2005中国食品零售业年度报告英文版

《2005中国食品零售业年度报告英文版》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《2005中国食品零售业年度报告英文版（27页珍藏版）》请在装配图网上搜索。

1、Required Report - public distributionDate: 1/5/2005CH4838China, Peoples Republic ofRetail Food SectorMainland China Food Retail Annual Report2005Report Highlights:Chinas food retail sector continues to grow and develop as hypermarket and convenience store chains expand across the country. Foreign-in

2、vested hypermarkets are likely to continue growing as restrictions on their activity and ownership are scheduled to be loosened in 2005.Table of ContentsI. Market Summary3I.A. Overview of the Retail Food Market in China3I.B Major Food Retail Chains in China6I.C. Advantages and Challenges for U.S. Ex

3、porters in China7I.D. Regional Market Profiles8II. Road Map for Market Entry18II.A Hypermarkets, Supermarkets and Warehouse Outlets23II.B Convenience Stores23II.C Traditional Markets, Wet Markets and “Mom and Pop” (Xiaomaibu) Stores24III. Competition25IV. Best Product Prospects26IV.A Products Presen

4、t in the Market Which Have Good Sales Potential26IV.B Products Not Present in Signficant Quantities, Which Have Good Sales Potential27V. Post Contact and Additional Resources27I. Market Summary I.A. Overview of the Retail Food Market in ChinaThe transformation of Chinas retail sector is continuing,

5、and all three of the leading cities, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing, are now home to multiple hypermarkets and convenience store chains. Supermarkets continue to be the most common retail format, but hypermarkets are gaining in popularity, and are now present in most medium and large sized cities.

6、Having reached saturation levels in Shanghai and Guangzhou, convenience store chains have turned their attention to other cities. Although progress has been slow, Beijing has finally become home to several convenience store chains. Meanwhile, many chains have found fertile ground in the booming citi

7、es that dot the landscape around Shanghai and Guangzhou. Growth in the cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou may slow somewhat, as both markets are close to saturation levels, particularly with hypermarkets. Beijing shows more potential for near-term growth, but the fastest development is likely to take

8、place in two areas: satellite cities near Shanghai and Guangzhou, and the large second and third-tier cities further inland. Most foreign-invested retailers already present in China have opened stores in these areas and have ambitious plans for further expansion.0500010000150002000025000300003500040

9、000Wholesale &RetailCateringOther*Figure 1: Retail Sales of ConsumerGoods, by Sector, 1990-2003Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 17-3*Beginning in 2002, direct sales of commodities by farmers were excluded from this figure.In the leading three cities, the emphasis appears to be shiftin

10、g toward differentiation, with chains pursuing different strategies to distinguish themselves from the competition. Some with longstanding reputations hope to cash in by offering more house-brand products, while others offer extended store hours or more ready-to-eat products. In all cases, competiti

11、on is driving down margins and forcing stores to supplement their revenue from other sources. One of the most widely favored sources of income are ever-higher listing fees charged to suppliers of new products. These are becoming an obstacle to innovation, as suppliers are unwilling to take the chanc

12、e that a new product will not be able to recover the substantial layout for the listing fee. In the post-SARS environment consumers have become more sensitive than ever to food-safety concerns. This has been reinforced by a continuous drumbeat of food adulteration and food poisoning scandals that re

13、ceive wide coverage in local papers. This heightened awareness has helped to drive consumers to the major chain stores, which are generally seen as less likely to carry counterfeit or unsafe products. On the other hand, at least one major foreign-invested chain in Shanghai was itself caught producin

14、g food under unsafe conditions. If repeated, such incidents could undermine the reputation of the entire chain.The Chinese government has expressed concern over the rapid expansion of foreign-invested chains, and is making efforts to ensure that domestic chains are able to compete. These efforts hav

15、e taken a number of different forms. Late in 2003, the government hinted that it would pursue violations of the complex licensing rules more aggressively. Carrefour was the most prominent victim, having its expansion plans suspended until issues related to the share of foreign ownership were resolve

16、d. The central government also warned local and provincial governments that approvals for foreign-invested retail projects would be contingent on tighter licensing procedures. At the same time, the government is attempting to make Chinese chains more competitive by encouraging mergers. The largest o

