外文翻译：通过并购创造价值

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1、Creating value through acquisitionsStuart E. Jackson, (2007),Creating value through acquisitions, Journal of Business Strategy, VOl. 28 Iss: 6 pp. 40 41A caution to readers who like nothing better than a headline-grabbing, out-of-the-blue acquisition: Im not one of you.You can use acquisitions to cr

2、eate value for your shareholders if you know where value hides.In fact, as a rule, I am an advocate of organic growth, of growing out from the core of the business in ways that build on established strengths. That strategy is at the heart of a discipline that I call strategic market positioning, or

3、SMP, which is about defending and growing your companys weighted share of the strategic market segments that define competitive advantage within your industry. This may be defined by geography, customer demographic, channel focus, and so on the critical dimensions of scale for your particular busine

4、ss. It is not about growth for growths sake，but about combining the fundamental principles of customer preference and producer economics with the goal of achieving strong market positions and higher profitability through the goal of achieving strong market positions and higher profitability through

5、selective growth.Stated simply, you are far more likely to increase the value of your company if you can find a way to expand your existing business and achieve increased benefits of scale or scope within your existing strategic segments.One huge problem with most of those headline-grabbing deals: i

6、t is hard to create value for shareholders given the price of acquisitions today. Every successful corporation is feeling the same growth imperatives, so almost all of them are looking for growing, profitable companies to add to their portfolios of businesses.Meanwhile, would-be acquirers face stiff

7、 competition from financial buyers. equity firms looking for good companies to buy. These financial buyers were not in the game 20 years ago, or even a decade ago. It can take only one or two such buyers with an inflated sense of their own management capabilities to drive the cost of a potential acq

8、uisition past what you should be willing to pay for it. This is no way to avoid it.The combination of these factors means that valuations of good companies, and even some not-so-good companies, have been steadily creeping upward since the market recovery began in 2001. The upshot? You may have to pa

9、y ten times cash flow or 20 times net earnings, or even more, to acquire a good property. This means that, even if you ignore the time value of money, you need many years of profits at the current level to get your money back.So that is the bad news. The good news is that there are definitely situat

10、ions in which, from an SMP perspective, acquisitions make good sense. The point is to use the discipline of SMP to figure out whether it is worth paying the acquisition premium that todays competitive M&A environment requires. You need to ask: What strategic segment are we entering through this acqu

11、isition and who is the competition in that segment? Will the new business strengthen our SMP in segments where we already compete? If we are entering a new strategic segment, can we leverage our SMP in adjacent segments to ensure that we achieve a strong SMP in the target segment? Bottom line, will

12、the new business make the weighted average SMP for our overall company better or worse?One of my favorite examples of an SMP-savvy buyer is Northrop Grumman, which since the late 1990s has used a number of targeted acquisitions to strengthen its SMP and, by extension, its profitability and value.Nor

13、throp by the early 1990s was a50-year-old major defense contractor looking hard for further growth. In1994, it paid $2.1 billion for Grumman Corporation, a premier electronic systems firm and the prime contractor for the lunar excursion module used in the Project Apollo moon landings. The acquisitio

14、n gave the company (now called Northrop Grumman) a strong technological position in airborne surveillance and electronics warfare systems. Nevertheless, results in the late 1990s were disappointing. Northrop Grummans margins in important programs remained anemic and revenue declined from $8.6 billio

15、n in 1996 to $7.6 billion in 1999.The central problem for Northrop Grumman was that it had failed to achieve scale through the Grumman acquisition and other recent purchases. Great technology alone was not sufficient. Being the fourth-largest military supplier, without a particularly strong niche in

16、 any of its strategic market segments, appeared to be a recipe for further decline.So the company took conscious steps to improve its SMP. In May 1999, it announced that it would buy Ryan Aeronautical from Allegheny Teledyne for $140 million, with the express goal of expanding its reach into key nic

17、he markets, including the emerging industry ofunmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs.Even within the tight-knit defense-contracting community, there were those who asked, Ryan who? The San Diego-based Ryan had only300 employees and annual sales of about $100million under 2 percent of the acquiring compan

