A game of cat's cradle science studies, feminist theory, cultural studies

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1、A Game of Cats Cradle: Science Studies, Feminist Theory, Cultural Studies Donna J. Haraway The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with that insight. Then we

2、 shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency. 1 (Nature(TM) + Culture(TM)dn = New World Order, Inc. n=0 Nature is a topos, or commonplace. Nature is a topic I cannot avoid. It is the imploded, densely packed location for the simultaneously ethnospecific, cultur

3、al, political, and scientific conversations about what the allowable structures of action and the possible plots in the sacred secular dramas of technoscience-as well as in the analysis of technoscience-might be. This nature, this common place and topical commons, has possessed me since I was a chil

4、d. To inhabit this nature has not been a choice, but a complex inheritance. I was riveted by natural law and fixed in the time zones of the Christian liturgical year, and then set loose in the culture medium of the molecular biological laboratory. For people nurtured in the worlds in which I grew up

5、, whatever else it also is, nature is good to think with.Nature is also about figures, stories, and images. This nature, as trpos, is jerry-built with tropes; it makes me swerve. A tangle of materialized figurations, nature draws my attention. A child of my culture, I am nature-tropic: I turn to nat

6、ure as a sun-loving plant turns to the sun. Historically, a trope is also a verse interpolated into a liturgical text to embellish or amplify its meaning. Nature has liturgical possibilities; its metaphoricity is inescapable, and that is its saving grace. This nature displaces me definitively by roo

7、ting me in its domain. The domain in which I am so organically rooted in the last years of the twentieth century is the fully imploded, fully artifactual, natural-cultural gravity well of technoscience. We do not so much swerve into this well as get sucked into it irrevocably. We had better learn to

8、 think this nature, this common and shared place, as something other than a star wars test site or the New World Order, Inc. If technoscience is, among other things, a practice of materializing refigurations of what counts as nature, a practice of turning tropes into worlds, then how we figure techn

9、oscience makes an immense difference. In this meditation, I want to suggest how to refigure-how to trope and how to knot together-key discourses about technoscience. Rooted in the (sometimes malestream and maelstrom) cross-stitched disciplines of science studies, this short essay is part of a larger

10、, shared task of using antiracist feminist theory and cultural studies to produce worldly interference patterns. Because I think the practices that constitute technoscience build worlds that do not overflow with choice about inhabiting them, I want to help foment a state of emergency in what counts

11、as normal in technoscience and in its analysis. Queering what counts as nature is my categorical imperative. Queering specific normalized categories is not for the easy frisson of transgression, but for the hope for livable worlds. What is normal in technoscience, and in its analysis, is all too oft

12、en war, with all its infinitely ramifying structures and stratagems. All too often, the war of words and things is the luminous figure for theory, explanation, and narrative. A lurking question stalks the project of refiguration: How can science studies scholars take seriously the constitutively mil

13、itarized practice of technoscience and not replicate in our own practice, including the material-semiotic flesh of our language, the worlds we analyze? How can metaphor be kept from collapsing into the thing-in-itself? Must technoscience-with all its parts, actors and actants, human and not-be descr

14、ibed relentlessly as an array of interlocking agonistic fields, where practice is modeled as military combat, sexual domination, security maintenance, and market strategy? How not? Let us work by learning to play an old game. After all, ever since World War II, game theory has had a very high profil

15、e in technoscience, much envied and imitated in the human sciences and popular culture alike. 2 Let us turn to a game made of figures-string figures. Here we might find some knots of interest for tying up approaches to technoscience. Cats Cradle In setting up a game of cats cradle for science studie

16、s aficionado/as who want time off from the video arcade shoot-em-ups of much scholarly practice, I need to hold onto two strands that structure all the figures: (1) Feminist, multicultural, antiracist technoscience projects aim to intervene in what can count as a good primal story, reliable rational

17、 explanation, or promising first contact among heterogeneous selves and others. Feminist, multicultural, antiracist technoscience projects do not respect the boundaries of disciplines, institutions, nations, or genres. The projects are as likely to be located in computer graphics labs as in communit

