合并政策和税收竞争[文献翻译]

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1、原文：Merger Policcy andd Tax CompeetitioonIn manyy situuationns govvernmeents hhave ssectorr-speccific tax aand reegulattion ppoliciies att theiir dissposall to iinflueence tthe maarket outcoome affter aa natiional or ann inteernatiional mergeer hass takeen plaace. WWe finnd thaat wheether natioonal o

2、or intternattionall merggers aare moore liikely to bee enaccted iin thee pressence of naationaally ooptimaal taxx poliicies depennds crruciallly onn the ownerrship struccture of fiirms. When all ffirms are oowned domessticallly inn the premeerger situaation, non-coopeerativve taxx poliicies are mmor

3、e eefficiient iin thee natiional mergeer casse andd smalller ssynerggy efffects are nneededd for this type of meerger to bee propoosed aand cllearedd. Theese reesultss are reverrsed wwhen tthere is a high degreee of foreiign fiirm owwnershhip prrior tto thee mergger.Mergerss havee playyed a promiine

4、nt role over the ppast ddecadee, andd inteernatiional mergeer activvity hhas grrown pparticcularlly fasst. Duuring the pperiodd 19811-19988 the annuaal nummber of meergerss and acquiisitioons (MM&A) hhas inncreassed moore thhan fiivefolld andd the sharee of crosss-bordder meergerss has reachhed moor

5、e thhan onne quaarter of thhe tottal byy the end oof this periood. Thhis inncreasse in mergeer acttivityy has lled too situuationns wheere a natioonal oor an interrnatioonal mmergerr have been in diirect compeetitioon witth eacch othher. AA receent exxamplee has been the bbiddinng racce forr the lea

6、diing Spaniish ellectriicity proviider EEndesaa, wheere thhe Gerrman-bbased E.ON compaany innitiallly compeeted wwith tthe Sppanishh-baseed rivval Gaas Nattural. The Spaniish auuthoriities favorred the nnationnal meerger and fformullated severre obsstaclees to an innternaationaal takke-oveer by E.ON

7、, whichh was one oof thee reassons wwhy E.ON eventtuallyy withhdrew its bbid. A diffeerent approoach hhas beeen taaken bby thee Brittish ggovernnment, whicch hass fullly libberaliized iits ellectriicity markeet in the eearly 1990ss. In this proceess, fforeiggn eleectriccity proviiders (amonng theem

8、E.OON ) ttook oover aa largge parrt of the BBritissh eleectriccity iindusttry. TThe Brritishh goveernmennt resspondeed to high profiits inn thiss and otherr privvatizeed indusstriess by iimposiing a one-ttime, sectoor-speecific wwindfaall prrofit taax inn 19977. Sinnce then, a reenewedd impoositioon

9、 of this tax hhas beeen reepeateedly ddiscusssed aas a ccompleement to thhe reggulatiion off pricces thhroughh the regullationn authhorityy Ofgeem (Offfice of Gaas andd Electtricitty Marrkets).The lasst exaample showss cleaarly tthat nnationnal goovernmments dispoose ovver addditioonal ppolicyy inst

10、rrumentts in an inndustrry wheere a mergeer or a forreign acquiisitioon hass takeen plaace. Pricee reguulatioon in privaatizedd nettwork indusstriess is one iimporttant wway too incrrease domesstic cconsummer suurpluss at tthe exxpensee of ccorporrate pprofits, whichh ofteen acccrue, at leeast iin p

11、arrt, too foreeign ssharehholderrs. Seector-speciific prrofit taaxes hhave vvery ssimilaar effectss, if theirr procceeds are rredisttributted too conssumerss in ccompennsatioon forr highher goodss pricces. OOn thee otheer hannd, thhere aare allso maany inndustrries wwhere subsiidies are grantted inn

12、 ordeer to improove thhe commpetittiveneess off domeestic produucts iin worrld maarketss. One sset off exammples are ddirectt subssidiess to sspeciffic seectorss, succh as mininng, shhipbuiildingg, steell prodductioon, orr airpplane consttructiion. MMoreovver, sseveraal of thesee secttors aand seeve

13、rall otherrs (e.g. aiir traansporrtatioon) allso reeceivee indiirect subsiidies by paaying reducced raates of exxcise taxess, in partiicularr mineeral ooil orr elecctriciity taaxes. To thhe exttent tthat tthese eco taxess reppresennt Piggouviaan taxxes thhat caause firmss to iinternnalizee the true