17、f these was the merger of Chinas two largest retail chains, Lianhua and Hualian, both state-owned enterprises. Supermarket chains remain the largest retail format. This sector is dominated by Shanghai-based Chinese chains with Lianhua and Hualian the largest players, followed by Nonggongshang and re

18、gional chain Suguo (Jiangsu province). The merger between Lianhua, Hualian and two other companies, has created a massive entity called Bailian. This has had relatively little impact on the retail scene as of yet, as both chains appear to be operating as separate entities. The merger appears to stil

19、l be in the process of rationalizing the diverse holdings of the four companies: the latest action involves the separation and merger of department store and shopping center assets into a single company called Shanghai Brilliance. Much more significant, Lianhua is ramping up its acquisitions of smal

20、ler local chains. In late 2004 the company paid $9.3 million to acquire Wanlifu Supermarket Co. in Hebei province, and another $18.1 million to acquire a shopping center in Hangzhou, (Zhejiang province). The firm announced that it will increase its budget for acquisitions from $73 million to over $1

21、00 million in 2005. Lianhua officials have noted that foreign acquisitions in the hypermarket field have inflated prices throughout Chinas food retail sector. A number of strong regional chains have also emerged, including Suguo in Jiangsu, Jinkelong and Wu Mart in Beijing and Hongqi (convenience st

22、ores) in Chengdu. Although Lianhua and Hualian remain the only truly nationwide supermarket chains, Shanghais Nonggongshang has expanded through much of the Yangtze River basin and into Beijing. Surveys indicate that Chinese supermarkets place their emphasis on dry, and frozen goods, with less than

23、one-third of floor space dedicated to fresh products, including fruit, vegetables, eggs and meat. 00.20.40.60.81GrainPorkBeefPoultryFishFreshVeg.LiquorFruitWineFreshFruitMilkYogurtLowest 10%AverageHighest 10%Figure 2. Relative Consumption of Selected Food ProductsBy Income Group, 2003 (volume basis)

24、% Relative ConsumptionThese statistics imply that as incomes rise, consumption of manyhigh-value products, particularly dairy and wine, is likely to increaseUrban IncomeGroupNote that percentages are calculated on a volume, not value basis. The supermarket format has lost ground to hypermarkets and

25、convenience stores in recent years. This trend is likely to continue for the near term, but may be limited by a combination of factors. The first is the very limited product variety and high prices in convenience stores. Convenience stores act less as major food outlets than as service centers offer

26、ing bill paying and other services, as well as impulse purchases. Few convenience stores offer much beyond snack foods and some boxed lunches. The second factor is the high population density of Chinese cities, combined with the small size of most supermarkets. This allows for a very large number of

27、 locations: in cities like Shanghai, most homes have a supermarket within walking distance. Hypermarkets, by contrast, are typically located in less densely populated suburbs. Although private car ownership is rising, the vast majority of Chinese households must rely on public transport to reach the

28、se hypermarkets, making daily excursions inconvenient, while the relatively small size of Chinese refrigerators (and apartments in general) makes monthly mass-buying trips less practical. The current supermarket format may, however, get a run for its money from discount stores specializing in shelf-

29、stable products at deep discounts. Carrefour recently introduced its Dia brand discount stores in Shanghai and has extremely ambitious plans (up to 3,000 stores by 2007) for this chain. The store size is similar to a small Chinese supermarket, although the product selection is much more limited.Hype

30、rmarkets have seen the most activity in the past year. This sector has by far the largest foreign presence, and interest is growing as the promised date of December15, 2004 approaches. This is the date when China has agreed to remove restrictions on foreign investment in retailing. Current regulatio

31、ns require foreign retail chains to establish joint ventures with Chinese companies. This has created a complex web in which foreign chains often have joint ventures with Chinese competitors. Although there may be considerable delay as various administrative and regulatory details are ironed out, th

32、is date is still viewed by many as a watershed. Wal-Mart appears to have been waiting on this date before establishing stores in Shanghai. Having constructed a distribution center in the city sometime earlier, it recently announced that its first store in Shanghai will open in summer, 2005, followed

