金融危机5周年

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1、Monetary policy after the crash Controlling interest 货币政策调控利率The third of our series of articles on the financial crisis looks at the unconventional methods central bankers have adopted to stimulate growth in its wake 本文重点检讨央行官员在危机初期为刺激增长而采取的非常规性政策 1 BEFORE the financial crisis life was simple for c

2、entral bankers. They had a clear mission: temper booms and busts to maintain low and stable inflation. And they had a seemingly effective means to achieve that: nudge a key short-term interest rate up to discourage borrowing (and thus check inflation), or down to foster looser credit (and thus spur

3、growth and employment). Deft use of this technique had kept the world humming along so smoothly in the decades before the crash that economists had declared a “Great Moderation” in the economic cycle. As it turned out, however, the moderation was transitoryand the crash that ended it undermined not

4、only the central bankers record but also the method they relied on to prop up growth. Monetary policy has been in a state of upheaval ever since. 金融危机前，央行官员们过着一种简单的生活，他们的任务非常明确。那就是，调和经济的起起落落，将通胀保持在一个稳定的低水平。同时，他们手中还具备一个看上去有效的工具来完成这个任务，即调高关键的短期利率以打击借贷，控制通胀；或者是下调利率以培育宽松的信贷，刺激增长和就业。对这种技术的熟练运用曾让整个世界在危机前的

5、数十年中平缓地向前推进，以至于经济学家们宣称，那段时期是经济周期的“大缓和”阶段。不过，局势的发展业已证明，所谓的“大缓和”不过是暂时的罢了。终结那场“大缓和”的危机不仅让央行官员的“功劳簿”多出一个不光彩的纪录，而且还对他们赖以推动增长的方式造成了打击。从那以后，货币政策就处于一种不稳定的状态之中。 2 The recession that accompanied the credit crunch in the autumn of 2008 delivered a massive blow to demand. In response central banks in the rich w

6、orld slashed their benchmark interest rates. By early 2009 many were close to zero, approaching what economists call the “zero lower bound”. Even so, growth remained elusive. Pushing rates below zero, though technically possible, would not have helped. Negative rates would merely have encouraged dep

7、ositors to withdraw their money from banks and hold it as cash, on which the rate of return, at zero, would have been higher. Central banks in the developed economies faced a frightening collapse in output and soaring unemployment without recourse to the tool that had been the mainstay of monetary p

8、olicy-making for a generation. 2008年秋天，伴随着的信贷危机而来的衰退给了需求重重的一击。为了应对危机，富裕国家的央行大幅降低了基准利率。到2009年早些时候，许多国家的基准利率已经接近零，达到了经济学家们所谓的“零利率下限”。但是，即便如此，增长依旧没有起色。将利率调整至零以下，虽说存在着理论上的可能，却无助于解决问题。负利率只会鼓励储户将他们的存款从银行中提取出来，以现金的形式握在手里，希望能够获得高于零的回报。面对产出的惊人下滑和失业率的大幅上升，发达经济体的央行失去了在过去一代人的时间里进行主流货币决策的救生工具。 3 Central banks we

9、re not entirely unprepared for this challenge. In the 1990s the Japanese economy had slumped following an asset-price crash. Facing weak growth and deflation the Bank of Japan had slashed rates to near-zero before embarking on a series of experiments with unconventional monetary tools. Although the

10、Bank of Japans performance was widely considered disappointing, if not an outright failure, the rich worlds central banks began by drawing upon its playbook. 各国央行没有为这种挑战做好完全的准备。在上世纪90年代时，日本资产价格的泡沫破裂，经济大幅下滑。面对疲软的增长和通缩，日本央行日银在出台一系列非常规性货币工具的实验之前，曾将利率下调至接近于零。尽管日银的表现还不能说是完全失败，但总体上令人失望。从那以后，富裕国家的央行开始谋划自己对

11、策。 4 Unconventional policy falls into two broad categories: asset purchases and “forward guidance”. Asset purchases are a natural extension of central banks more typical activities. Americas Federal Reserve, for instance, has long bought Treasury bills and other bonds with short maturities to increa

