社会压力与监管力量对公司主动重述不法收入的影响

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1、标题：社会压力与监管力量对公司主动重标题：社会压力与监管力量对公司主动重述不法收入的影响述不法收入的影响 Coming Forward proposing that firms voluntarily restate their earnings Subsequent to Wrongdoing Effect factors Social and Regulatory Forces 作者：作者：Michael D. Pfarrer Ken G. Smith, Kathryn M. Bartol Dmitry M. Khanin Xiaomeng Zhang摘摘 要要 研究内容：研究内容：Inv

2、estigating the effects of social and regulatory forces on a firms decision to disclose past wrongdoing by restating its earnings. 研究结果：研究结果：Firms are more likely to voluntarily restate their earnings in response to informal social pressures from other firms in their industry and less likely to do so

3、 in response to formal regulatory sanctions. 研究目的：研究目的：Examines the effectiveness of “hard” versus “soft” deterrence measures on firm compliance for corporate governance and public policy research.前前 言言社会背景社会背景：The corporate governance problems of earnings manipulation and accounting fraud appear co

4、mmon among U.S. firms.背景分析：背景分析：The governance problems of earnings manipulation and accounting fraud are addressed by both formal and informal external forces. How do formal and informal external forces impact the likelihood that a firm will voluntarily disclose past wrongdoing and restate its earn

5、ings? 研究背景：研究背景：Although the governance literature in accounting has investigated restatements, it has not focused on voluntary restatements as a core construct of interest, nor have researchers theorized and tested how external social and regulatory forces affect the decision to come forward and re

6、state earnings.一、问题的提出一、问题的提出 公司违规：公司违规：A majority (83%) believes it is acceptable to bend rules that are out of date or ambiguous, whereas 74% believe it is acceptable to do so to achieve performance goals.(A survey of corporate executives by Veiga et al. 2004). 问题：问题：All public firms are at risk o

7、f regulatory deviance through manipulation of earnings and thus also at risk of restating them. 本文研究：本文研究：The first to make voluntary restatements the main construct of interestVoluntary disclosure of wrongdoing 术语源头：术语源头：Sociological and legal research 术语内涵：术语内涵：Indicating intentional, manipulative

8、,or fraudulent behavior . 术语辨析术语辨析(Voluntary disclosure )： From an accounting standpoint，firms ordinarily disclose positive information about themselves; In this study, disclosing earnings subsequent to Wrongdoing.Effects of Voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing 短期来看：短期来看：Significant negative financial

9、 and managerial consequences(examples) The decision to voluntarily restate earnings can be highly problematic. 长期来看：长期来看：Voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing may be a more effective strategy than concealment Regulators encourage the voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing.二、提出假设二、提出假设 Effects of Informal a

10、nd Formal Forces 假设一：假设一：Informal Social Forces How do peers, industry leaders,and network connections affect the likelihood of a firm voluntarily restating its earnings? 假设二：假设二：Formal Regulatory Forces DO formal sanctions truly have a deterring effect? 假设三：假设三：Moderating Role of Firm Status How do

11、es firms status moderate the effects of informal forces and formal forces? 假假 设设 一一o Hypothesis 1A (H1A)： Industry performance leaders that voluntarily restated will increase the likelihood that a firm in the industry will voluntarily restate its earnings.o Hypothesis 1B (H1B)：Industry size leaders

12、that voluntarily restated will increase the likelihood that a firm in the industry will voluntarily restate its earnings.o Hypothesis 1C (H1C)： The greater the number of previous voluntary restaters in the industry, the greater the likelihood that a firm in the industry will voluntarily restate its

13、earnings.o Hypothesis 1D (H1D)：Network members that voluntarily restated will increase the likelihood that a firm in the network will voluntarily restate its earnings.假假 设设 二二o Hypothesis 2 (H2)： The greater the number of previous forced restaters in the industry, the lower the likelihood that a fir

14、m in the industry will voluntarily restate its earnings.假假 设设 三：三：o Hypothesis 3A (H3A)： The strength of the positive relationship between informal forces and the likelihood of a firms voluntarily restating its earnings will decrease with the firms status.o Hypothesis 3B (H3B)： The strength of the n

15、egative relationship between formal forces and the likelihood of a firms voluntarily restating its earnings will increase with the firms status.三、研究方法及分析模型三、研究方法及分析模型 数据来源数据来源 变量分析：因变量、自变量、控制变量变量分析：因变量、自变量、控制变量 测验分析：测验模型、测验结果、信度检验测验分析：测验模型、测验结果、信度检验（一）数据来源（一）数据来源 公司样本公司样本o 公司样本来源：公司样本来源：Execucomp da

