

32、of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good ent

33、repreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s G, B with Prs = G | entrepreneu

34、r is bad = Prs = B | entrepreneur is good = (3)The unconditional probability of a good signal is (1 ) + (1 ), so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(1 ) + (1 ) entrepreneurs before a good one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital cont

35、ribution K and expected evaluation costs = C/(1 ) + (1 ) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing inst

36、ead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought

37、of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts considered arbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence

38、, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance m

39、arkets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC ma

40、rket.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signa

41、ling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that th

42、e pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularl

43、y small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motiv

44、ate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the models conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the s

45、hape of the security exists independently of the contracts origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raising money from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general par

46、tners information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。更糟糕的是，通常情况下，创业者拥有丰富的科技知识，但是缺乏信用积累，也没有渠道传递自己的信用。 巴里认为风险资本正好填补了创业资本的空缺： 在小规模阶段，风险资本进入资本市场是受

47、限的。想必并不是所有创业者都能依靠自有资金创业，或是依靠银行或者天使投资人填补空缺。风险资本家为他们提供了一项为在风险情境中使用而特意设计的资金。风险资本家们通过预先的严格评估以及此过程收集的信息可以大大降低逆向选择成本。 按照巴里的说法，这些问题可以通过昂贵的尽职调查反映出来。通过直接揭示项目质量，减少创业者和风险资本家之间的信息不对称。另一方面，如果质量是可以发出信喜的，那么昂贵的尽职调查就是不必要的。换而言之，尽职调查和发出信息都可以解决逆向选择问题，这两种方法是相互替代的，所以重点是谁更具有性价比。 这种看法存在几个问题。为什么假设银行不能（或者不选择）作为一个风险投资者进行严格评估？

48、为风险情境“设计”风险资本是什么意思？当人们注意到直接负债被作为逆向选择问题的解决法案而实际上风险投资家们却经常持有可转换优先股，人们会倍感疑惑。事实上，从预期收益与权益部分不成正比或者完全颠倒的意义上看，合约有强大的约束力。 像巴里指出的，这些问题可以通过高昂的严格的评估以反映解决。通过直接揭示项目的质量，可以减少企业家与投资家的信息不对称。相比之下，如果质量是能够被我们了解，那么昂贵的尽职调查是不必要的，因为我们不必了解其他。换而言之，无论是昂贵的尽职调查还是讯息都可以解决逆向选择问题。这两种机制是可以相互替代的；这样问题就变成了哪个性价比更高。 论文的第一贡献是证明在企业金融市场上消息是

49、昂贵的，尽职调查也是如此。然而，对于新创公司，如果筹集不到资金，那么公司可能几乎没有价值。不良企业家试图在任何成本下联营。正如分析表明，证券的吸引力不足会使不良企业家转而离开，事实上，证券对于优秀的企业家也是如此没有吸引力。昂贵的尽职调查便作为首选解决方案出现。 根据以往得知的风险资本市场上的尽职调查成本的重要性，弗瑞德和汉斯里奇把创业资本融资过程描述为六个逐步严格的阶段。在第一轮资金启动前，这种尽职调查平均需要花费97天的时间方能完成。大多数的资本方案无法成功通过第一阶段审查，更别说后续审查了。完整的融资过程被描述成“比银行贷款参与性更高”。 本文的第二个贡献是在昂贵的尽职调查与高级(或股权

50、等)金融合同建立起联系。这种联系背后是简单的洞察力。根据定义，低级合同是安全的。也就是说，各公司的预期收益间差别不大。高级合同放大了投资的优劣项目间在收益方面的差别，从而放大了筛选不良项目的激励。实际上，高效的合同使得风险资本家能够承担选择不良企业家的费用。因此，高效的合同鼓励尽职调查。总之，这个模型研究的有三点：（1）昂贵评价带来的预期好处；（2）这种昂贵评价作为解决传统逆向选择问题的方案；（3）传统解决方案是由与风险资本市场对应的参数模型所主导的。继萨尔曼开创性的工作之后，一种关于创业资本家合同设计的理论文献出现了。这些论文的一个共同点是，他们使得可转换债券最优的观点合理化。这个模型的第二

51、个共同点是代理成本的引入。例如，风险资本家和企业家对待项目风险以及退出战略有不同的偏好。某种程度上，这篇文章对代理成本的依赖归功于对他们的相关经验充分信任。这大概也关系到上述共识：由于债务被认为是对逆向选择的最佳应对，非债务证券必然意味着另一种市场摩擦的存在。另一方面，我们可以很清晰的知道权益资本如何导致权益类证券。通过给予双方大致对称的回报，关于未来行动的利益冲突会被减轻。当然，从目前的模型无意透漏的代理问题表明他们并不是重要的经验。相反，教训是，代理成本不是权益类证券的必要条件。也许令人惊讶的是，与本文关系最密切的理论成果载于公开交易证券的分析。假设流动性是外源的，价格有竞争的市场决策者决

52、定，布特和萨克雷的研究表明：将证券分类成信息敏感类证券和安全类证券能够增加或者减少经营者发布信息的激励机制。弗朗哥和卢金研究了一种类似的环境，但是将公司权利分类成外售部分和保留部分，再次分析证券设计和信息采集的相互作用。两个重要的区别决定了我的结果，除了这些公开交易的模型。首先，这些模型排除信号，所以它不可能审查传统的逆向选择解决方案是否是主要的，如果是这样，那要看在什么样的环境下。其次，目前还不清楚这些公开出售模型如何扩展到创业资本市场，原因是驱动其结果的假设，即完全无弹性的需求流动性交易者的损失，无法与创业资本环境相适应。资本投资是创业者不可缺少的一部分。投资项目的价值在1和之间，G, B

