Russia's Power and Alliances in the 21st Century

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1、Russias Power and Alliances in the 21st CenturyBy Andrei P. Tsygankov For helpful comments I would like to thank Valentina Feklyunina, the editors and all the participants of the workshop.San Francisco State UniversityIn “Perspectives on the Changing Global Balance of Power,” edited by Alasdair Youn

2、g and Jane Duckett, special issue of Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4, October 2010, forthcoming.AbstractRussias power resources have recovered significantly since the start of the 21st century and with that recovery the Kremlin has become more assertive in pursuing its great power ambitions. To remain a gr

3、eat power, however, even a regional one, Russia has to recover its economy and learn to exploit its comparative advantages, such as expertise in energy and military affairs and memberships in international organizations.IntroductionWhat you are defines what you do. Russia has historically establishe

4、d itself as a regional great power and strives to preserve that position in the new international environment. Until the Bolshevik revolution, Russia had had no global ambitions but sought to dominate the Eurasian landmass from the Far East to the Balkans and Eastern Europe. After the short-lived gl

5、obal geopolitical struggle with the Western nations during the Cold War, Russia is returning to its identity as a regional great power. Its priorities once again include security and prosperity in the territories adjacent to its borders, and it increasingly sees itself as a European power with speci

6、al relations to Asia and the Far East (Tsygankov 2007). In the new world of globalization, Russia has no global economic reach of China or India. Even though it sprawls over eleven time zones and four major regions Europe, Central Asia, the Far East and the Arctic and borders several others (Pavlovs

7、ky 2009), Russia is not a global power.Russia is, however, a peculiar regional power. It seeks to remain regional by acting globally, thus distinguishing itself from established global powers in the West and rising global powers, such as Brazil, China and India. As Stephen Kotkin (2009) puts it, Rus

8、sia “remains a regional power that acts like a global superpower”, whereas China “has been transformed into a global superpower but still mostly acts like a regional power.” Russia acts in the way it does because geography and history have taught it the value of staying engaged with the most advance

9、d nations. At least since emergence of the West as the dominant civilization, Russia has been determined to secure recognition and be considered “like the West.” If the Western nations are great powers, Russia too aspires to such status. If the West demonstrates accomplishments in institution-buildi

10、ng, economic prosperity and human rights protection, Russian leaders are also drawn to these accomplishments and attempt to replicate them at home. Such global engagement has been essential for developing the economic and military capabilities necessary for survival in a region historically populate

11、d by some of the most powerful states on earth. To secure borders and meet other challenges in Eurasia, Russia has had to develop the capabilities and status of a great power. Remaining a great power, even a regional one, today is a serious challenge. Russia must act in the new international context

12、 which includes preservation of a considerable Western influence and the expansion of Chinese influences in Eurasia. To succeed, Russia has to develop its capacity of a power by exploiting its global comparative advantages, such as expertise in energy and military affairs and memberships in internat

13、ional organizations. Such global engagement is necessary yet again for generating revenue, protecting Russias sovereignty and status. Many Western observers (e.g., Menon and Motyl 2007; Wallander 2007) are skeptical that the Russias leadership is able to design a coherent long-term plan with appropr

14、iate institutional, material and intellectual support, and this is in part because the Kremlin is fundamentally weakened by the competition of rival factions. The Kremlin, however, has overcome many of its weaknesses of the 1990s and reached consensus on some principle objectives of Russias foreign

15、policy, such as preservation of Russias global influence and status of a regional great power. On Russias consolidation and change in elite belief system, see Mankoff 2009; Tsygankov 2010. This article first explores the origins of Russias great power ambitions. It then evaluates Russias recovery af

16、ter the Soviet disintegration and the countrys place in the global power calculus by analyzing its economic, political and military capabilities. The final section offers assessment of Russias likely strategy and alliances within the next ten to twenty years given the existing international predicam