33、 by two others. Japanese retailer Ito Yokado, already owner of five joint-venture stores in China, has announced plans to establish wholly-owned stores as well. Changes in the ownership regulations raise important questions about the status of existing joint ventures. Regulations limiting foreign Mu

34、ch will depend on precisely how the liberalization takes place. Some chains are expected to buy out their joint venture partners if possible, since these are often competitors. Some chains, however, seem content to continue with the joint venture arrangement. Germanys Metro, for example, has been qu

35、oted as saying that it has no plans to buy out partner Jinjiang Group. (This may be because Metros partner, Jinjiang Hotel Group, is not seen as a competitor. In fact, Jinjiangs strength in the hotel business works well with Metros strategy of acting as a supplier for restaurants and hotels). Likewi

36、se, although it has announced its intention to establish wholly-owned stores, Ito Yokado does not appear to have plans to buy out the partners in its existing JV stores.Convenience Stores remain one of the most dynamic categories for food retail, though development in Shanghai and Guangzhou appears

37、to have slowed from the frenetic pace of previous years. The sector is dominated by domestic chains, though the imminent appearance of 7-11 in Beijing will finally give it a toehold outside of South China, and Japans Family Mart recent established itself in Shanghai. (Interestingly, Ito Yokada is an

38、 investor in both 7-11 Beijing and Family Mart in Shanghai).Many chains are seeking to expand into new markets where competition is less fierce. Development in second and third tier cities appears to be taking on two paths: expansion by chains that are already established in the key markets, and dev

39、elopment by a strong local chain. In the areas surrounding Shanghai and Guangzhou, the first pattern appears to dominate, as local giants Quik and Kedi (in Shanghai) and 7-11 (in Guangzhou) expand to nearby cities such as Suzhou, Wuxi and Shenzhen. Beijing is also following the first pattern, as Qui

40、k and 7-11 are moving into that large and still underdeveloped market. The second pattern seems to dominate further inland. In Nanjing local chain Suguo is the major player, while convenience in Chengdu is overwhelmingly dominated by local chain Hongqi (Red Flag).The other means being pursued to mai

41、ntain profits while expanding is niche marketing. Last year Quik announced an agreement with a subsidiary of Sinopec Petroleum to provide convenience stores in gas stations, and Kedi is pursuing similar deals. The gas-station store trend is most advanced in Guangzhou, where British Petroleum is alre

42、ady one of the largest convenience store chains. Other stores are seeking very specific market niches, including high-end malls and combining operations with other types of retailers. Convenience continues to be dominated by domestic chains, although the imminent appearance of 7-11 in Beijing will g

43、ive it its first presence outside of southern China. The largest chains are directly or indirectly connected to either major supermarket/hypermarket chains (such as Lianhua, Hualian and Nonggongshang) or food processing companies.Traditional markets continue to be a presence throughout China, althou

44、gh many of the wet markets in big cities are being closed or consolidated. Local authorities in most cities view wet markets as unsanitary, not to mention that tax revenues from these markets are small relative to those from supermarkets. The SARS outbreak provided a pretense for intensifying closur

45、es and consolidations in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. For those markets that remain, regulation is much tighter than before. Despite this, wet markets persist. The main reason is the lack of quality fresh meat and vegetables at local supermarkets and the inconvenience of traveling to h

46、ypermarkets for fresh products. In fact, street vendors selling fresh vegetables outside of supermarkets are a common sight, and appear even to be encouraged by the supermarkets as a way of generating foot traffic. The other major traditional formats include small variety stores (xiaomaibus) and fru

47、it stands. The typical xiaomaibu is much smaller than a convenience store, privately owned, and stocks an eclectic mix of products. Although facing a serious challenge from convenience stores, the xiaomaibus remain a significant presence in Chinese cities, and appear likely to continue for some time

48、. The convenience chains have focused their attention on high-traffic sites near schools, bus and subway stations and hospitals, leaving ample territory for the xiaomaibus, which often serve a single apartment complex. Small scale and private ownership also allow the xiaomaibus to tailor their produ

49、ct selection to match the specific needs of individual customers. Like convenience stores, most xiaomaibus offer a range of other services, such as bill payment and IP card sales. Fruit stands fill another gap left by convenience stores, most of which carry few if any fresh products. They are furthe