12、se the money supply and reduce short-term interest rates. After its benchmark rate fell close to zero the Fed began buying longer-term securities, including ten-year Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities, to bring down long-run borrowing costs . 非常规性政策分类两大类，一类是资产购买，一类是“前瞻性指引”。资产购买是央行典型性行为的自然

13、延伸。例如，美联储就一直在购买美国国债和其他种类的短期债券，其目的是为了增加资金供应，降低短期利率。在其基准利率降至零附近后，美联储又开始购买包括十年期国债和由抵押贷款支持的债券等长期证券，以期降低长期的借贷成本（见表一）。 5 Printing money to buy assets is known as “quantitative easing” (QE) because central banks often announce purchase plans in terms of a desired increase in the quantity of bank reserves.

14、The Bank of Japan first attempted QE in 2001 when it promised to buy Yen400 billion-worth of government bonds a month in order to raise the level of reserves to Yen5 trillion. The central banks of America, Britain and Japan have all engaged in QE since the crisis struck, buying up a vast stock of fi

15、nancial assets (see chart 2). 印钱购买资产的方式被称为“量化宽松（QE）”，这是因为央行经常以“需要提高银行准备金总量”为由，宣布购买计划。日银在2001年的时候第一次尝试QE政策。当时日本银行为了将储备金水平提升至5万亿日元，承诺每月购买价值400亿日元的政府债券。自本次危机以来，美国、英国和日本的央行都曾实施过QE，购买了大量的金融资产（见表二）。 6 Economists reckon QE works in a few ways. Central bankers emphasise the “portfolio-balance effect”. When

16、a central bank buys bonds from investors with newly created money, they use the proceeds to rebalance their portfolio by buying assets of different risk and maturity. In doing so they boost asset prices and depress interest rates (increased demand for bonds allows them to be sold at lower rates). Ch

17、eaper borrowing, in turn, prods businesses and households to invest. 经济学家认为，QE发挥作用的方式有数种。央行官员看重的是其“组合平衡效应”。当央行用新印制的钞票从投资者手中购买债券时，通过购买不同风险和不同到期时间的资产，他们是在利用这一过程在平衡自己的投资组合。他们的做法即推高了资产的价格也打压了利率（增加对债券的需求可以压低它们的利率）。结果，较低的借贷成本刺激了企业和家庭的投资行为。 7 QE can stimulate the economy via a fiscal effect, too: lower int

18、erest rates reduce government borrowing costs and so lower expected future taxation. And QE also helps shape expectations of inflation. A central bank announcing a new, higher inflation target might use QE to convince markets it will meet it, since, other things being equal, an increase in the amoun

19、t of money in circulation leads to higher prices. If people think their money will be worth less in the future, they have an incentive to spend more of it now. QE还可以通过财政效应来刺激经济：压低利率降低了政府的借贷成本，打消了市场对未来提高税收的预期。同时，QE还有助于市场形成对通胀的预期。宣布提高通胀预期新政策的央行可能会利用QE向市场证明，他会完成这一既定目标。这是因为其他相同的手段，如增加流通中的货币总量，会导致价格的上涨。如

20、果人们预期他们的钱在未来会贬值的话，那么他们就会产生一种现在多花钱的动力。Talking prop大谈货币政策的支撑作用 8 Forward guidance, the other main unconventional tool, is an attempt to boost the economy by signalling central banks future policies more clearly. The Bank of Japan first attempted to talk the economy back to health in 1999, when it prom

21、ised to keep its main interest rate near zero “until deflationary concerns subside”. The Fed and the Bank of England have since mimicked this approach. In early 2009 the Fed said its interest rate was likely to remain low for “an extended period”. In August 2011 it sought to improve this formulation

22、 by adding a date, specifying that low rates would stick around until at least mid-2013. 另一种非常规性工具叫做“前瞻性指引”，它指的是央行为了推升经济而事先将其未来政策以更明晰的态度传达给市场。日银是在1999年首次尝试这一政策的。当时，为了向市场说明其将要把日本经济带回健康状态的政策，日银承诺将主要利率维持在零附近，“直到通缩担忧平息为止”。自那以后，美联储和英格兰银行也模仿了这种做法。美联储在2009年早些时候曾表示，其利率有可能“在今后较长的一段时间内”维持在低位；到了2011年8月，美联储又通过延

