关于中国盈余管理的探索研究外文翻译（可编辑）

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1、关于中国盈余管理的探索研究外文翻译 外文翻译Earnings management in China: an exploratory studyMaterial Source: Managerial Auditing JournalAuthor: Carlos Noronha, Yun Zeng, Gerald Vinten It is well known that the economy of China has been developing at an astonishing pace and Chinas role as a global economic powerhouse is

2、 undeniable. Coupling with this rapid economic growth, a sound framework of corporate governance has become a top priority in the Chinese governments agenda. Recently, a number of efforts could be seen driving Chinas business environment toward higher level of transparency and accountability. For ex

3、ample, conversion of non-tradable shares into freely tradable shares, promulgation of new accounting standards converging with International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS, mandate quarterly reporting and the many reforms in related legal areas. Nevertheless, Chinas capital market is still emerg

4、ing and the building up of a well-defined corporate governance framework can only proceed gradually. As such, while many Chinese businesses are becoming very influential multinational corporations, there is still a perception of private entrepreneurs operating in China under inefficient checks and b

5、alances and lack transparent financial reporting. Take the area of accounting standards reform for instance. Beginning February 2006, all listed companies in China have to report their financial statements using the new Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises ASBE. This helps to improve the qu

6、ality of the financial information reported and has an important impact on boosting investor confidence. A recent study by Ip and Noronha 2007 also indicated that harmonization progress of the Chinese accounting standards is heading toward the right direction. However, given the nascent development

7、into a capital market and the enormous vastness of China as an economic system, the road toward properly regulated financial reporting is still long and winding, especially for non-listed companies. As commented by an International Finance Corporation the private sector arm of the World Bank Group s

8、taff member, most small and mid-sized enterprises in China are run informally. They are family-owned, they do not have checks and balances and their financial reporting is not transparent. Therefore, it can be seen that the regulatory system is still very crude, with many aspects of accounting pract

9、ices not clearly regulated. Wu 2004 pointed out that the deficiencies of accounting standards have seriously influenced the quality of accounting information in the Chinese market Dechow and Skinner 2000 have pointed out that accounting academics often have very different perceptions of earnings man

10、agement than do practitioners and regulators. Practitioners and regulators often see earnings management as pervasive and problematic and in need of immediate remedial actions, while academics are more unwilling to believe that earnings management is actively practised by firms. Dechow and Skiner200

11、0 observe that academics usually make general statements about earnings management and often choose to examine large samples of firms, and so tend to use statistical definitions that may not be very powerful in identifying earnings management. Dechow and Skinner 2000 has also mentioned that, in cont

12、rast, practitioners and regulators observe actual cases of earnings management on a regular basis because their objectives are different from those of academic research. Also, academics usually focus on particular ex-post samples and management incentives that are not of great interest to practition

13、ers. As a result, many studies on earnings management do not pay much attention to the opinions of practitioners and regulators and have limited practicability. Taking a practitioners viewpoint, the first step is to understand why companies engage in earnings management, or what their specific reaso

14、ns to manage earnings are. This involves asking a number of practical research questions. For example, according to existing literature, researchers have tested and summarized four main kinds of incentives for earnings management namely, debt covenant, capital market pressure, tax considerations and

15、 management compensation, but which incentive is more important than the others? Dechow and Skinner 2000 have pointed out that capital market pressures such as meeting analysts expectations is more important than contractual arrangements, but is this also true for Chinese companies? Also, different

16、market and institutional factors will influence the ranking of incentives. Baralexis 2004 found that small companies are more concerned about tax expenses, while some Chinese researchers argue that state-owned companies have low incentives to meet the expectations The ranking of incentives is also i

17、nfluenced by company size and ownership type. Public companies care more about capital market responses than do private companies and this may be due to the special arrangement of the capital market in which public companies have priority to be listed. These public companies pay little attention to

18、tax expenses because the government who levies the tax also has the right to share the profits after tax. While for private companies, tax consideration is much more significant because less tax expense directly means more net profit for the shareholders. Size also significantly impacts on the consi

19、derations of the managers. Large and oversized companies usually care more about market value and less about tax considerations, while it is the opposite among small companies. Different incentives will also influence the specific methods used to manage earnings. Generally speaking, Chinese companie

20、s prefer to employ simple, direct and effective ways, such as adjusting accounts receivable and using related parties transactions to color their financial reports rather than employing complicated techniques, although for tax considerations, there are some special ways to cope with the Chinese taxa