14、sociaal cost of thheir pproduccts, ssuch ttax reebatess alsoo reprresentt subssidiess to tthe innvolveed secctors and, imporrtantlly, too the electtricitty andd enerrgy seector itsellf. Inn all thesee casees, seector-speciific taax or subsiidy pooliciees cann be aadjustted byy natiional policcymakee

15、rs inn respponse to a changge in markeet strructurre cauused bby a mmergerr.we arguue thaat thee posssibiliity too levyy induustry-speciific taaxes oor subbsidiees in a natioonallyy optiimal wway haas impportannt reppercusssionss on tthe poositioon thaat nattionall regullationn authhoritiies taake v

16、iis-a-vis aa natiional or ann inteernatiional mergeer prooposall. At thhe samme timme, meergingg firms will incorrporatte a ppossibble chhange in poolicy when decidding aabout a merrger iin a pparticcular counttry. TTo anaalyze this interractioon bettween tax aand meerger policcies wwe sett up aa mo

17、deel wheere booth fiirms aand meerger regullationn authooritiees antticipaate thhat taaxes wwill bbe opttimallly adjjustedd in tthe hoost coountryy afteer a mergeer hass takeen plaace. MMore sspecifficallly, wee inveestigaate a settiing off Courrnot qquantiity compeetitioon bettween four produucing

18、firms wheree two firms are llocateed in each of twwo symmeetric counttries. Impoortanttly, tthese firms may hhave fforeiggn shaarehollders, thuss giviing ann inceentivee to eeach ggovernnment to emmploy profiit taxxes thhat caan be partlly expportedd to fooreignners. Startting ffrom aa markket sttru

19、ctuure off doubble duuopolyy, ourr focuus is on thhe compaarisonn betwween aa natiional mergeer in one oof thee counntriess and an innternaationaal mergeer bettween a homme andd a fooreignn firm.Our anaalysiss showws thaat thee relaative attraactiveeness of a natioonal vversuss an iinternnationnal m

20、eerger depennds crriticaally oon thee degrree off foreeign ffirm oownersship. When all ffirms are nnationnally ownedd prioor to the mmergerr, theen a nnationnal meerger will lead to moore effficieent taax polliciess as ccomparred too the interrnatioonal mmergerr. In contrrast, when the llevel of foo

21、reignn firmm owneershipp is hhigh iinitiaally, then non-ccooperrativee tax policcies iin thee hostt counntriess willl be mmore eefficiient uunder the iinternnationnal meerger. Exteendingg the modell to aallow for ssynerggy efffects of meergerss, we show that thesee welffare pproperrties transslate i

22、nto the nnationnal (iinternnationnal) mmergerr beinng morre likkely tto be propoosed aand addoptedd whenn the degreee of foreiign fiirm owwnershhip iss low (highh). Thhese rresultts impply thhat a more geogrraphiccally dispeersed ownerrship struccture of fiirms, in coombinaation with non-ccooperrati

23、veely chhosen natioonal ttax pooliciees, maay offfer onne expplanattion ffor thhe reccent ssurge in crross-bborderr mergger acctivitty.Our anaalysiss relaates tto twoo straands iin thee liteeraturre. Fiirst, theree is aa growwing rrecentt liteeraturre on mergeer polliciess in oopen eeconommies. This

24、 literraturee, howwever, typiicallyy regaards mmergerr conttrol aas an isolaated ppolicyy probblem ffor naationaal or interrnatioonal rregulaators. The literraturee thatt anallyses the iinteraactionn of mmergerr conttrol wwith oother policcy insstrumeents iis scaarce, and iit almmost eexclussivelyy

25、focuuses oon intternattionall tradde polliciess as tthe addditioonal ppolicyy variiable (Richhardsoon, 19999; HHorn aand Leevinsoohn, 22001; Huck and KKonradd, 20004; Saggii and Yildiiz, 20006). In coontrasst, thhe intteracttion bbetweeen merrger ppolicyy and natioonal ttax pooliciees hass not been