18、ys size. Critics of the deal suggested that Northrop Grumman had overpaid for Ryan by a factor of two or three. But let us apply the four-question SMP test outlined above and scrutinize the deal from the parent companys point of view.What strategic segment are we entering through this acquisition, a

19、nd who is the competition in that segment? Northrop Grumman felt that the UAV strategic segment was attractive for several reasons. First, there was mounting pressure from the public to reduce military casualties, increasing demand for unmanned technologies. Second, there was an increased need for s

20、urveillance to leverage a dwindling number of combat platforms. And finally, new technologies were increasing bandwidth available for remote control and receipt of video surveillance. There were only a small number of companies in the UAV strategic segment, and Ryan was the leading player.Will the n

21、ew business strengthen our SMP in segments where we already compete? Here, the answer was probably no. Ryan was unlikely to have much of an impact on Northrop Grummans existing segments, including ships and combat fighter aircraft. There was little prospect of sharing manufacturing costs and support

22、 functions across the two companies product lines.If we are entering a new strategic segment, can we leverage our SMP in adjacent segments to ensure that we achieve a strong SMP in the target segment? Here the answer was clearly yes. Ryan already had a strong position in the emerging segment. The pa

23、rent company possessed technologies (especially Grumman technologies) that could contribute to next-generation UAVs. In addition, Northrop Grumman was a savvy and well-connected player in the defense industry, with the contacts to help win contracts for good products.Bottom line, will the new busine

24、ss make the weighted average SMP for our overall company better or worse? This, clearly, was the crux of the SMP test of the acquisition. To justify the cost of the deal, Northrop Grumman needed not just to maintain Ryans leadership in UAVs, but also to grow the business sufficiently to have an impa

25、ct on the parent companys overall SMP.This is exactly what Northrop Grumman has done. Among the companys 2004 contracts were $1.04 billion for X-47B Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems. That single contract was more than enough to justify the $140 million cost for acquiring Ryan. Other UA V business h

26、as followed, and the Global Hawk UAV has played a critical role in the Iraq War.In terms of shareholder returns, it is difficult to separate out the impact of the Ryan acquisition from the string of other, mostly larger acquisitions that Northrop Grumman has completed since 1999. But the companys re

27、venues have increased an average of 26.2 percent annually since 1999, and net income has increased by 20.1 percent annually (to $1.4 billion). The stock price has risen at an average annual rate of 12 percent. Today, Northrop Grumman is the second-biggest US defense contractor (behind Lockheed Marti

28、n). Meanwhile, once-tiny Ryan began generating annual revenues more than ten times its acquisition price a clear SMP ”win.The acquisition price became irrelevant when considered against the amount of new business generated by the deal. Yes, acquirers may pay a steep acquisition premium in todays mar

29、ketplace, but as the Northrop Grumman/Ryan deal clearly illustrates, there are properties for which you should pay such a premium, assuming that you have a clear view of the strategic market position that you are trying to build.Successful acquirers focus on understanding the strategic value of an a

30、sset, measured in terms of either stronger SMP and increased revenues, or higher profitability for the combined organization a value that is often very different from a fair price based on multiples of historic earnings, or cash flow.You can use acquisitions to create value for your shareholders if

31、you know where value hides.To sum up, the sme financing is a global problem, but also a systematic engineering, which requires concerted effort, also needs the medium and small-sized enterprises management, this thing whether it advances the way how difficult, as long as we joint effort, to break th

32、e financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises contribute their wisdom and strength, change the idea, bold innovation, finding solutions to sme financing in the right way, then we will be on a road more walk more broad prospects, we would also more and more beautiful.通过并购创造价值斯图尔特E.杰克

