房地产经纪人买房子外文翻译

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1、英文翻译题 目 Buying a House and Decision to Use a Real Estate Broker 决定通过房地产经纪人买房子 原文： Buying a House and the Decision to Use a Real Estate BrokerIntroductionWhat is it that residential real estate brokers do and why would a home buyer engage their services? As is often the case, answering this question

2、is not a simple task. Home buyers who acquire their house through a broker do not purchase just a house-they also obtain the services of the broker. In other words, these buyers are consuming a bundled good. One dimension of this good is lower search time, and thus lower search costs, associated wit

3、h buying through a broker. Recent research (Baryla and Zumpano, 1995) suggests that choosing a broker improves the marginal efficiency of search, making it more likely that a buyer will find a satisfactory match earlier in the search process. Buying through a broker also increases the supply of hous

4、es available to buyers, and provides buyers with information on the quality of different houses and the neighborhoods in which they are located. Brokers frequently help buyers identify sources of mortgage financing and property insurance, as well as assist buyers in recording the title.All of these

5、services suggest that brokers provide value added to buyers (in addition to providing a service to sellers), something that these buyers would be willing to pay for. Thus this bundle of services and the house that is purchased would, intuitively, be priced higher than homes purchased without the ass

6、istance of a broker. Several studies (Janssen and Jobson 1980; Jud and Frew, 1986) observe that buyers pay more for homes listed with brokers. It is not possible, however, to determine whether this applies to the entire residential housing market since research to this point has relied on local data

7、. Higher prices indicate willingness by buyers to pay more for broker-listed houses than those sold directly by owners. Alternatively, competition from for-sale-by-owner properties may prevent sellers from passing on commission costs to buyers in the form of higher prices. Therefore, at issue is whe

8、ther broker-assisted sales result in higher prices.If search duration is affected by broker assistance what about price? This study attempts to answer these questions by developing an empirically testable model of broker choice. In the process, this study should provide important insights into the e

9、fficiency of the residential housing market as well as the effectiveness of brokers as market intermediaries. Specifically, this study examines the effects of a real estate broker by hypothesizing a two-stage process. In the first step a buyer decides whether to engage the services of a broker to as

10、sist with the search. Empirically, this decision is modeled as a probity equation where the choice to use a broker is a function of such variables as the cause of the move (i.e. changes in the household, or work-related moves), the income, age, experience, and market knowledge of the buyer, and othe

11、r buyer characteristics.The second step is the purchase. Here selling prices are modeled as a function of house characteristics, buyer characteristics, and whether the sale was broker-assisted. This approach should provide information about the determinants of housing prices. In particular，this mode

12、l should allow us to determine whether the broker-assisted buyers and buyers for-sale-by-owner properties constitute segmented markets which would permit the maintenance of housing price differentials. This study uses cross-section data from a nationwide survey of recent homebuyers and sellers condu

13、cted by the Research Division of the National Association of Realtors. This database includes both broker-assisted sales and sales by owners, allowing an assessment of the impact of the real estate broker on selling price, and by implication, the value of the marketing services which brokers provide

14、 to sellers. Our results indicate that indeed buyers who use brokers do pay more for their homes than those who do not buy through a broker. But our results also imply that it is not because these buyers have used a broker. Rather, this group of buyers would have paid a higher price regardless of th

15、e means by which the purchase was consummated. These buyers have higher incomes, are more likely to be from out of town, are more likely to have employer assistance in the purchase-all factors that lead them to pay more for a house, but also to make them more likely to use a broker in purchasing the

16、ir home. When the decision to use a broker is accounted for, these buyers do not wind up paying more for their homes, and there is some evidence that they actually pay less than a comparable buyer who buys without an agents assistance. The layout of this study is as follows. The relevant literature

17、is reviewed in section 2.In section 3 the data, variable selection, and model are described. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and the last section contains the conclusions of the study. Literature review A broad range of research has focused on the determinants of housing prices. These incl

18、ude traditional estimates of housing demand hedonic modeling of housing prices, the determinants of the tradeoff between price and time on the market, and models of the search process. Other literature has examined the role of real estate brokers and has focused on the impact of brokers on buyer sea

19、rch, or has examined the welfare and/or moral-hazard implications of broker intermediation. Few studies have tried to measure the direct effects of real estate brokers on the housing market, and fewer still on home selling prices. The work that has been produced to date has often generated conflicti

20、ng results. In part, these disparate results may reflect data availability problems, as virtually all of these earlier studies have been based on local data, and samples tended to be small, making generalizations difficult. In one of the first empirical studies of broker choice, Janssen and Jobson （