16、tabase Execucomp数据库的数据来源于公司的年度财务报表、股东签署的委托书、美国证券交易委员会(SEC)10-K报告（$年度报告），可查询到美国公司高阶主管薪资资料及产业资讯，包括了至今为止纳入标准普尔1500指数的2532家公司资讯。o 公司样本情况：公司样本情况：本研究采用样本中公司的资产价值幅度为21.4万1050亿（美元），中位数为9.31亿美元。o 样本分类标准：样本分类标准：100个标准产业分类代码 four-digit SIC codes：由4位数字组成，前两位数字是识别主要行业， 第三位数字确定产业类别，第四位表示具体产业。（ SIC Standard Indust

17、rial Classification）标准普尔1500指数o 标准普尔指数：标准普尔指数：由美国最大的证券研究机构即标准普尔公司编制的股票价格指数。标准普尔（S&P）作为金融投资界的公认标准，提供被广泛认可的信用评级、独立分析研究、投资咨询等服务，其中标准普尔1200指数和标准普尔500指数已经分别成为全球股市表现和美国投资组合指数的基准。o 标准普尔标准普尔1500指数：指数：由标准普尔500指数、标准普尔中型股400和标准普尔小型股600构成。2005年，该指数代表了大约90%家美国公司总市值，其中公司市值变化幅度为4000万美元3820亿美元，中位数为19.5亿美元。o 市值：

18、市值：公司资产的市场价值，即公司现有股份数额乘以每股市场价值。如某公司发行股票1亿股，每股的市场价值为15元，公司的总市值为15亿元。市值是投资者选择投资品种的一个重要指标，市场上的股票根据市值规模分为大盘、中盘、小盘等。（一）数据来源（一）数据来源 公司样本公司样本o 注意：注意： The sample contains only publicly traded firms.o 理由：理由： Given that several studies have shown that smaller firms are more likely to restate their earnings th

19、an larger firms, the use of the S&P 1,500 should make for a more conservative sample for testing the hypotheses in this study.（一）数据来源（一）数据来源 重述清单重述清单o 样本来源：样本来源：The 2002 U.S. GAO report Financial Statement Restatements：Trends,Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remainingo 样本特征：样本特征：Only co

20、ntaining Restatements prompted by wrongdoingo 样本统计：样本统计： S&P1500 and available through Execucomp (385篇）GAO report （845篇）voluntary restaters （170篇）Forced restaters （215篇）样本内部样本内部T检验检验 Differences between those firms labeled as voluntary restaters and the foeced restaters.比较因素Firm size （assets)num

21、ber of employeesfirm performanceleverageoverall firm healtht 1.420.030.140.111.11pp 0.16p 0.96p 0.88p 0.91p 0.26Theres no significant differences between those firms labeled as voluntary restaters and the foeced restaters.样本实际调查样本实际调查o 方法：方法：Simulating the GAO search and classification processo 过程：过

22、程：Investigating each company to determine the announcement date(s) of the expected restatement and the reason(s) for the restatement and recorded it.o 结论：结论：1. Each company restated future earnings for aggressive and/or irregular reasons.2. Aggressive accounting practices in the sample were confined

23、 mostly to revenue recognition (40%)and cost or expenses (38%) and fraudulent accounting(22%).3. Agreeing that 170 of announcements should be labeled voluntary（二）变量（二）变量 因变量因变量o Voluntary whether firms voluntarily restated their earnings in a given year. Dichotomous and measured at the firm-year lev

24、el.（二）变量（二）变量 自变量自变量o Informal Leader ForcesPerformance leader = 1 或 0 （dichotomous）Size leader = 1 或 0 （dichotomous）o Informal Peer ForcesThe count of voluntary restaters in a given industry in the prior year o Informal Network ConnectionsShared auditor = 1 或 0 （dichotomous）o Formal Regulatory Forc

25、es The count of firms in a given industry that were previously forced to restate by the SEC in the prior year. o Status The rank of the number of the firms employees vis-vis other industry members. (1 n)Industrys seventy fifth percentile or greater in return on assets (ROA) and voluntarily restated

26、its earnings in the prior year .Industrys seventy fifth percentile or greater in assets and voluntarily restated its earnings in the prior year. Sharing the same auditor with the firm voluntarily restating its earnings in the prior year.（二）变量（二）变量 控制变量控制变量oOption PercentageThe ratio of the top manag

27、ement teams mean option value to total compensation. (salary+bonus+options+additional income). oAudit Committee MeetingsThe number of meetings each year for each firm in our sample for the 19942001period.oFirm Size Assets The annual year-end asset total for each firm over the eight-year periodoFirm

28、Leverage The ratio of a firms long-term debt to its assets oFirm Performance ROA Return On Assets,资产收益率 oMultiple Restaters = 1 或或 0 Beginning with a firms second restatement receives a “1”.（三）测验分析（三）测验分析 模型模型o Cox proportional hazards regression model （COX 比例风险回归模型）比例风险回归模型） h (t | xj)=h0 ( t ) exp