26、addreessed in thhis liiteratture sso farr. A ssecondd liteeraturre strrand oon whiich ouur papper buuilds is thhe anaalysiss of ooptimaal commmoditty taxxationn in ooligoppolisttic maarketss (Keen and LLahirii, 19998; Loockwoood, 20001; KKeen eet al., 20002;Hauufler et all.,20005;Hasshimzaade ett al

27、.,2005). Thiis litteratuure, hhoweveer, haas foccused mainlly on issuees of commoodity tax hharmonnizatiion annd thee choiice off commmodityy tax regimme undder ann exoggenoussly giiven mmarkett struucturee. It has nnot adddresssed thhe impplicattions for ttax poolicy that folloow froom chaanges in

28、thhe undderlyiing maarket condiitionss as aa resuult off merggers.The plaan of the ppaper is ass folllows. Sectiion 2 descrribes the bbasic frameework for oour annalysiis. Seectionn 3 prresentts thee bencchmarkk casee of ddoublee duoppoly, wheree two firmss are locatted inn eachh counntry aand alll

29、fouur firrms coompetee in bboth mmarketts. Seectionn 4 annalyzees thee channges iin taxx poliicies and wwelfarre wheen a nnationnal meerger occurrs in one oof thee counntriess. Secction 5 carrries out tthe saame annalysiis forr an iinternnationnal meerger. Secttion 66 intrroducees synnergy effeccts

30、asssociaated wwith aa natiional and aan intternattionall mergger annd commparess the condiitionss undeer whiich onne or the oother type of meerger is prroposeed andd acceepted by meerger authooritiees. Seectionn 7 cooncluddes.In pracctice a corre mottivatiion foor firrms too undeertakee merggers, an

31、d aan impportannt reaason ffor reegulattion aauthorritiess to ppermitt themm, is that mergeers caan creeate ssynerggy efffects. We aanalyzze howw largge thee costt saviings mmust bbe forr a naationaal or an innternaationaal merrger iin ordder too be iin thee inteerest of booth thhe merrging firmss a

32、nd thhe reggulatiion auuthoriity off the host counttry. WWe deaal agaain wiith diiffereent owwnershhip sttructuures oof firrms. DDue too the compllexityy of tthe reesultiing exxpresssions, we cconfinne thee disccussioon in the mmain ttext tto thee polaar casses off fulll natiional ownerrship and cco

33、mpleete innternaationaal ownnershiip divversifficatiion We shouuld obbservee a poositivve andd systtematiic rellationnship betweeen thhe forreign ownerrship sharee and the sshare of crross-bborderr merggers iin a pparticcular indusstry. Theree is iindeedd somee firsst, suuggesttive eevidennce inn fa

34、voour off thiss proppositiion. IIn thee OECDD counntriess the sharee of ccross-bordeer merrgers in thhe tottal nuumber of M&A casess difffers wwidelyy acrooss diiffereent ecconomiic secctors and iis higghest in maanufaccturinng. Att the same time, manuufactuuring is allso onne of the mmost iinternna

35、tionnalizeed secctors with respeect too foreeign oownersship, at leeast iin Eurropeann counntriess. Simmilarlly, thhere aare seectorss withh a loow shaare off foreeign ffirm oownersship, such as coonstruuctionn, wheere thhe shaare off crosss-borrder mmergerrs in the ttotal numbeer of M&A casess is a

36、also llow. AA detaailed empirrical studyy woulld be needeed to rigorrouslyy testt whetther tthis ppositiive reelatioonshipp betwween fforeiggn ownnershiip andd the sharee of ccross-bordeer merrgers holdss moree geneerallyy, andd whetther iit cann be llinkedd to tthe innteracction of naationaally oop

37、timaal taxx poliicies and mmergerr conttrol.In manyy induustriees govvernmeents hhave ssectorr-speccific taax andd reguulatioon polliciess at ttheir dispoosal tto inffluencce thee markket ouutcomee afteer a cchangee in mmarkett struucturee has occurrred. In thhis paaper wwe havve sett up aa simpple

38、moodel tto anaalyze how nnationnally optimmal tax rrates will be addjusteed in respoonse tto a nnationnal meerger on thhe onee handd and an interrnatioonal mmergerr on tthe otther. Extennding the aanalyssis too incoorporaate syynergyy effeects oof merrgers, we hhave tthen sstudieed howw thesse chaan