21、1980）find that real estate agents do have an impact on price. Using data from the Canadian housing market, Janssen and Jobson results indicate that with real estate firms of comparable size, brokers who list comparable properties for higher prices than competing brokers tend to realize significantly

22、 higher selling prices. The higher selling prices tend to be associated with transactions involving executive transfers and broker-arranged secondary financing. These results may in turn indicate that brokers obtain higher prices when dealing with buyers who are both less knowledgeable about local m

23、arket conditions and less sensitive to price. Yavas and Colwell (1994) suggest that selling price may also be, at least to some degree, a function of the type of broker listing arrangement used by the seller. In a study of the residential market Jud (1983) estimates the demand for real estate broker

24、age services. Using housing transactions data from three urban areas in North Carolina, Jud finds that brokers do not affect the prices of the houses which they sell, although they do appear to influence the level of housing consumed by buyers. In a subsequent study Jud and Frew (1986), using differ

25、ent data, find that brokers do obtain higher prices for the homes they sell. Evidence is also presented that broker-assisted buyers have a greater demand for houses than their non-broker-assisted counterparts. Their results lead them to conclude that broker intermediation has an effect analogous to

26、that of advertising in markets with imperfect information. More recent research by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) examines the extent to which differences in information and search costs are related in housing prices. Using data from the Baton Rouge market area Turnbull and Sirmans compare the prices p

27、aid by first-time and out-of-town buyers to the prices paid for comparable housing by more knowledgeable local and repeat homebuyers. Their results indicate that home prices are similar across buyers with different information sets and search Costs. Since these were all broker-assisted transactions,

28、 Tarnbull and Sirmans conclude that existing brokerage institutions, such as the MLS, successfully eliminate the potential price effects of asymmetric information and, thereby improve the efficiency of the housing market. It is not possible, however, to determine from this study whether price differ

29、ences exist between broker-assisted and non-broker assisted transactions. Although selling prices are not compared, a study by Baryla and Zumpano (1995), for the first time, uses a national sample of broker-assisted and non-broker sales transactions to assess the impact of intermediation by the agen

30、t on search effort. This study indicates that information asymmetries are present in the residential real estate market and that intermediation by agents does affect buyer search efforts. First-time buyers and out-of-town buyers search longer than more experienced and local home buyers. Equally impo

31、rtant real estate brokers are able to reduce search time for virtually all classes of consumers whether first-time experienced local or out-of-town buyers. A follow-up study by Baryla, Zumpano, and Elder (1995) finds that the mechanism by which agents reduce buyer search duration is an increase in s

32、earch intensity. Having more market access and housing information than buyers working without brokers, broker-assisted consumers are able to visit more homes during a given period of time. These results suggest that buyers with high information and search costs are more likely to seek out the servi

33、ces of real estate brokers. Whether this implication is true, and what effect such a search decision has on selling price however remains to be seen. The next logical step, therefore, is to examine this choice and its consequent effect on home prices. Data and methodology This study uses data from a

34、 nationwide survey of home buyers conducted by the National Association of Realtors in 1987. The survey, The Home Buying and Selling Process was mailed to over 30,000 households. After eliminating incomplete or faulty questionnaires the database totaled 2495 observations all of which took place in19

35、86. Table 1 displays summary statistics from the survey sample, categorized by whether the transaction was agent-assisted or non-agent-assisted. Table la displays agent usage based on differences in information and search costs among the buyers. Evaluating the impact of the real estate broker on pri

36、ces paid by home buyers would seem initially a straightforward process: One estimates a price equation using ordinary least squares, controlling for differences in housing characteristics (as in a hedonic price model) and the impact of buyer characteristics on the price, including a dummy variable d

37、efined to indicate whether the buyer used a broker in the transaction. Or one could estimate separate equations for the broker-assisted and non-broker-assisted buyers. The difficulty is that the price paid by the buyer and the choice of whether to utilize a broker may be linked. A higher price paid

38、by buyers using a broker may not imply that prices are higher for homes listed by brokers. Instead it may be that this group of buyers would have paid a higher price regardless of whether or not they used an agent. This is a classic example of self-selection: If those who use an agent are predispose

39、d to pay a higher price, the ordinary least squares estimate of the coefficient on the agent variable will overestimate the effect of the agent on the price paid by the buyer. The presence of selection bias could imply a number of possibilities. One is that the bias exists and that after taking into

40、 account the self-selection by these buyers, housing prices are still higher for the group using a broker (as indicated by the coefficient of the broker variable). This result would imply that there are two separate residential real estate markets: one for broker-assisted properties and the second f

41、or the for-sale-by-owner (FSBO) properties. This separation could permit the maintenance of housing-price differentials between the two groups of consumers. If selection bias is present and housing prices are higher for broker-listed properties the price differences observed could be attributed to t