23、长时间的办法来试图增进这种构想，其具体做法是承诺至少到2013年中期保持低利率不变。 9 In December 2012 the Fed adjusted its communications again. It announced that rates would stay low until the unemployment rate had fallen to at least 6.5%, as long as short-run expectations of inflation were no more than 2.5%. In August 2013 the Bank of E

24、ngland followed suit, stating that it would not raise rates until unemployment had fallen to 7%, provided financial markets behaved themselves and inflation remained subdued. 到了2012年12月，美联储再次对沟通政策做出调整，宣布直到失业率至少降至6.5%、短期通胀预期不超过2.5%为止，不会对低利率政策做出改变。2013年8月，英格兰银行如法炮制。她宣布，倘若金融市场的表现中规中矩而且通胀可控，她不会提高利率利率，直到

25、失业率降至7%为止。 10 Like QE, forward guidance works in several ways. A promise to tolerate higher inflation in the future, if believed, can stimulate economic activity in the present, just as the threat of higher prices due to an expanded money supply does. By the same token, a promise to hold short-term

26、rates low for a long time should reduce long-term rates too, since long-term rates are typically compounded short-term rates along with a premium to allow for rising inflation and other risks. 就像QE一样，“前瞻性指引”发挥其作用的方式也有数种。如果央行能让市场相信，它能容忍未来较高水平的通胀，那么这就可以刺激当前的经济活动，其道理同增加货币供应会带来价格上涨的威胁如出一撤。央行承诺在长时间内将短期利率

27、维持在低位也应该能够降低长期利率。因为长期利率一般是由两个部分组成的，一是短期利率，二是容忍通胀和其他风险上升的预期。 11 In addition, investors respond to the “real” or inflation-adjusted interest rate, which equals the “nominal” or advertised interest rate minus expected inflation. When inflation is expected to be negative, meaning that prices are falling

28、, the real interest rate may actually rise. Deflation, by raising the value of a unit of money in terms of other goods, in effect increases the cost of borrowing. If a central bank credibly promises more future inflation, by contrast, the real interest rate can fall and even dip below zero. A negati

29、ve real interest rate works where a negative nominal interest rate does not: holding cash does no good, since inflation reduces the purchasing power of hard currency as well as deposits. It is therefore in everyones interest to save less, and to borrow and invest more. 除此之外，投资者还关心“实际”利率或者是经过通胀调整的利率，

30、即“名义利率”或者是指导利率减去通胀预期后的利率。当市场的通胀预期为负的时候，即预期价格下跌，此时实际利率可能上升。通过用其他商品来提高货币价值的通缩实际上增加了借贷的成本。相比之下，如果央行对未来的通胀做出了令人可信的承诺，实际利率就有可能下跌，甚至跌至零以下。负的实际利率可以发挥作用，但负的名义利率却毫无用途：由于通胀在降低存款购买力的同时也降低了硬通货的购买力，因此持有现金不是一个好办法。总之，少存钱，多贷款，多投资对每个人都有好处。From theory to practice 从理论到实践 12 Studies of quantitative easing generally fin

31、d that it has indeed reduced long-term interest rates. One rule of thumb has it that $600 billion in purchases brings down long-run rates by 0.15-0.2 percentage points, equivalent in impact to a cut of 0.75 percentage points in the Feds benchmark short-term interest rate. Lower rates are estimated t

32、o have raised real output in Britain and America 2-3% higher than it would have been without QE, even though borrowing costs remained stubbornly high for British banks. 研究发现，量化宽松确实能降低长期利率。经验表明，购买600亿美元的资产会将长期利率压低0.15-0.2个百分点，其效果相当于美联储将基准短期利率下调0.75%。据估算，较低的利率让英国和美国的实际产出比不实行QE高出了2-3个百分点，即便英国银行的借贷成本仍旧顽