18、y meetings, in biomedical worlds as in antitoxics work. Feminist, multicultural, antiracist technoscience projects include, for example, popular cultural production (film, TV, video, print fiction, advertising, music, jokes, theater, computer games), diverse practices for apprehending and refiguring

19、 the ethnospecific categories of nature and culture, professional studies of technoscience (philosophy, anthropology, history, sociology, semiology), community organizing, labor practices and struggles, policy work at many levels, health politics, media interventions, environmental activism, technic

20、al design, engineering, and every sort of scientific research. These practices regularly do not respect boundaries between and among sacred categories, such as nature and society or human and nonhuman. But boundary crossing in itself is not very interesting for feminist, multicultural, antiracist te

21、chnoscience projects. Technoscience provokes an interest in zones of implosion, more than in boundaries, crossed or not. The most interesting question is, What forms of life survive and flourish in those dense, imploded zones? (2) Textual rereading is never enough, even if one defines the text as th

22、e world. Reading, no matter how active, is not a powerful enough trope; we do not swerve decisively enough. The trick is to make metaphor and materiality implode in the culturally specific apparatuses of bodily production. What constitutes an apparatus of bodily production cannot be known in advance

23、 of engaging in the always messy projects of description, narration, intervention, inhabiting, conversing, exchanging, and building. The point is to get at how worlds are made and unmade, in order to participate in the processes, in order to foster some forms of life and not others. If technology, l

24、ike language, is a form of life, we cannot afford neutrality about its constitution and sustenance. The point is not just to read the webs of knowledge production; the point is to reconfigure what counts as knowledge in the interests of reconstituting the generative forces of embodiment. I am callin

25、g this practice materialized refiguration; both words matter. The point is, in short, to make a difference-however modestly, however partially, however much without either narrative or scientific guarantees. In more innocent times, long, long ago, such a desire to be worldly was called activism. I p

26、refer to call these desires and practices by the names of the entire, open array of feminist, multicultural, antiracist technoscience projects. Optical metaphors are unavoidable in figuring technoscience. 3 Critical vision has been central to critical theory, which aims to unmask the lies of the est

27、ablished disorder that appears as transparently normal. 4 Critical theory is about a certain kind of negativity-i.e., the relentless commitment to show that the established disorder is not necessary, nor perhaps even real. The world can be otherwise; that is what technoscience studies can be about.

28、Technoscience studies can inherit the bracing negativity of critical theory without resurrecting its Marxist humanist ontologies and teleologies. If the poison of metaphor-free facticity can be neutralized by the tropic materiality of worldly engagement-and again, engagement without narrative or sci

29、entific guarantees-then technoscience studies will have done its job. Perhaps cracking open possibilities for belief in more livable worlds would be the most incisive kind of theory, indeed, even the most scientific kind of undertaking. Perhaps this is part of what Sandra Harding means by strong obj

30、ectivity! 5 High theory might be about pushing critical negativity to its extreme-i.e., toward hope in the midst of permanently dangerous times. So, for me, the most interesting optical metaphor is not reflection and its variants in doctrines of representation. Critical theory is not finally about r

31、eflexivity, except as a means to defuse the bombs of the established disorder and its self-invisible subjects and categories. My favorite optical metaphor is diffraction-the noninnocent, complexly erotic practice of making a difference in the world, rather than displacing the same elsewhere. Two col

32、ored fibers run through my work: (1) I draw on intersecting and often coconstitutive threads of analysis-cultural studies; feminist, multicultural, and antiracist theory and projects; and science studies-because each of them does indispensable work for the project of dealing with sites of transforma

33、tion, heterogeneous complexity, and complex objects. (2) For the complex or boundary objects in which I am interested, the mythic, textual, technical, political, organic, and economic dimensions implode. That is, they collapse into each other in a knot of extraordinary density that constitutes the o