21、tion law. Reclassification and restatement of administrative expenses and advertising expenses are effective in altering the tax expense. From this study, we can conclude that earnings management is pervasive in China and managers view earnings management as reasonable and useful. This earnings mana

22、gement dilemma in China is in fact the dilemma of the institutional setting in the market. Here, we can make several points for further consideration. Firstly, the ownership structure of state-owned companies in the market has blurred the control of the entities. Legally speaking, state-owned compan

23、ies are owned by the people, although in fact no one claims shares or dividends from the companies. The multi-level principal-agent relationship in the administration of state-owned companies provides many chances for misconduct. Secondly, the management system also leads to serious earnings managem

24、ent. Top management in state-owned companies are also the government officials and they can skillfully shift between the two identities. In order to be promoted as high ranking officials, the managers are not appraised in terms of standards set for services provided as government officials. Rather,

25、they are evaluated based on the performance of the company managed by them as reflected by mechanical standards like rate of return, net income level, growth rate and so on. Thus, the mixed identity as corporate manager and government official leads to a strong tendency for state-owned companies to

26、manage earnings. The weak accounting system is another contributing factor. Chinese accounting standard construction is a patchwork instrument rather than a systematic project. Standards are issued only when some weaknesses are found. The lack of a systematic framework of accounting standards brings

27、 many opportunities for earnings management. Another fact that makes the cost of earnings management bearable is that the legal system does not state clearly and in detail the consequences and penalties for managing earnings. Therefore, earnings management cannot be detected easily and appropriately

28、 prosecuted. Last but not least, the inequity of tax status forces most of the small and medium sized companies to manage earnings in order to lower tax expenses. From the above points, we conclude that the institutional setting usually decides the incentives and techniques of earnings management. O

29、ur analysis about earnings management is based on the institutional characteristics of the market. The construction of effective accounting standards can only solve part of the problem. The lessening of earnings management and the advancement of accounting information quality should be based on prof

30、ound reform of the economic and political system. Nevertheless, due to the specificity of the Chinese market, directly applying the experience or methodology from a different market may result in an unrealistic conclusion. In terms of accounting practices, we call for strict regulations especially o

31、n related parties transactions and clear presentation of accounts receivable as well as provisions. Rigorous regulations cannot completely remove earnings management from the market, but it can probably reduce it and provide explicit evidence for detecting and penalizing earnings management behavior

32、s. Changing the institutional arrangement of the capital market to allow more companies with clear ownership structure to be listed, and property rights reform, as well as the improvement of the legal system, are necessary steps to control the prevalence of earnings management.译文关于中国盈余管理的探索研究 资料来源:管

33、理审计杂志 作者:Carlos Noronha, Yun Zeng, Gerald Vinten 众所周知,中国经济以惊人的速度发展,成为全球经济强国是不可否认的。配合快速的经济增长,在中国政府的议事日程中,完善法人治理结构成为当务之急。最近,经过努力可以看到中国的商业环境向更高层次进步,具有透明度和可靠性。例如,非流通股股东向流通股股东转换,颁布的新会计准则符合国际财务报告准则(IFRS),授权季度报告和许多相关法律改革。然而,我国的资本市场和公司治理结构只能继续逐渐增加。这样,当许多中国企业已经变成非常有影响力的跨国公司时,还有私营企业家觉得在国家的效率检查和平衡下,缺乏透明的财务报告。

34、以会计准则改革为例,2006年2月开始,我国上市公司必须根据新企业会计准则报告他们的财务报表。这有助于提高报告财务信息质量,有助于增强投资者信心。最近Ip,Noronha(2007)的研究也表明,中国会计准则正向正确和谐的方向前进。然而,考虑到这个初生的资本市场在巨大广袤的中国是一个经济体系,规范适当的财务报告道路仍然漫长蜿蜒,尤其是对非上市公司。国际金融公司私营部门的工作人员,世界银行集团,大多数科技型中小企业,在中国成为非正式的团体。他们是家庭,他们没有检查和平衡财务报表透明的权利。因此,我们可以看出监管制度还很粗略,会计实践的许多方面没有清晰的管制。吴(2004)指出,会计准则的不足,严