17、ents. The origins of Russias great power ambitionsRussia has established itself as a great power by engaging more advanced state in projects of common concern or challenging them to recognize Russias ambitions and international claims. In so doing, Russian leaders have sought to preserve limited and

18、 regional, rather than global, control, yet they have also recognized the importance of acting globally for achieving what are largely regional objectives. These objectives included defense of its borders and cultural allies Orthodox Christians in the 19th century, communists in the 20th century and

19、 ethnic Russians after the Soviet disintegration and these objectives required that Russia remain a great power and be recognized as such by the outside world. Historically, Russias power status was maintained by addressing diverse international challenges. After the fall of Byzantium in the 15th ce

20、ntury, Russia emerged as the center of the Eastern Christianity and fought multiple wars with the Ottoman Empire to defend Orthodox Christians in the Crimea and the Balkans. Russia also challenged European states to recognize its regional ambitions. In the 20th century, the Kremlin followed largely

21、the same logic when it challenged the United States and Britain to recognize the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.By the late-20th century, the international context had changed. Ideological confrontation yielded to the logic of economic globalization, and Russia too had to change method

22、s to defend its position as a great power. Russia now had to shift emphasis from defeating its rivals militarily or through counter-intelligence operations to demonstrating its ability to compete on the global markets. Two historical forces shaped Russias behavior. First, although it has emerged as

23、historically dependent on the Wests power and recognition, Russia has never been colonized by the Western nations and greatly values its political and spiritual independence (Poe 2003). Such independence has kept alive Russias ambitions to preserve its influence in Eurasia and Eastern Europe. Second

24、, being a continental empire with vast borders made Russia wary of multiple and varied challenges to its security. Russia compensated for this vulnerability by developing a highly centralized political system in order to be able to respond rapidly to threats from abroad. Although Russias political a

25、nd economic system was not principally different from those of Western European states in the early 17th century, autocracy had to be transformed to comply with imperatives of military modernization (Lynch 2005: 23-25) The highly centralized state also gained an upper hand internally often by suppre

26、ssing resistance from commercial classes. Both established and rising power face relatively few external threats to their security. Russia, however, remains preoccupied with the security of its borders and natural resources and acts as a concerned regional power. Much of this preoccupation has roots

27、 in Russias militarized history and geography of resistance to real and perceived threats from abroad. By contrast, the Western states, especially those protected by the oceans from potential invasions, historically had fewer security challenges. Recovering state and power capabilitiesAfter the coll

28、apse of the Soviet Union, Russias power capabilities declined substantially. Russia lost one sixth of its territory, its economy shrank by some 50 percent and the state was divided by powerful individuals practically losing the ability to govern. Many observers referred to Russia during the 1990s as

29、 being on the verge of becoming a failed state (see, for example, Holmes 1997; Popov 2004; Willerton, Beznosov and Carrier 2005). The Western states expected Russia to follow their political and economic recommendations, yet programs of Western assistance served mostly to encourage the destruction o

30、f the previous economic system and to build relationships within a narrow and corrupt ruling elite (see, Wedel 1998; Cohen 2000; Reddaway and Glinski 2001). For example, the figures of the overall capital flight during 1992-99 exceeded the amount of financial assistance. According to Russias officia

31、l statistics, capital flight was $182 billion while foreign assistance amounted to $174 billion (Korolev 2001: 76). The so-called reformers in Russia were well aware of the state of affairs, yet they were unable to say “No” to Western “assistance.” The situation has changed since the late-1990s when

32、 Russia began to recover. Russias economic power, both in terms of shares of global gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita, has increased (Young, this volume, figures 1-2). By 2007 the economy had recovered to its 1990 level and growth continued to grow at about 7 percent per year. Thus dur

33、ing 1999-2007 the overall size of the economy increased about six times in current dollars from $200 billion to $1.3 trillion. Russias per-capita GDP quadrupled to nearly $7,000, and about 20 million people were lifted out of poverty (RIA Novosti, March 1, 2008). Another dimension of Russias recover

