欧洲CRO论坛 PowerBlackoutRisks

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1、Power Blackout RisksRisk Management OptionsEmerging Risk Initiative Position PaperNovember 201134555688912121518182022Content1. Summary2. Power blackouts challenge society and economy3. Blackout risks on the increase3.1. HOW POWER MARKET TRENDS INFLUENCE BLACKOUT RISKS3.1.1.3.1.2.3.1.3.Liberalisatio

2、n and privatisationRenewable energiesHuge investments in power supply infrastructure required53.2. HISTORICAL POWER BLACKOUT EVENTS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS3.2.1.3.2.2.Historical blackoutsWhat are the causes of blackouts?3.2.3.Average blackout duration per country114. Potential blackout scenario4.1. CON

3、SEQUENCES4.2. COST ANALYSIS OF HISTORIC BLACKOUT SCENARIOS5. Considerations for risk management5.1. TRENDS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION (BI) RISK LANDSCAPEAND POWER DEPENDENCY5.1.1.5.1.2.General impact of blackout in light of changed production processesSpecific impact based on car manufactur

4、ers18195.2. BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING TO MITIGATE POWER BLACKOUT RISKS5.3. RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS5.3.1.5.3.2.5.3.3.5.3.4.Principles of insurabilityCurrent risk transfer solutionsFuture risk transfer productsResidual risk acceptance222324246. Conclusion7. AnnexAuthors:Michael Bruch, Volker Mnch,

5、Markus Aichinger (Allianz)Michael Kuhn, Martin Weymann (Swiss Re)Gerhard Schmid (Munich Re)Editor:Markus Aichinger (Allianz)Grateful acknowledgment to all CRO Forum Emerging Risk Initiative member companiesfor their comments and revisions.Title picture: Credit: C. Mayhew & R. Simmon (NASA/GSFC), NOA

6、A/ NGDC, DMSP Digital ArchiveLayout: volk:art51, Munich | Printing: Mhlbauer Druck, Munich22526131. SummaryBlackouts during the last ten years in Europe and Northern America have demonstrated an increasing likelihoodof supra-regional blackouts with accompanying large economic losses. The earthquake,

7、 tsunami damage andpower shortages that idled thousands of Japans factories in 2011 highlighted its role as a key and sometimesthe only source of auto parts, graphics chips and other high-end components. Many manufacturers are currentlyusing up the inventories that they had in stock before the earth

8、quake. A similar situation could occur as a resultof a larger power outage and this risk may further increase in the future. One reason are insufficient incentives toinvest in reliable power supply infrastructures. But new and smarter grids including storage capacities (e.g. pumped-storage hydropowe

9、r plants) are required to handle the future growth of volatile renewable energies, which arelocated far away from the centres of demand. Furthermore the vulnerability of the power supply industry, theindustrial and commercial companies and the public and private sector is high due to the interconnec

10、tednessand dependency of all areas on Information and Communication Technology (ICT), navigational systems andother electronic devices.Whereas short term power blackouts are experienced frequently on a local or regional level around the world(e.g. caused by natural catastrophe events like earthquake

11、s, storms, floods or heat waves), societies are not familiarwith large scale, long-lasting, disruptive power blackouts. Traditional scenarios only assume blackouts for a few daysand losses seem to be moderate, but if we are considering longer lasting blackouts, which are most likely from spaceweathe

12、r or coordinated cyber or terrorist attacks, the impacts on society and economy might be significant.So far insurance companies were not affected significantly beyond taking care of their own business continuitymanagement in order to mitigate losses following a blackout. Risk transfer via insurance

13、has usually requiredphysical damage to either the insureds assets or the assets of specific service providers to trigger a businessinterruption claim. But only 20% to 25% of business interruptions, such as supply chain disruptions are related toa physical loss1. Therefore insured persons and organis

14、ations should be aware that they may face huge uninsuredlosses. This might trigger an increasing demand for new risk transfer solutions related to power blackout risks inthe future.The insurance industry can offer well contained event covers which fulfil the principles of insurance: randomness,asses

15、sability, mutuality and economic viability whereas utilities and governments have to increase their efforts tomake our power infrastructure resilient against such events.http:/ on Power Blackout Risks2. Power blackouts challenge society and economyElectricity is the backbone of each industrialised s

16、ociety and economy. Modern countries are not usedto having even short power blackouts. The increased dependency on continuous power supply related toelectronics, industrial production, and daily life makes todays society much more vulnerable concerning powersupply interruptions. A brownout (reduced