33、逊.通过并购创造价值J.商业策略杂志.（2007年），28卷 第 40-41 页.提醒那些喜欢吸引人眼球的让人出乎意料的收购的读者们：我不敢苟同这样的想法。 如果你知道哪里值隐藏着价值，你就可以利用收购来为你的股东创造价值。事实上，一般地来说，我提倡有机地增长，就是在既有的优势上从核心业务当中获得 这种增长。这种用以捍卫和扩大公司的加权份额的市场战略以明确您在所在行业内的竞争 优势的一些策略，我称之为市场战略定位或者说是SMP，它是一门学科性的核心内容。这 种竞争优势可能由地理方面、客户人口统计资料方面以及销售渠道热度方面等等的因素一 一也就是您特定的业务本身的规模决定。它不是为了增长而增长，

34、而是把客户偏好、生产 者所用的经济学的基本原理与实现强大的市场定位和通过选择性的增长来实现更高的收 益率的目标相结合。简单地来说，如果你能找到在你现有的战略段内扩大您现有的业务以及实现增加收益 的规模或者范围的一种方法，那么你更有可能使你公司的价值得到增加。大多数的这些喜欢头条新闻的交易有一个巨大的问题：现今发出的收购价格在某种程 度上来说很难为股东们创造更多的价值。每个成功的的公司感觉到有相同的增长义务，所 以几乎所有人都正在寻找业务上的不断增长、利润丰厚的公司将它们添加到自己的投资组 合公司里。与此同时，潜在的收购者们面对着与金融买家的激烈竞争。股本公司都在寻找好的公 司进行购买。这些金融

35、买家不是像十年之前或二十年之前一样在游戏。只要有一两个这样 有抬高价格意识的买家在你面前炫耀一家公司潜在收购的成本的时候，你将会很愿意为这 家公司买单。这是没有办法避免的事情。这些因素综合起来意味着估值的一些好公司和甚至一些不太好的公司，但在 2001 年 市场复苏以来一直稳步向上发展的公司。但是结果如何？您可能要付出十倍以上的现金流 或 20 倍左右的净收益，或者更多的钱来完成兼并一家好的公司。这意味着即使你忽略金 钱的时间价值，在目前的利润水平上你也需要比预计更多的时间才能收回你的投资成本。这就是坏消息。而好消息是，从SMP的角度看，目前肯定是有解决方法让收购能够带 来效益的。成功的关键之

36、处就是使用SMP的原理找出在现今的竞争收购兼并环境中是否值 得付出收购溢价。这时你就需要问问自己：我们要通过此次收购进入哪个战略领域，该领 域的最大竞争者或者主要竞争者是谁？新业务是否将加强我们在已有战略领域中的战略 地位吗？如果我们正进入一个新的战略阶段，我们能否可以利用我们在相邻区域的战略地 位来确保我们达到在目标阶段中强有力的战略地位吗？至少要弄清楚新的业务将会使公 司整体的战略地位得到大幅提升还是大幅下降？一个我最喜欢的并且懂得SMP的精明买家就是诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司，自上世纪90年 代末以来已使用很多有具有针对性的收购，以加强其战略地位，并且不断地扩展，以增强 其盈利能力和公司价值。九

37、十年代初期诺思罗普是一家有着50多年历史并且努力地寻找进一步发展机会的国 防承包商。在 1994 年，诺思罗普支付给格鲁曼公司 21亿美元，格鲁曼是一家电子系统公 司并且是阿波罗登月项目中登月舱的主要承包商。这次收购提升了公司（现称诺斯罗普格 鲁曼）在机载监视和电子对抗系统中强有力的技术地位。不过，在上世纪 90 年代末的结 果却令人失望。诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司在重要项目的利润率仍然在贫血，收入从1996年的 86 亿美元下降到了1999年的76亿美元。然而诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司的关键问题是它未能通过收购格鲁曼公司和其他最近的购 买计划实现规模化。仅仅靠有那么伟大的技术是不够的。作为第四大的军事供应商