42、he predisposition of buyers using a broker to pay more for their homes. If no selection bias is present the higher prices may represent the value added by the broker which the buyers are willing to pay for. Alternatively no price differentials may exist due to the competitive impact of FSBOs on the

43、prices paid for broker-assisted transactions. The choice of whether to use a broker and its subsequent effect on price is modeled using a Heckman two-stage model. In the first stage, a probity equation is employed to model the decision to choose a real estate broker. The decision is modeled as a fun

44、ction of eight variables. Buyer income (AINC) is employed as a measure of the opportunity cost of search. It has already been shown that buyer search duration can be reduced by working with a real estate broker. If higher income buyers have higher opportunity costs we would expect that they would ch

45、oose to buy through a real estate broker. Source: Leonard V. Zumpano, Harold W. Elder, Edward A.Baryla.1996. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. Academic Publishers13:169-181. 6译文： 决定通过房地产经纪人买房子简介 房地产经纪人究竟是做什么的，为什么购房者会激发他们的服务呢？在通常情况下，这是一个不容易回答的问题。其实购房者在通过经纪人买房子的过程中买到的不仅仅是房子，而同时是在取得经纪人的服务。换

46、言之，这些购买者通过经纪人拥有了一个很好的的购房途径。通过经纪人购买房子的一个好处就是可以减少搜寻房子的时间，从而降低了买房过程中的成本。最近的研究认为（巴雷拉和祖帕诺 1995），通过房地产经纪人买房子，大大提高了购房者购房的效益，因为这样这些购房者在寻找房子的过程中更有可能找到称心如意的房子。通过经纪人买房子增加了可供购房者选择的房源，购房者还可以向经纪人提出自己对房子的要求，如要求的房屋的质量以及希望房屋的街道位置。经纪人经常会记录买家的信息并协助买家办理按揭融资和财产保险服务。 这些服务都表明，经纪人向买家提供了额外的有价值的服务（除了向卖方提供服务），有时候，那些买家愿意支付那些额外

47、的费用。因此，包含这些服务的房屋的销售价格会高于无经纪人协助置业的房屋的价格。一些学者注意到买家对于那些业主代理上市的房子会支付更多。然而，要确定这是否适用于整个住宅市场是不可能的，因为研究这一点要依靠当地的数据资料。较高的价格预示着买家相对于那些直接出售的房子更愿意较多支付那些业主代理上市的房子。另外，来自自有产权出售的竞争可能会阻止卖家以高价的形式将委托成本传递给买家。因此，问题是业主辅助销售是否会导致价格的提高。如果购房者是在经纪人的协助下搜寻房子的，那么价格会是怎么样呢？本文尝试从经纪人选择的发展经验检验模式来回答这些问题。在这个过程中，本文对整个住宅市场的效率以及经纪中介市场的有效性

48、提供了重要的见解。 具体来说，本文探讨的是在以两阶段进程的假设条件下对一个房地产经纪人的影响。第一步，买方决定是否聘请一个协助搜寻房屋的服务经纪人。根据经验，这个是由普罗比模型方程决定的，而收入，年龄，经验和对买方市场的认识，以及其他买主的特点都将作为变量引起函数的移动（即改变在家庭或工作有关方面的移动），从而影响买方是否选择使用代理。第二步是购买。在这里房屋的销售价格是根据房屋的特色，购买者的喜好，以及是否需要提供经纪协助而确定的。这种方法需要提供相关决定因素的信息才能确定住宅的价格。尤其，这个模型可以让我们确定买家是否可以接受代理协助房屋与业主自行出售房屋之间的差价。 本文参考了美国房地产

49、经纪人协会研究部对全国购房者和销售者所进行的调查的数据。该数据包括了房地产经纪人对经纪辅助销售和业主销售的两种模式在影响销售价格方面的评估，并揭示了经纪人为卖方所提供的营销服务的价值。 我们的研究结果表明，通过经纪人买房的买家的确要比不通过经纪人的买家支付更多的费用。但我们的结果也同样表明，支付更多的费用并不是单单因为使用了经纪人。相反的，这类买家无论以何种方式购买房子都会比其他买家花更多的钱。导致他们花更多钱的因素是：可能这些购买者的收入很高，可能他们来自其他地方，也可能是受别人的雇佣而这么做，更有可能的是他们通过经纪人来购买自己的房子从而使自己的房子升值。当这些卖家决定使用经纪人来买房时，