17、voltage) of some minutes or a similar blackout (complete failure ofelectricity supply) may cause some inconvenience at home such as having the lights turn off. But a blackoutof a few hours or even several days would have a significant impact on our daily life and the entire economy.Critical infrastr

18、ucture such as communication and transport would be hampered, the heating and water supplywould stop and production processes and trading would cease. Emergency services like fire, police or ambulancecould not be called due the breakdown of the telecommunication systems. Hospitals would only be able

19、 to workas long as the emergency power supply is supplied with fuel. Financial trading, cash machines and supermarketswould in turn have to close down, which would ultimately cause a catastrophic scenario. If the blackout were tospread across the border lines, which is more likely today due to the i

20、nterconnection of power grids betweendifferent countries, the impacts would escalate as a function of the duration of the interruption.The following position paper highlights the risks and future trends linked to power blackouts. It further explores riskmanagement options including operational risk

21、management measures, the importance of a high quality businesscontinuity management plan and risk transfer options. Furthermore it emphasizes the insurance industrys optionsto expand coverage based on physical damage and to consider new non-physical damage insurance solutions.This might be insurance

22、 cover or alternative risk transfer solutions, which respond and cover emerging risks suchas power outages, but also political risks, pandemics and/or supply chain disruptions.picture alliance/dpa4WorldU.S.A.CanadaU.S.A.PhilippinesIndonesiaU.S.A.WorldWorldWorldWorldChinaChina BrazilJapanGermanyGerma

23、nyBrazilSpainSpain23453. Blackout risks on the increase3.1. How power market trends influence blackout risksThe worldwide power supply industry experienced two major changes in the last ten to twenty years: Liberalisation and privatisation Expansion of renewable energy production capacities3.1.1. LI

24、BERALISATION AND PRIVATISATION2Nowadays, most industrialised countries have 10 to 20 years experience with privatisation and liberalisation ofelectricity systems. The liberalisation of the market resulted in the separation of power generation and transmissionand distribution (T&D) business. This pro

25、cess has created an additional interface which can adversely impactcommunication and coordination activities between operators on both sides. The past blackout events reveal (seeboxes in 3.2.1 and annex) that underlying causes are also partly linked to the privatisation and liberalisation trendsdue

26、to missing incentives to invest in reliable, and therefore well maintained, infrastructures. The discrepancy isfurther described in chapter 3.1.3.3.1.2. RENEWABLE ENERGIES3Efforts to mitigate climate change across the world are focusing on the expansion of renewable energy productione.g. onshore and

27、 offshore wind farms, solar and biomass power plants. Half of the estimated 194 gigawatts (GW)of newly added electric capacity worldwide in 2010 is represented by renewable energies which was an increase of8% compared to 2009. According to the World Wind Energy Association (WWEA), about 175,000 mega

28、watts (MW)of energy are now being produced by wind power stations around the world. Leading producers are the United States,China and Spain. The European Union intends to increase the renewable energy share of total energy production to20% by 2020.Figure 14: The top three countries for Renewable Ene

29、rgy electricity productionWind430Hydroelectricity3,428Geothermal62.5Solar Photovoltaic18.2Biomass210TWh201094.750.743.072139636616.510.37.06.96.22.955.633.827.1Total electricityproductionTWhPercentage of81.758.1RE %2.02.21.214.316.017.10.30.416.64.5 100 km)above the earths surface such bombs are cal

30、led a HEMP (high altitude electromagnetic pulse) weapon. Alreadyin 1962 a military test 400 km above the Pacific proved the power of such an attack.As an unintended side effect the power and telephone infrastructure of Hawaii was affected despite the smallbomb (1.4 Mt) and the far distance (1500 km)

31、 from the point of detonation.IEMI (Intentional Electro Magnetic Interference) attacks use special high power electromagnetic weapons withoutany of the side effects of a classic explosion and with limited impact area.Both such weapons have the capacity to cause similar types of damage, such as sever

32、e solar storms (seeseparate box). HEMPs or IEMIs can lead to severe physical damage to all unprotected electronics and transformersby inducing several 100 to 1000s of volts. Typically microchips operate in the range of 1.5 to 5 volts and aretherefore not capable of withstanding such voltages. The im

33、pact area can be in the range of several hundredmeters to an entire continent.In the U.S. the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic PulseAttack (http:/www.empcommission.org) researches the effects and mitigation measures to such attacks.10Averagenumberofpoweroutag