50、r supported by the Chinese tradition of giving a gift, often of fruit, when visiting friends. While imported products are virtually nonexistent in xiaomaibus, fruit stands stock a surprising number of imported and counterfeit-imported products.I.B Major Food Retail Chains in ChinaRevenue, Lies and S

51、tatisticsAll statistics on Chinas food retail industry have serious shortcomings, a result more of the tangled web of ownership than any shortcoming in reporting. A particular problem is reporting income for foreign invested joint-venture stores. Sometimes the income is listed under the Chinese JV p

52、artner, sometimes separately. In cases where Chinese JV partners report income from the JV, it is often unclear what proportion of the JV income is being included. In addition, many companies have other lines of business, such as logistics or hotels, which are not separated when income is reported.

53、On the other side, it can be difficult putting together the total income of a foreign chain operating in China, because many form JVs with different partners in different regions. Compounding this are similar complexities in patterns of domestic ownership. For example, the Kedi chain of convenience

54、sotres is owned indirectly by Nonggongshang through its ownership of Bright Dairy, but is listed separately in most statistics. Nonggongshang, however, also owns the Alldays convenience store chain. While Alldays is not listed separately in any statistics, it is not entirely clear whether it is incl

55、uded in the total numbers for Nonggongshang. Likewise, Lianhuas Quik convenience store chain, the largest in China, is not listed separately, but is clearly not included in the number of stores reported by Lianhua in 2002. Lianhuas store number more than doubles in 2003, however, indicating that the

56、 convenience stores are likely now being included. Whether Quiks revenues were also excluded from Lianhuas in 2002 is unclear, though it seems unlikely as the change from year to year was quite small. Lianhua also happens to be the JV partner for Carrefour in the Shanghai area. How much of the incom

57、e from the Carrefour JV is being reported in Lianhuas revenue figures is unclear.Keeping these shortcomings in mind, the following table provides some sense of the size of the food retail sector and the key players.Table 1. Top Ten Retailers in China20032002CompanyStore No.Revenue (Billion RMB)Compa

58、nyStore No.Revenue (Billion RMB)1Lianhua257924,031.20Hualian Group192121,473.002Hualian138818,033.00Lianhua120018,330.023Beijing Hualian6213,600.00Beijing Hualian5310,300.004Carrefour4113,436.82Carrefour3510,693.455NGS121312,381.40NGS7028,730.006Hualun Wanjia46710,323.59Hualun Wanjia4568,591.077Sugu

59、o11629,580.00Suguo9317,054.008Beijing Wumei5188,504.51Beijing Wumei3575,067.259Wal-Mart335,853.29Wal-Mart254,739.5810Metro185,620.64Metro165,310.29Source: China Chain Store & Franchise Association, 2003I.C. Advantages and Challenges for U.S. Exporters in ChinaTable 2. Strengths and Challenges for U.

60、S. Products In the Retail Food MarketAdvantagesChallengesChinese consumers generally regard U.S. products as being of high quality.U.S. products are routinely counterfeited.Chinese consumers spend over 1/3 of their income on food.Consumers are extremely price sensitive, and are often unwilling to ri

61、sk spending on products they are unfamiliar with.U.S. brands are widely known and respected in Chinas urban markets.Many U.S. companies have established plants in China, manufacturing their products using Chinese ingredients.Incomes are growing rapidly in second-tier cities, creating a whole new ran

62、ge of opportunities.Distribution and logistics remain underdeveloped, making distribution of imported products to interior cities extremely difficult.Food is a central part of Chinese culture, and consumers enjoy trying new tastes.Lack of knowledge about U.S. products and how to prepare them makes c

63、onsumers more hesitant to buy.Chinas entry into the WTO has reduced tariffs on many imported products.Labeling and sanitary restrictions act as non-tariff barriers. Enforcement of these rules is haphazard, creating additional uncertainty.The Agricultural Cooperation Agreement opened the Chinese mark

64、et to many U.S. products that were previously banned.U.S. exporters that have relied on gray market channels in the past lack direct contact with Chinese buyers.Rapid growth in retail food chains has created more opportunities for bulk purchasing.Purchasing by most retail chains remains decentralized. Few purchase imports directly, so exporters must establish a relationship wit