34、y was that its middle class now constituted about 25 percent of the population (Kommersant, February 27, 2008). The social aspect of recovery is essential for preventing internal destabilization and allowing the state to conduct an active foreign policy. Over the 2000-2005, the average Russian saw a

35、 26 percent annual growth in his income, relative to only 10 percent rise in that of the average Chinese (Crandall 2006). As a result, the number of Russians who thought that the chosen development course in Russia was correct had been growing year on year. Even the global financial crisis has not c

36、hanged the fact that almost 80% of Russian remains satisfied with their living standards (RIA Novosti, March 9, 2010). Other significant Russian power resources are its oil and gas reserves. Russia has approximately 13 percent of the worlds known oil reserves and 34 percent of its gas reserves (Arba

37、tov, Belova and Feygin 2006). This power resource has gained in importance as global energy demand and prices have risen. Russias main energy markets are in Europe, and Europe is expected to considerably increase its consumption of national gas over time. According to estimates of the International

38、Atomic Energy Agency, Russian gas will account for about 33-34 percent of European demand compared with the current 25 percent (RIA-Novosti, March 10, 2010). Energy remains Russias important comparative advantage and, although the global economic recession has seriously affected Russia, energy exper

39、ts project recovery of the markets within the next several years.Acting assertively on the recovered state and power capabilitiesRecovery of state and power capabilities allowed the Kremlin to act assertively in foreign policy. The philosophy behind such assertiveness has been state-led internationa

40、l economic expansion. Rather than becoming a wide-open to Western economic and political influences something that the new Russian leadership had experimented with during the 1990s it now pursued a course of selective openness managed by an increasingly strong and nationalistic state. In the world o

41、f growing energy prices, the emphasis shifted from providing macroeconomic discipline and tough fiscal policies toward desire to capitalize on Russias reserves of natural gas and oil. As viewed by Vladimir Putin, the role of the energy sector is to work with the state to promote international econom

42、ic expansion and to reinforce sovereignty and independence which were undermined during the 1990s. According to this perspective, relying on market forces is essential, but insufficient: “Even in developed countries, market mechanisms do not provide solutions to strategic tasks of resource use, prot

43、ecting nature, and sustainable economic security.” The passage is from Putins PhD thesis “Mineral Raw Materials in the Strategy for Development of the Russian Economy” defended in 1999 (cited in Larsson 2006: 58). The state therefore has to shape policy outcomes by actively seeking to control social

44、 resources, coordinating the activities of key social players and assisting the country in finding its niche in the global economy. Thus the Kremlin insists on the need for Russia to protect its path of development and natural resources. The economic recovery provided conditions for Russias active b

45、usiness promotion in Europe, which accounts for 50% of Russias foreign trade. The Kremlin insisted on long-term contracts with Europeans and greater integration with European markets in order to avoid repetition of the 1985-1986 scenario when sharp decline in energy prices had considerably contribut

46、ed to breakup of the Soviet economy. Outside European markets, Moscow hardly has a choice of not developing its capacity as a global middleman by coordinating its production with other key energy producers and offering its expertise in building energy infrastructure across the world.The Kremlin also

47、 has been actively selling weapons abroad in part to raise revenue for domestic modernization. The main customers of Russias armament are global and include India, China, Algeria, Venesuala, Malaysia and Syria. Despite the global financial crisis, Russia exported in 2009 $7.4 billion worth of weapon

48、s 10 percent more than in the previous year (Itar-Tass, January 30, 2010). Furthermore, the Kremlin adopted a more assertive global stance to defend its vision of international rules - partly to reflect Russias concerns with its sovereignty and independence and partly to respond to dissatisfaction w

49、ith the United Statess invasion of Iraq and the former Soviet region. Soon after the invasion of Iraq, the United States pushed the entire former Soviet region toward transforming its political institutions and was now working on extending membership in the alliance to former Soviet states such as A