34、eperyearAveragedurationofeachpoweroutage(hours)9878113.2.3. AVERAGE BLACKOUT DURATION PER COUNTRYFigure 4: Outages per year and duration, 20097140012007Average durationof each outagein hoursAverage numberof outagesper year100080060065434002200010AllcountriesEast Asia& PacificEasternEurope &Central A

35、siaLatinAmerica &CaribbeanMiddle East& NorthAfricaOECDSouth AsiaSub-SaharanAfricaCountries groupingSource: World BankReliability of power supply varies significantly across regions (Figure 4). Even within OECD countries the quality ofsupply is not uniform and power outages quite severly impact econo

36、my. The United States, as an example, has anaverage of nine hours of disruptions each year for every consumer. Those interruptions are estimated to result ineconomical losses of least USD 150 bn each year. Compared to other industrialized countries the reliability of theU.S. grid is 5-10 times less

37、than in major European countries. The average electricity consumer in U.S. has tocope with approx. 30 times more service interruptions each year than in Japan or Singapore. U.S. grid stabilitywill decrease in the future if there are not enough investments in the infrastructure.The October 2007 study

38、, “2007 Long-Term Reliability Assessment,” of NERC (North American Electric ReliabilityCorporation) came to the following conclusions:8 Long-term capacity margins on the nations transmission systems are inadequate to protect these systemsfrom interruptions such as brownouts or blackouts. Absent imme

39、diate investments, this condition will worsenover the next decade; Projected increases in peak demand for electricity exceed projected additions of generation capacity; The areas of greatest concern are California, the Rocky Mountain states, New England, Texas, the Southwest,and the Midwest. In tota

40、l, the U.S. will require about 120 GW of new generation just to maintain the minimum 15 percentcapacity margin required for system reliability.WORLD BANK STUDY, HTTP:/SITERESOURCES.WORLDBANK.ORG/EXTESC/RESOURCES/APPROACH_PAPER_ANNEXES_14_OCTOBER_2009.PDFHTTP:/WWW.OE.ENERGY.GOV/DOCUMENTSANDMEDIA/ATTA

41、CHMENT_1_NEXTGEN_ENERGY_COUNCIL_LIGHTS_OUT_STUDY.PDF.PDFCRObriefing on Power Blackout Risks94. Potential blackout scenarioA regional blackout lasting more than several days already could be considered as a “worst case” scenario.Most back-up and security systems will fail after a longer period withou

42、t electric power, leading to an almostcomplete failure of most critical infrastructures.As shown before such a scenario could be caused by a wide range of events.For example, during the European heat wave of 2003, generation of electricity of power plants, incl. nuclearplants, had to be reduced due

43、to the scarcity and high temperatures of the adjacent water bodies which aresubstantial for cooling purposes. Almost all rivers had record low water levels leading to reduced hydroelectricgeneration. Due to the massive lack of wind even wind generation capacity was down significantly. Prolongedheat

44、waves may additionally result in a drop in biomass production due to reduced growth of plants.If such preconditions coincide with a high electricity demand and increasing instability in the power grid, thereis the potential for a supra regional collapse.A comparable collapse can also be caused by a

45、severe geomagnetic storm or an HEMP attack, due to the simul-taneous damage to several key transformer locations and/or high voltage transmission lines. (OECD report 2011.9)4.1. ConsequencesMost critical systems such as hospitals, first responder facilities, water and sewage systems and stockexchang

46、es have backup power generation in place. However, these typically have only enough fuel for severalhours to a maximum of a few days.Immediately after a blackout, it is not possible to purchase any goods without cash as no electronic paymentis possible. The 2003 blackout illustrated that after 3 to

47、6 hours without power most fuel stations and therefineries had to close down, leaving the public without fuel for cars or backup generators as the pumps didnot operate. Aluminium melting furnaces will already sustain irreversible physical damage after 4-5 hours withoutelectricity.Governments have ty

48、pically, however, implemented emergency fuel storages to keep most critical facilitiesalive for several weeks up to a month.After one month with no electrical power, water, transportation, emergency services, critical manufacturing,and chemical sectors can face widespread outages within the affected

49、 region. The loss of water systems dueto a power outage leads to many cascading effects. Hospitals, schools, nursing homes, restaurants, and officebuildings all rely on water to operate. Water is used for drinking, sanitation, and heating and cooling systemsin those facilities. Many manufacturing op