29、(xjx) h (t | xj)为具有j个协变量X的个体在时刻t的风险函数，h0 ( t )为基线风险函数，x为估算的回归系数。 相对危险度（相对危险度（RR）：）：任意两个个体的风险函数之比 风险比风险比HR：变量xj暴露水平时的风险率与非暴露时的风险率，约等于相对风险率RR 一般用于计算事件发生的可能性和时序性一般用于计算事件发生的可能性和时序性 本文用于研究社会压力和监管势力对本文用于研究社会压力和监管势力对重述不法行为重述不法行为及其财产的可能性及其财产的可能性的影响。的影响。 （三）测验分析（三）测验分析 结果结果o Table 1： Descriptive Statistics a

30、nd Correlationso Table 2 ：Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results for Voluntary Restatements（三）测验分析（三）测验分析 信度检验信度检验o Reran the models with forced restaters as our 0/1 dependent variable To check the theory that informal social forces rather than formal regulatory forces drive voluntary decisions.o Sub

31、stitute several alternative measures of constructs To check for consistencyo Ran the model using the 149 restaters labeled voluntary by the GAO in place of the 170To check the robustness of our results o Ran repeated measures of logit and probit models with robust estimators of variance in place of

32、the Cox model To check that the Cox regressions to show that our results are robust under a more conservative test.四、讨论o Comparing with previous studies Prior research ：u Focused almost entirely on explaining the internal firm-level reasons that may be conducive to white-collar crime and corruption

33、and have not examined what external forces could lead companies toward recovery and public rehabilitation after they have undertaken some illegal activities. Comparing with previous studiesu Accounting research on restatements, while vast, has yet to explore the social and regulatory forces that inf

34、luence the likelihood of a firm restating its earnings, nor has it investigated the impact of these informal and formal sanctions on the likelihood of a firm voluntarily coming forward and admitting wrongdoing. Comparing with previous studiesu Prior research on corporate governance and compliance ha

35、s not examined how formal and informal external forces affect a firms decision to voluntarily disclose past wrongdoing Comparing with previous studies “our study” ：u The contribution of this study lies in its focus on explaining and testing how external social and regulatory factors induce firms vol

36、untary disclosure of past wrongdoing as measured by voluntary restatement of earnings. Comparing with previous studiesu We find that both industry-level self-regulatory mechanisms and formal sanctions can influence the firms decision to come forward and admit its malfeasanceu Our study finds a negat

37、ive impact of formal regulatory forces (via direct government intervention) on the likelihood of a firm coming forward and disclosing wrongdoing. It also establishes that higher firm status reduces the impact of certain industry leader and peer pressures on coming forward. Some instructions for this

38、 studyo Some instructions for this study Our study extends corporate governance research by demonstrating that informal social forces can prompt firms to undertake voluntary actions 。 In our research, we predicted that prior voluntary restatements of industry leaders, peers, and network members woul

39、d reduce potential restaters uncertainty about the consequences of their actions. Some instructions for this study We also found that companies associated through indirect social ties, such as sharing a connection to the same accounting firm, may develop some common patterns of behavior The results

40、also supported our hypothesis that formal regulatory forces have a negative rather than a positive effect on the likelihood of firms coming forward and voluntarily disclosing wrongdoing Some instructions for this study We also find that the effects of leaders and peers past actions on the likelihood

41、 of a firm voluntarily disclosing wrongdoing depend on the focal firms status A particular strength of this study is that it has examined a very specific type of corporate misconduct or wrongdoing: the voluntary restatement of earnings. Some instructions for this study Another strength of our study

42、was that our sample of restaters comes from those firms that are members of the S&P 1,500, which represents nearly 90% of the U.S . Our study was also prior to the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The prospects for future researcho The prospects for future research Future research shou

43、ld examine whether other types of social network ties, including belonging to the same boards, educational institutions, and professional associations would affect a firms decision to voluntarily disclose its past wrongdoing. The prospects for future researcho The prospects for future research Futur

44、e research should investigate other settings and decisions where uncertainty may drive the emergence of informal norm-setting behavior, such as product quality, safety standards, and advertising norms.The prospects for future research Future research should examine whether other types of social netw

45、ork ties, including belonging to the same boards, educational institutions, and professional associations would affect a firms decision to voluntarily disclose its past wrongdoing. The prospects for future research Future research that has access to managerial reasoning for voluntarily restating ear

46、nings or admitting other forms of corporate wrongdoing could achieve that goal. We hope that our findings serve as an anchor point for future research on voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing as well as the multiple factors that impact this difficult decision.五、致谢五、致谢o Axel v. Werder Don Hambrick, Ed Z

47、ajac, and three anonymous reviewers oOliver Kim, Chuck LaHaie, Jim Peters, Mike Peters, Cindy Stevens, and individuals at the U.S. GAO othe Academy of Management annual meetings 六、结束语六、结束语oThe explanation about coded rank To properly interpret the effect of status on the other independent variables,

48、 we have not reverse coded rank. oIt is also important to note that in our sample, the SEC did not consistently target specific industries. oIn a post hoc test, we also found a negative direct effect between a firms status and the likelihood that it would voluntarily restate its earnings (HR=097; 001).