35、重地影响了中国市场会计信息的质量。这可以使我们相信盈余管理在中国是常见的。 Dechow,Skinner(2000)指出,会计学者与从业人员和监管机构对盈余管理有不同的认识。从业人员和监管机构经常看到盈余管理具有巨大的影响力,且有问题需要有紧急的自救措施,而学术界更愿意相信盈余管理正积极被公司运用。他们观察到学者总是常规的陈述盈余管理,经常选择去检查公司的大样本,所以倾向于使用统计定义,可能不会很清晰的识别盈余管理。他们也提到,相比之下,从业人员和监管机构观察到盈余管理的实际情况,在正常的基础上,因为他们有不同的学术研究目标。同时,学者通常都是将目光集中在特定的事后样品和管理的成因,不是具有浓

36、厚兴趣的实践者。因此,许多研究盈余管理的人不重视专业人员和监管机构的意见,觉得他们的实用性很有限。 以从业者的观点,第一步是要理解为什么公司从事盈余管理,或他们进行盈余管理特定的理由,这涉及到一些现实的研究问题。举例来说,根据现有文献中,研究人员已经测试了四种主要盈余管理,即债务契约,资本市场的压力,税收的费用和管理补偿激励。Dechow,Skinner(2000)指出,相比资本市场压力,会议分析师预期更重要的是契约性协议,不过这也适用于中国的企业。同时,不同的市场和制度因素将影响评价奖励。Baralexis(2004)发现小公司重视税收费用,同时一些中国研究者认为国有企业的激励机制,可以用相

37、对低的奖励满足他们的期望。 激励的评价中,受到公司规模和所有权类型的影响。上市公司对资本市场的要求比私营企业更关心,这可能是由于资本市场的上市公司有优先上市的权力。这些上市公司很少注意政府的费用,税收征收也有权利来分享税后利润。而对私营企业,税务的考虑则更重要,因为少缴费用直接意味着股东有更多的净利润,也显著影响公司经营规模的大小。大公司通常更关心市场价值和少考虑税收,而小型公司则相反。 不同的激励机制对收入管理的具体方法有影响。一般来说,中国公司更喜欢雇佣简捷有效的方法,如调整应收账款及使用有关当事人的交易润色他们的财务报表,而不是使用复杂的技术。虽然在税收问题上,有一些特殊的办法来应对我国

38、的税收法律。管理费用和广告费用的重编在改变税务费用也具有一定的效果。 从本研究中,我们可以得出结论:盈余管理在中国很普遍,管理者认为盈余管理是合理和有用的。事实上,中国财务管理的困境是这种机构设置在市场上进退两难的竞争力。这里,我们可以做出一些分析,可供进一步考虑。 首先,国有企业的所有权结构在市场上是模糊控制的实体。从法律上讲,国有公司属于法人,尽管,事实上没人认领公司股份的红利。多层次委托代理的关系为许多国有企业的不端行为提供了机会。 然后,不当管理体系也会导致严重的盈余管理。高层管理人员在国有公司也是政府官员,他们可以熟练的在这两个身份之间变换。为了升为高官,管理者没有为评估服务标准方面

39、提供政府官员。实际上,他们基于评估公司绩效的机械标准,也期望得到回报率,净收入水平、发展速度等。因此,混合身份的公司经理和政府官员为国有企业的盈余管理形成一股强大的趋势。 其次,微弱的会计系统是另一个促成因素。中国会计准则建设是一项拼接的工具而不是一项系统工程,只有某些缺陷被发现。缺乏系统的会计准则框架为盈余管理创造了很多机会。另一个事实是受盈余管理法律体系不明确的影响,处罚的收入没有细致的管理。因此,盈余管理不容易检测到,也不能被适当查处。 最后,不平等的税收地位使大部分的中小型公司为了低税收费用而实行盈余管理。综上所述,我们可以得出结论:通常,制度的设置决定盈余管理的积极性和技术。我们的分析是基于与盈余管理制度特点相符的市场份额。有效的会计标准的建立才能解决一部分的问题。盈余管理的减少和推进会计信息的质量应该建立在深刻的经济政治体系中。然而,由于中国市场的特殊性,从国外的市场直接应用经验或方法,可能也会导致一些不切实际的结论。 在会计实践中,我们必须严格要求规范会计准则,严格的法规虽然不能彻底从市场上清除盈余管理,但它可以减少并提供明确的盈余管理检测的证据,使之成为社会化的行为。改变资本市场的制度安排,让更多的上市公司股权结构更加清晰,提高产权制度改革以及加强法律系统的改进措施,对控制盈余管理的盛行都是非常必要的。