50、erations either use water as an ingredient in their processes or rely onwastewater systems to remove and process their manufacturing waste. Fire fighters depend on water to carryout their emergency response, and access to safe water is necessary for providing mass care services andpreventing the spr

51、ead of disease. Without electricity most heating systems do not operate. During winter typicalhomes can cool to below freezing level within few days. It must be expected that people will try to heat theirhomes using open fires, leading to many homes burning while there is no water for emergency resp

52、onse teams.http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/25/46891645.pdf1213Space weatherThe term space weather summarizes different astrophysical effects the earth is exposed to. Constantly emittedclouds of electrically charged particles (plasma) from the sun into space are called solar wind. Large eruptionsof pl

53、asma from the suns corona are known as coronal mass ejections (CME) and create solar storms. The sunfollows an 11 year cycle of changing solar activity with the next maximum expected in 2013. During a solarmaximum 1 CME reaches the earths orbit every 5 days on average, while during a solar minimum o

54、nly 1 CMEreaches our planet every 45 days.A solar storm that reaches earth, generates intensive showers of particles and gigantic currents in the ionosphere(producing bright auroras) and induces major alterations in the geomagnetic field resulting in a geomagnetic storm.Large scale electric conducto

55、rs in the changing magnetic field, whether cables or pipes, run currents called geo-magnetically induced currents (GIC). Depending on the underneath geology long power lines connect (or shortcircuit) regions of different geoelectric potential. This can trigger GIC (up to 200 Ampere or more over time

56、 spansof more than 10 seconds) to enter the power grid through transformer grounding cables. The electromagneticinduction is higher the longer the transmission line and more severe for east-west directed transmission lines.While power grids normally work with alternating currents they are not design

57、ed to handle direct currents (like GIC)induced by a geomagnetic storm. Those currents affect the electricity infrastructure, in particular high-voltageregulating transformers and substations, but also telecommunication networks and even pipe lines are exposed.GIC could hold the power to not only cau

58、se tripping of transformers but also damage or even destroy transformers,resulting in a different quality of power outage, i.e. not only large-scale but also long-lasting.The first historical event where GIC appear to be linked to a large loss was a telegraph breakdown on September 2,1859 the so-cal

59、led Carrington event. The day before, scientists detected a spectacular solar flare that hadtriggered a series of CMEs, followed by the largest aurora ever reported. At the same time, the extreme geo-magnetic storm overloaded telegraph lines worldwide, causing short circuits and fires in telegraph s

60、tations andultimately a breakdown in service.More recently on March 13, 1989, during a large magnetic storm accompanied by vivid auroras visible as farsouth as Hawaii and Cuba, GICs hit power lines from the Hydro-Qubec power network. This led to a blackoutaffecting 6 million people and losses of mor

61、e than CAD 10 million. The increasing dependence of society onelectricity and electronics, and of course satellites (e.g. GPS timing signals), leads to a growing exposure tostrong space weather events, amplified by over-aged or sometimes degraded high-voltage equipment. CRObriefing on Power Blackout

62、 RisksScenario of large-scale and long-lasting power outageWorst case solar storm scenario: A severe geomagnetic storm (similar to the Carrington event of 1859) distorts the Earths magnetic fieldcreating colourful aurora effects on the night sky. Multiple transformers fail (either tripping or damage

63、)with cascading effects leading to a widespread power outage in the Northern Hemisphere (mainly affectedareas include Canada, U.S.A., Scandinavia and Russia). Water, food, and fuel supply is disrupted, financialtransactions stop, communication channels are interrupted and transportation of goods get

64、 challenging.As transformers have typical replacement periods of several months up to a year the power blackout mightlast longer than a few months.U.S. Storyline for worst case U.S. impacts* Affected U.S. regions with 130 m people affected Assumptions: strength as May 1921 event (10 x strength of 19

65、89 events, but less strong than 1859Carrington event) 300 transformers affected; delivery time per transformer about 12 months Economic costs USD 1 trillion Further impacts include satellite damage, GPS signal disturbance, telecommunications break-down andindustry dependent on electricity.This worst

66、 case scenario is mainly based on assumptions of widespread catastrophic transformer damages,long term blackouts, lengthy restoration times, and chronic shortages which will take 4 to 10 years for a fullrecovery.Such a scenario although unlikely can have devastating economic impacts and will also impact manyindustries. The insurance industry covers which could potentially be affected include: Property: commercial and industrial business as well as personal lines Liability: general liability, Dir