50、他们也并不打算为此而付出更多的钱，并且有一些证据表明，他们实际支付的钱比不使用经纪人协助的卖家要来的少。本文的布局如下：第二部分的回顾有关文献，第三部分对数据、变量选择和模型进行描述，第四部分用实例证明结果，最后一部分记载本文的结论。文献综述大多数文献都集中在研究房价的决定因素，包括对住房需求，住房价格，以及价格和时间之间的关系的研究。当然也有一部分文献研究了房地产经纪人的作用，经纪人对购房者买房的深远影响，以及利益和道德对经济中介的影响。但很少有研究试图衡量房地产经纪人对住房市场的直接影响，因为在如今的工作中往往会产生很多研究文献相矛盾的结果。在某种程度上，这些不同的结果可能反应了数据的可能

51、性问题，因为几乎所有的这些早期研究都以本地数据为依据，并且所抽取的样本的数量又往往很少，因此很难一概而论来衡量房地产经纪人对住房市场的直接影响。詹森和乔布森（1980）在关于经纪人选择的第一个实证研究中发现，房地产经纪人也会对价格产生影响。分析了来自加拿大的房屋市场数据后，詹森和乔布森表明，在一定规模的房地产企业，对于同类物业经纪人会比竞争者列出更高的价格从而实现销售价格的显著提高。较高的售价往往与行政转让和经纪人安排的再融资有关。这些结果可能反过来说明对于那些了解当地市场信息并且对价格缺乏敏感的买家，经纪人能卖出高价格。亚瓦斯和科维尔（1994）认为至少在一定程度上卖方想通过经纪人来控制价格

52、。乔德（1983）凭借其在住宅市场的研究，他估计了房地产经纪服务的作用。根据来自北卡罗来纳州的三个城市的住房交易数据，乔德认为，经纪人不影响他们出售的房屋的销售价格，即使他们似乎影响了购房者的住房消费水平。但在之后的研究中，乔德和佛瑞（1986）使用了不同的数据后发现经纪人能将房子卖到更高的价格。同时也证实了有经纪人协助的买家市场要比非经纪人协助的买家市场大。根据以上的结果他们得出了这样结论，他们认为在完全没有信息的市场中经纪人起到了类似广告的作用。近期特恩尔和锡尔曼斯（1993）在调差不同的信息量和搜寻成本与房价的关系。根据巴吞鲁日的市场数据，恩布尔和锡尔曼斯把第一次购房的买房者出示的价格和

53、有着大量的信息量并且有广阔的购买市场的外镇买房者出示的价格进行了比较。经过比较厚他们发现吗，房价在不同的信息量和不同搜寻成本的买家中是相近的。恩布尔和锡尔曼斯的结论针对的是现有的经纪机构，如大联盟，成功地消除了信息不对称的影响，从而提高了住房市场的效益。尽管巴雷拉和祖帕诺（1995）的首次研究没有比较销售价格，而是对经纪人辅助交易和非经纪人销售交易进行调查研究。这项研究表明住宅房地产市场的信息是不对称的，而且买方代理中介确实会影响房屋的搜寻工作。同时研究还表明，房地产经纪人确实可以减少几乎所有类型消费者的买方过程的时间，无论是第一次买房的，买房经验丰富的，本地的购房者或者是外地的。数据和方法本

54、文使用来自美国房地产经纪人协会在1987年对全国的购房者进行的调查数据。调查结果显示，在整个房屋购买和销售过程中，是邮寄到超过30000户人家的。在排除不完整或错误的问卷调查，共计2495观测数据库，所有这些都发生在1986年。表1汇总统计显示，从调查样本中，对有关交易是否代理不协助或者代理辅助进行分类。香格里拉表显示购房者之间的信息和搜寻成本的差异。选择性偏见的存在可能暗示了一些可能性。其中之一是偏见存在，并且在考虑到这些购房者的自我选择，使用一个代理集团的房价仍较高（由代理的变量系数表示）。这一结果将意味着有两个不同的住宅房地产市场：经纪辅助为其中之一，如果选择存在偏差，住房价格的经纪属性就越高，价格差异可能是由于购房者倾向使用经纪人来购买他们的房子。如果没有选择性偏见存在，价格较高的价值可能是由通过经纪人买房者的购买者来补充。赫克曼两阶段模型是是否使用代理及其后效应对价格的影响。在第一阶段，采用概率方程来模拟决定选择一个房地产经纪人。这一决定被建模称一个八个变量的函数。买方收入作为搜索的机会成本。它已被证明，通过房地产经纪人可以减少买方搜寻期间的工作。如果收入较高的购房者有较高的机会成本，则我们可以预料，他们会选择通过房地产经纪人来购买。出处：伦纳德v 祖帕诺, 哈罗德w 埃德尔, 爱德华A 巴雷拉. 房地产金融和经济, 学术出版社. 1996: 13:169-181