33、固地保持在高位。 13 Recent research also suggests that QE plays a strong role in reinforcing a central banks forward guidance. The Feds signalling, for example, seems to be responsible for much of the movement in the prices even of assets it is not buying itself. And market bets on future interest rates rev

34、eal that investors find central banks promises to keep rates low more credible when accompanied by QE purchases. 近期的研究的另一个结果是，QE在强化央行前瞻性指导方面承担了一个重要的角色。例如，即使有些资产并不在美联储的购买范围之内，其价格仍会受到美联储的信号的影响。市场对未来利率的预期表明，当央行的前瞻性指导连同QE购买行为一起出现时，投资者会认为央行将利率维持在地位的承诺更加可信。 14 Whether forward guidance is effective at boos

35、ting output is harder to say. There is some agreement that communication about future policy reduces long-term interest rates. But it is unclear why rates fall. They could drop because markets believe the central banks promise to keep short-term rates low, which should encourage more investment and

36、growth. But they could drop because markets read the central banks guidance as a signal that the economy is weaker than expected, implying less demand for loans. That could actually prove counterproductive if it discouraged new investment. 前瞻性指导是否能有效提高产出是一个比较难以说清楚的问题。有人认为，有关未来政策的沟通可以压低长期利率。但是，利率下降的原

37、因还不清楚。这可能是因为，市场相信了央行将利率保持在低位的承诺，这应该能够鼓励更多的投资并带来增长；这也可能是因为，市场将央行的前瞻性指导解读为经济弱于预期的信号，市场会认为央行在暗示，贷款的需求将减少。如果前瞻性指导挫伤了新投资，那么它实际上是在起反作用。 15 Some recent Fed research suggests the first effectthe credibility of the promiseis more important. Other work indicates that guidance may be more powerful when it clea

38、rly represents a “commitment” to a particular policy rather than a “forecast” of future economic conditions and the policy that is likely to flow from them. 美联储的最新研究证实，前瞻性指导的第一个效应，即承诺的可信性更加重要。不过，也有一些研究表明，当前瞻性指导明确地代表了一种对某项特殊政策的“承诺”，而不是对未来经济条件和可能从这些条件中得出的政策的“预测”时，这种指导的作用可能会更有力。 16 What is certain is t

39、hat for all the experimentation, the rich worlds big economies are still struggling. Output in Britain remains below its pre-crisis peak. Some 10m fewer Americans are now working than might reasonably have been expected in 2007. The euro area is only just escaping the second trough of a double-dip r

40、ecession, and its unemployment rate remains in double digits. Unconventional monetary policy, in short, does not seem to be working as well as the conventional sort used tobut there is no agreement why. 目前可以确定的是，尽管进行了所有这些实验，但是，富裕国家中的大型经济体仍在挣扎之中。英国的产出仍旧低于危机前的高点。正在工作的美国人可能比2007年预想的要少1000万人。欧元区仅仅是刚刚逃离了

41、双底衰退的第二个低谷，而且其失业率仍旧维持在两位数。总之，非常规性政策看上去并没有像过去的常规型政策那样发挥作用，而且直到如今也没有找到其中的原因。 17 Some economists maintain that monetary policy, conventional or otherwise, loses much of its power at the zero lower bound. Simon Wren-Lewis of Oxford University argues that monetary policy cannot stabilise the economy with

42、out fiscal easing, meaning more government spending or lower taxes, to transmit newly created money and low rates into the real economy. Others, such as Richard Koo of Nomura Research Institute, reckon that highly indebted firms and households are simply unable to respond to lower long-term interest

43、 rates by borrowing more. 有的经济学家坚持认为，货币政策不论是常规的还是非常规的，在利率位于零下限时，就会失去其效力。牛津大学的西蒙雷恩-刘易斯指出，没有宽松的财政政策配合，货币政策无法稳定经济。即只有在政府增加开支降低税收的情况下，才能将新印制的钞票和低利率转化到实体经济中去。如野村研究所的辜朝明等其他的经济学家认为，高负债的公司和家庭根本不可能通过再去贷款的方式对较低的长期利率做出反应。 18 Some believe that unconventional policy would work better if central banks only pursue