38、，其所 有战略市场部分都没有特别强大利无疑会造成公司的进一步衰退。因此公司应该采取由意识的步骤以改善自身的战略地位的方法。 1999 年5月宣布它 将用130亿美元从阿勒格尼莱购买瑞安航空，明确表明目标是将其活动范围扩大到利基市 场，包括无人驾驶飞机和无人机的新兴行业。即使在紧密防御承包社区内也有一些人会问：“瑞恩是谁？”位于圣地亚哥地区的瑞 恩仅仅只有300名员工，年销售额却达到约100亿美元 ，其规模不到收购公司大小的2%。 这笔交易的批评家们认为诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司多付了瑞恩两、三倍的钱。但让我们应用 SMP 原理的四个问题来测试上文所述并且用母公司的观点审议这一交易看看。我们通过此次收购

39、要进入什么战略区域以及该领域的主要竞争者是谁？诺斯罗普格 鲁曼公司出于几个原因考虑认为无人机战略部分应该非常具有吸引力。首先，来自市民的 越来越大的压力他们要求减少军事人员的伤亡率，这增加了对无人驾驶技术的需求。其次， 有增加监督设施的需要来平衡日益减少的作战平台。最后，新技术带来的宽带的增加使得 远程控制和视频监控更加方便。当时在无人机战略领域中只有少数的几家公司，而瑞恩是 其中的领头羊。新业务会加强我们在已有竞争领域中的战略地位吗？在这里，答案可能是否定的。瑞 恩公司对诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司的现有战略部分不太可能有太大影响，其中包括船舶和战斗 航母。所以减少制造成本以及对生产线的功能支持的可能

40、性是极小。如果我们正进入一个新的战略段，我们可以利用我们在相邻区域的战略地位来确保我 们达到在目标段中强有力的战略地位吗？这里的答案显然是肯定的。瑞恩在新兴段已经有 了一个强大的地位。母公司拥有的技术（特别是罗普格鲁曼公司的技术），有助于下一代 无人机的诞生。此外，在国防行业诺斯罗普格鲁曼是一家精明的、声名在外的国际公司， 这有助于赢得好产品的合同。底线是要弄清楚新的业务将会使公司整体的战略地位得到提升还是下降？这一点，很 明显，是SMP测试关于收购的的症结所在。为了证明交易成本的合理，诺斯罗普格鲁曼公 司需要的不只是维持瑞恩在无人机领域的领导地位，还要让这项业务的发展足以影响到母 公司的总体

41、的战略地位。这正是诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司做的事情。在该公司2004年的合同是10.4亿美元的x -47 b无人作战航空系统联合。这单独合约足以证明付出1.4亿美元的代价获得瑞安是 正确的选择。其他无人机业务已经紧随其后， 在伊拉克战争中“全球鹰”无人机已经发挥 了非常重要作用。至于股东回报，很难从诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司自 1999年以来的其他较大的已完成的收 购中分离出收购瑞恩带来的影响。但自 1999 年以来每年公司的收入平均增加了 26.2%， 其中净收入每年增长了20.1%（达到1.4亿美元）。股票价格年平均增长率上升到了12%。 如今，诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司是（在洛克希德马丁）后面的第二大美国国防

42、承包商。同时， 一次小小的瑞恩收购开始生成超过其十倍购置价格的年营业收入一一多么明智的战略地 位的胜利啊。当时考虑的新业务产生的交易量时购置价格便变得无关紧要了。的确如此，在当今的 市场，收购者非常可能需要支付一笔不合理的收购溢价，但作为诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司、瑞 恩交易清楚地说明了，假设你有试图建立的明确的市场战略位置的时候，那么就你必须要 支付这笔费用的属性。成功收购者强调理解一项资产的战略价值，无论是从强有力的战略地位、增收情况还 是联合组织更高的收益率来衡量它都是与基于历史的收入或现金流的倍数的平价所不 同的。如果你知道哪里值隐藏着价值，你就可以利用收购来为你的股东创造价值。融资是一个全球性的难题，也是一项系统工程，需要各方的共同努力，也更需要企业 自身的管理进步，这件事情不管它的前进道路上有多大的困难，只要我们大家共同努力， 为破解企业的融资难题贡献自己的智慧和力量，转变观念，进行大胆创新，找到解决企业 融资难的正确途径, 那么在这一条道路上面我们就会越走越宽广，我们的前景也会越来越 美好。