34、bjects themselves. In my sense, story telling is in no way an art practice-it is, rather, a fraught practice for narrating complexity in such a field of knots or black holes. In no way is story telling opposed to materiality. But materiality itself is tropic; it makes us swerve, it trips us; it is a

35、 knot of the textual, technical, mythic/oneiric, organic, political, and economic.I try to attend to the differently situated human and nonhuman actors and actants that encounter each other in interactions that materialize worlds in some forms rather than others. My purpose is to argue for a certain

36、 kind of practice of situated knowledges in the worlds of technoscience, worlds whose fibers reach deep and wide in the tissues of the planet. These are the worlds in which the axes of the technical, organic, mythic, political, economic, and textual intersect in optically and gravitationally dense n

37、odes that function like wormholes to cast us into the turbulent and barely charted territories of technoscience. Along with other science studies scholars, I use the terms actors, agencies, and actants for both human and nonhuman entities. 6 Remember, however, that what counts as human and as nonhum

38、an is not given by definition, but only by relation, by engagement in situated, worldly encounters, where boundaries take shape and categories sediment. If feminist, antiracist, multicultural science studies-not to mention technoscience-have taught us anything, it is that what counts as human is not

39、, and should not be, self-evident. The same thing should be true of machines, and of nonmachine, nonhuman entities in general, whatever they are. Both technoscience and technoscience studies teach people like those likely to be reading this essay, who like me are kicking and screaming in symptomatic

40、 Western universalist objection, that there is no pan-human, no pan-machine, no pan-nature, no pan-culture. The saving negativity of critical theory teaches the same thing. There are only specific worlds, and these are irreducibly tropic and contingent. The choice to use the terms actors, agencies,

41、and actants invites trouble, but it circumvents worse trouble, I hope. The invited trouble is obvious. Actors and agents seem a lot like the self-moving entities of a cosmos furnished in enduring Aristotelian style. They look a lot like preformed, modular subjects or core substances, with adhering a

42、ccidents. Actors and agents act; they author action; all real agency is theirs. All else is patient, if occasionally passionate. All else is ground, resource, matrix, screen, secret to be revealed, fair game to be hunted by the hero, who is, to repeat ad nauseam, the actor. Actants are a little bett

43、er; they at least are collectives for a semiotic action-function in a narrative, and not just fictionally coherent, single substance-actors. Actants are bundles of action-functions; they are not Actors and Heroes. To understand a story, it is almost never a mistake to anthropomorphize an actor; it m

44、ight be a big mistake to anthropomorphize an actant. Part of the legacy of all this Aristotelian furniture is that everything in the world not self-moving (and guess who is most self-moving of all-our old friend, the self-invisible man) ends up having to be patient. Nonhuman nature (including most w

45、hite women, people of color, the sick, and others with reduced powers of self-direction compared to the One True Copy of the Prime Mover) has been especially patient. (As you can see, this little lesson in the history of philosophy is a bit eclectic. No matter, cosmic interior decorating in post-pom

46、o essays shows worse taste than that.) To insist that both those humans denied the power of self-motion in the history of Western philosophy and also all of nonhuman nature be seen to be lively, consequential, where the action is, agents, actors, etc.-in short, movers and shakers in the knowledge-pr

47、oduction game-I am willing to risk the metaphysical chronic fatigue syndrome induced by the language of agencies and actors. I do not yet know how to insist on such things well enough by a means other than stressing one pole of a disreputable binary, while refusing to use the more patient pole for m

48、uch of anything. This is an occupational hazard for feminists of my cultural history. We seem terribly afraid of patience; we mistake it for passivity. Hardly any wonder. Like the characters in Marge Piercys Woman on the Edge of Time, I do not know how to leap out of my natural-cultural history to m

49、ake it all come out right. 7 I try to get out of the trouble my language invites by stressing that the agencies and actors are never preformed, prediscursive, just out there, substantial, concrete, neatly bounded before anything happens, only waiting for a veil to be lifted and land ho! to be pronou