44、d it more vigorously. Soon after Japan ran into its own zero lower bound, Ben Bernanke, who was then an economist at Princeton University but is now chairman of the Fed, argued that the Bank of Japan needed to set a higher inflation target, buy more assets and devalue the yen by purchasing foreign c

45、urrencies. Robert Hall of Stanford University suspects that pushing the real federal-funds rate down to -4% would be sufficient to get the American economy moving faster. As long as the Fed keeps inflation around 2%, however, the real interest rate can go no lower than -2% (a zero federal-funds rate

46、 minus the 2% rate of inflation). 有的观点认为，只要央行在寻求非常规性政策时表现出更多的积极性，这种政策就一定会发挥更大的作用。在日本的利率降至零下限后不久，当时还在普林斯顿大学任教的现任美联储主席本伯南克就曾经指出，日本银行需要设定一个更高的通胀目标，购买更多的资产，并且还要通过购买外国货币的方式让日元贬值。有人认为，将联邦政府债券的实际利率压低到-4%或许会足以让美国经济加速。但是，斯坦福大学的罗伯特霍尔对此表示了怀疑。他认为，只要美联储将通胀维持在2%左右，实际利率就不可能低于-2%（零利率加上2%的通胀率）。 19 Christina Romer of

47、 the University of California, Berkeley is one of the many economists who see a need for a psychological jolt to rouse the economy. She argues for “regime change”, meaning not just a change in leadership, but also a dramatic shift in policy. She wants central banks to stop targeting inflation and to

48、 focus instead on total spending in the economy, or nominal GDP. Although in most circumstances the two approaches would deliver similar results, a nominal-GDP target gives a central bank more leeway to fight unemployment during steep downturns. Just as important, in her view, the policy change woul

49、d signal to markets that the Fed meant to restore rapid growth once and for all. 许多经济学家还提出这样一种观点：为了促进经济发展，有必要进行“心理震撼”。加州大学伯克利分校的克里斯蒂娜罗默既是其中之一。她所谓的“政权更替”不仅意味着更换领导层，同时还要对政策进行一次彻底的调整。她希望央行不再把目标放在通胀上面，而是将精力在经济的总开支，即名义GDP上面。尽管在大多数情况下，这两种标能够产生同样的结果，但是名义GDP可以让央行在经济直线下滑期间同失业率作斗争时能有更多的回旋余地。在她看来，政策的调整同样重要，它回向

50、市场发出这样一种信号，即美联储意在一劳永逸地恢复增长。 20 Yet for every critic who believes that central banks have done too little, there is one who fears they have done far too much. By propping up asset prices artificially, some complain, central bankers are stoking inequality, rewarding financial firms despite their past

51、misdeeds and sowing the seeds of the next crisis. Many, especially on the right in America, give warning that the massive increase in the money supply QE entails can lead only to a debasement of the currency and hyperinflation. Others gripe that low interest rates in the rich world have sent a flood

52、 of hot money towards emerging markets, generating financial instability. 然而，在某些人认为央行做得不够的同时，也有人认为担心央行做得太过。一种观点认为，通过人为地推高资产价格，央行官员的做法等于是在加剧不平等，等于是回报了那些之前犯下过错的金融企业，等于是为下一次危机播下了种子。美国保守派中的许多人警告说，大量增加QE所需的货币的供应只会导致货币贬值和超级通货膨胀。他们抱怨说，富裕国家的低利率会让大量的热钱流向新兴市场，从而造成金融混乱。 21 It is likely to take years to discern

53、 which of these criticisms are warranted. Not until 1963 did Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz publish “A Monetary History of the United States”, definitively establishing that misguided monetary policy had helped entrench the Great Depression. Unfortunately for the many countries still enduring sub-par growth, a similarly decisive resolution to todays monetary-policy debates is still far off. 断定这些批评声音的对错可能需要数年的时间。米尔顿弗里德曼和安娜施瓦茨直到1963年才发表了美国货币史一书，他们在书中明确指出，误导性的货币政策是”大萧条“的帮凶。不幸的是，对于许多仍在忍受低增长的国家来说，同样的对当前货币政策讨论的决定性决议还远未出现。