50、zerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. Washington also was routinely denouncing Russia for using energy as political leverage to influence its neighbors policies. In response, Putin (2007) accused the United States of disdain for the basic principles of international law and having overstepped its national

51、 borders in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies. Putins successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, built on Putins vision, seeking to position Russia as a more global player and a maker of new global rules. Russia thus seeks to articulate its concerns using its membership within

52、 existing international organizations, particularly its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and proposing new international treaties, such as a new pan-European treaty to establish a new security architecture, in which Russia would become a fully-fledged participan

53、t and NATO cease to serve as the key organization responsible for European security. Medvedev ( 2008) also proposed an overhaul of the international economic order so that it was less reliant on the US, which he blamed for causing the global financial crisis by trying to substitute itself for the gl

54、obal commodities and financial markets. The Kremlin, along with China and other BRIC countries, has also advocated steps to reduce reliance on the dollar in international economic transactions. So far, these efforts have not had much success.Thus Russia has become stronger and more confident since 2

55、000. It has preserved and developed important attributes of a great power and is more recognized as such by the outside world. In the longer run, however, Russia faces multiple challenges to its ambition to remaining a great power. Russias material capabilities are limited. Although it has recovered

56、 from the longest economic depression in its history, much of the Russias recovery has been due to high oil prices. According to World Bank estimates, energy has accounted for about 25 percent of the Russian economy and for about 50% of its GDP growth (Rutland 2008: 1063-1064). Moreover, although Ru

57、ssias economic growth during the seven years preceding the recent financial crisis was impressive, its share of global GDP is a mere 2.3 percent, and may rise only to 3.5 percent by 2020 (Kuchins and Weitz 2008: 6). Consequently, Russia is unlikely to close the gap with the United States in terms of

58、 GDP during the next ten to fifteen years and the gaps between its GDP and those of China and India will continue to widen. In addition, Russias military expenditures do not match those of China, France, and the United Kingdom, not to mention the US. Overall, Russia has made some progress in some ar

59、eas, but continues to stagnate and fall behind in others. The fact that Russia has managed to muddle through thus far is not a guarantee that it will be able to in the future, and the current economic crisis narrows the Kremlins options further. During the recent crisis, Russia, which is heavily dep

60、endent on energy, including exports, was hit particularly hard and its GDP fell by around 9 percent in 2009, while China and India continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace. Russia has also had to spend a considerable portion of its reserves to bail out domestic enterprises, including non-competiti

61、ve ones, and to scale down its activist foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Mankoff 2010). The crisis therefore has slowed down Russias international assertiveness.Adjusting to changed global circumstances In the 21st century, Russias foreign policy will be affected by two critical fact

62、ors continuing economic globalization and the consequent importance of economic development rather than security alignments; and gradual decline of the Wests power. Under the conditions of economic globalization, Russia will continue to seek to preserve its regional great power status by building ne

63、w alliances. Unlike the old alliances, which were exclusive military commitments, the new alliances are soft in the sense that they are non-exclusive and driven by specific economic and political needs. In addition, the international system is moving away from dominance of the West that characterize

64、d the post-Cold War period, although the direction of that development remains unclear. Military involvement in the Middle East and Afghanistan, as well as the continuous global financial crisis, makes it difficult for the West to function as the worlds economic and political authority. China and th

65、e Asia-Pacific region are emerging as new centers of the worlds gravity. For much of the post-Cold War period inter-state conflicts did not challenge the Wests ability to intervene, but Russias military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 underlined its willingness to use force in pursuing its in

66、terests and challenged the Wests monopoly to interfere as a peacemaker. In the increasingly post-Western world, the US may require additional allies and may have to learn to act in consultation with the Kremlin, among others. Consultations with China and Russia with regard to Iran and North Korea are among growing sig