50、nced. Human and nonhuman, all entities take shape in encounters, in practices; and the actors and partners in encounters are not all human, to say the least. Further, many of these nonhuman partners and actors are not very natural, and certainly not original. And all humans are not the Same. This is

51、 a key difference from the way the humans and the non-human components of knowledge production are generally figured in scientific discourse. In that kind of discourse, the objects of discovery and explanation might be hidden, but they are preformed, there, ready for the first voyager to pronounce l

52、and ho! and forever after pose as the ventriloquist (representor) to the way the world really is. And the subjects/actors who do the discovering are, at least ideally, interchangeable, all the Same, self-invisible, reliable, modest witnesses-self-invisible, transcendent Subjects, in short, out on a

53、noble journey to report on embodied Nature. Traditional scientific realism depends on that kind of reality, where nature and society are really, foundationally, there. It is really existing reality, a bit like actually existing socialism used to be-quite totalitarian, really, though said to be fully

54、 objective, i.e., full of objects. I find such realism simply objectionable, and full of nothing but tricks. Expunging metaphoricity from the sacred realm of facticity depends on the conjuring trick of establishing the categorical purity of nature and society, nonhuman and human. All that is needed

55、for a game of cats cradle is now in play. Drawn into patterns taught me by a myriad of other practitioners in technoscience worlds, I would like to make an elementary string figure in the form of a cartoon outline of the interknitted discourses named (1) cultural studies; (2) feminist, multicultural

56、, antiracist science projects; and (3) science studies. Like other worldly entities, these discourses do not exist entirely outside each other. They are not preconstituted, nicely bounded scholarly practices or doctrines that confront each other in debate or exchange, pursuing wars of words or cashi

57、ng in on academic markets, and at best hoping to form uneasy scholarly or political alliances and deals. Rather, the three names are place markers, emphases, or tool kits-knots, if you will-in a constitutively interactive, collaborative process of trying to make sense of the natural worlds we inhabi

58、t and that inhabit us; i.e., the worlds of technoscience. I will barely sketch what draws me into the three interlocked webs. My intention is that readers will pick up the patterns, remember what others have learned how to do, invent promising knots, and suggest other figures that will make us swerv

59、e from the established disorder of finished, deadly worlds. Cultural Studies: A set of discourses about the apparatus of bodily/cultural production; emphasis on the irreducible specificity of that apparatus for each entity. Not culture only as symbols and meanings, not comparative culture studies, b

60、ut culture as an account of the agencies, hegemonies, counter-hegemonies, and unexpected possibilities of bodily construction. Deep debts to Marxism, psychoanalysis, theories of hegemony, communications studies, critical theory of the Frankfurt variety, the political and scholarly cauldron of the Ce

61、nter for Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. Relentless attention to the ties of power and embodiment, metaphoricity and facticity, location and knowledge. Unconvinced by claims about insuperable natural divides between high and low culture, science and everything else, words and thing

62、s, theory and practice. 8 Feminist, Multicultural, and Antiracist Theory/Projects: The view from the marked bodies in the stories, discourses, and practices; marked positions; situated knowledges, where the description of the situation is never self-evident, never simply concrete, always critical; t

63、he kind of standpoint with stakes in showing how gender, race, or any structured inequality in each interlocking specific instance gets built into the world-i.e., not gender or race as attributes or as properties, but racialized gender as a practice that builds worlds and objects in some ways rather

64、 than others, that gets built into objects and practices and exists in no other way. Bodies in the making, not bodies made. Neither gender nor race is something with an origin, for example in the family, that then travels out into the rest of the social world, or from nature into culture, from famil

65、y into society, from slavery or conquest into the present. Rather, gender and race are built into practice, which is the social, and have no other reality, no origin, no status as properties. Feminist, antiracist, and multicultural locations shape the standpoint from which the need for an elsewhere,

66、 for difference is undeniable. This is the unreconciled position for critical inquiry about apparatuses of bodily production. Denaturalization without dematerialization; questioning representation with a vengeance. 9 Science Studies: reflexivity, constructionism, technoscience instead of science and technology, science in action, science in the making (not science made)