53、，代表项目质量，否则1.投资项目预期收益值V= i1 + (1 )，当 K时。否则，此模型也承认无风险债务，这将消除不利选择问题。创业者必须保证当前资产的价值V，加上剩余索取权之后，若能够达到预期价值，那么合同就是可以接受的。在一个成熟企业的融资模型里，V被定义为当前资产的价值，因为这是在没有新的投资情况下公司的价值。从创业环境看，这种解释是合理的，而且，由于没有融资吸引力，创业者只能依靠现有资本。区别只是融资数量。与成熟企业相比，对于初创企业，当前资产的价值是很小的，相对于其他参数（比如K 和）来说。项目的净现值，假定满足EVG V K 0 EVB V K （1）方程(1)用来衡量一个项目的

54、价值。当且仅当该项目是优良的时候，项目的净现值才是正的。最后，假定净现值满足(EG V K) + (1 )(EB V K) 0 (2)其中是经济体系中优秀项目的比重，由于净现值平均值为正，所以该模型承认混同均衡。资金的一种来源是那些依据观察进行信用评价的，对企业不甚了解的投资者。这种投资者可能会被认为是竞争激烈的商业信贷市场的代理人。根据这一解释，很明显，这个投资者需要平衡债务。简单的说，当一个人不了解情况时，他就会用传统的方法解决逆向选择问题。正如在引言提到的，这种方法就是负债。资本的另一个来源是拥有评估项目质量好坏的能力的投资者。这种投资者被成为风险投资家。这种看法还认为，风险资本家一般选

55、择高质量的合同。同样的，风险资金家通常选择采用技术进行筛选，而以前这种做法并不明显。特别是，如果融资合同是非常大度的（留给风险投资家大量股份），那么放弃对投资项目进行评估将是有利可图的。这样的结果对于不良企业家是有利的，因为他们太想吸引到资金证明他们能够得到好公司的垂青，从而获得融资。通过限制联营，昂贵的尽职调查可以使得不良企业家转变成好的企业家，在此过程中，好的项目会得到真正的投资。创业者寻求的融资形式是不分优劣的，而风险资本家有一个评价等级。对于每一个创业者，付出的成本C和风险资本家收到的讯息S G, B满足Prs = G | 不良创业者 = Prs = B | 优秀企业者 = (3)一个

56、好的信号的概率为(1 ) + (1 )，所以风险资本家一般用1/(1 ) + (1 )来评价创业者。融资合同要有足够的优惠，以弥补风险投资家的资本贡献K和预期评估成本，优惠= C/(1 ) + (1 )。这个模型承认贝叶斯纳什均衡的三种类型。在分离均衡中，良好的创业者提供一个安全环境而不良企业家都不喜欢这样效仿。由于只有好的公司会积极参与，所以逆向选择被采用的情况越来越少。风险资本均衡作为后备方案。在这种情况下，企业家的合约吸引着投资者去评价公司的价值。最后，联营可以被看作是良好的创业者认为上述两种解决逆向选择问题的方案太过昂贵的的无奈之举。在本文中，我并没有重视债务和证券资本。此前草案考虑了

57、所有的证券，产生了这种直觉：高效率的证券促进尽职调查，而低效的证券对信号有更强的影响。证券等级的严格限制简化了证券的认知，保留了关键的直觉，并使我的研究成果与现代文献相比较。本文认为，在创业资本市场上，项目质量比信息质量的更具成本效益比。这个主题牵扯到一个实证文献，即在这个市场上，实证调查是非常广泛的。事实上，尽职调查是风险资本市场的显著特征。该模型的几个特征是非常明显的，让人觉得这种机制是解决逆向选择问题最佳替代方法。在一个更丰满的模型中，这两个机制可以作为互相补充的部分来运作。一般来说，一个角色都存在着创业信息和风险资本家的尽职调查。该文件的草拟方案显示互补性可以由多种方式触发。比如，假设

58、企业家有很多混乱的私人信息。最安全的方式可能还是收集信息，从而通过所获得的信息筛选创业者。但只要存在不确定性，即使是自我选择之后，昂贵的尽职调查仍是有利的。信息的获得发生在风险资本市场。该模型能够揭示首次公开发行单位的用途，这些公开发行单位通常以股票和认股权证的形式用于小而有风险的产品。认股权证的加入从逆向选择角度看令人费解，因为现有文献认为证券主要强调不良环境的回报。本文的逻辑表明，这些认股权证强调极致的好的环境，激励投资者在进行项目评估时，当其他逆向选择解决方法过于昂贵时，选择使用认股权证。最后，该模型的结论不依赖于良好企业家选择合同这个假设。信息采集的激励和安全之间的关系独立于合同本身而存在。人们可以在一个风险投资基金里寻找一个普通合伙人筹集资本，宣布基金持有何种证券。越是权益类证券，普通合伙人获得的信息、获取的激励越强。出处:克里斯容.企业融资和昂贵的尽职调查.金融评论，2009（44）：P137-149.