39、ges in taax pollicy ffeed bback oon the iincenttives for ffirms to prroposee one or thhe othher kiind off mergger, aand foor thee mergger regullationn authhoritiies too acceept itt.Our anaalysiss showws thaat a nnationnal annd an interrnatioonal mmergerr leadd to ddifferennt inccentivves foor nattio

40、nall tax policcy. Onn the one hhand aan intternattionall mergger inncreasses thhe 24 incenntivess for non-ccooperrativee tax policcy to tax fforeiggn firm oownerss in eexcesss of tthe efficieent leevels. On tthe otther hhand, an innternaationaal merrger lleads to a largeer shaare off consuumptioon i

41、n each counttry beeing sservedd by llocal produucers and tthus iincreaases tthe incenntive for eeach ccountrry to grantt Pareeto effficieent suubsidiies. WWhich of thhese ttwo efffectss dominnates depennds crruciallly onn the sharee of fforeiggn firm oownersship iin thee pre-mergeer situaation. If a

42、all fiirms aare loocallyy owneed iniitiallly, thhen thhe nattionall mergger iss the dominnant aalternnativee, in the ssense that it reequirees fewwer coost saavingss in oorder to bee propposed by thhe merrging firms and tto be clearred byy the regullationn authhorityy. In contrrast, if thhe sharee o

43、f fforeiggn firm oownersship iis larrge, tthen tthe innternaationaal merrger wwill bbe prooposedd and ccleareed forr a wiider rrange of coost saavingss.One impplicattion oof ourr modeel is that a risse in interrnatioonal pportfoolio ddiverssificaation will favouur crooss-boorder mergeers, oother thi

44、nggs beiing eqqual. When, as iit is oftenn arguued, aa risee in fforeiggn assset hooldinggs is one oof thee conssequennces oof ecoonomicc inteegratiion, tthen oour annalysiis proovidess an eexplannationn for the rrisingg sharre of crosss-bordder meergerss. In princciple our aargumeent iss compplemen

45、ntary to otther rreasonns forr crosss-borrder mmergerrs fouund inn the literraturee, in partiicularr the argumment tthat tthey aallow firmss to ssave aaggreggate ttranspport ccosts. It iis intterestting tto notte, hooweverr, thaat thiis altternattive aargumeent caannot explaain a risinng shaare off

46、crosss-borrder mmergerrs oveer timme, ass it bbecomees lesss impportannt wheen ecoonomicc inteegratiion prroceedds andd trannsportt costts acccordinngly ffall.Our anaalysiss coulld be extennded iin sevveral direcctionss. Onee posssibiliity woould bbe to indiggenizee the sharee of fforeiggn firm oown

47、ersship, and rrelatee thiss sharre expplicittly too the forcees of econoomic iintegrrationn. In such a settting interrnatioonal pportfoolio ddiverssificatiion wouldd leadd to ggains in thhe forrm of higheer retturns or loower aaggreggate rrisk, but iit wouuld also causee highher innformaation or trr

48、ansacction costss. If econoomic iintegrrationn reduuces tthe latteer, thhe linnk bettween globaalizattion aand thhe risse of crosss-bordder meergerss coulld be expliicitlyy modeeled. We doo not expecct, hooweverr, thaat ourr concclusioons woould bbe funn- demenntally aaltereed by this extennsion. An

49、otther mmodel extennsion wouldd be tto connsiderr conseecutivve merrgers, or mergeer wavves. In suuch a settiing itt woulld be possiible tto derrive equillibriuum marrket sstructtures for aany giiven sset off exoggenouss modeel parrameteers (aas in Horn and PParsonn, 20001). IIn priinciplle thiis ex

50、ttensioon couuld bee incoorporaated iinto oour modell, butt the analyysis mmust aaccounnt forr bothh the changge in markeet strructurre andd for the cchangee in ttax pooliciees folllowinng eacch merrger. We leeave tthis ttask ffor fuuture reseaarch.Source: Andreeas Hauflle, 2007.”Mergeer Pollicy aan

51、d Taax Commpetittion”, Muniich Diiscusssion PPaper No.399 P25-35.译文：合并政策和税收收竞争通常政府有特定定部门的税收收和管理政策策来处理国内内并购或者跨跨国并购中产产生的市场问问题。我们发发现国内并购购或跨国并购是否否为国内最佳佳税收政策所触发，主主要取决于公公司的所有权权结构。当企企业在合并中中为纯粹国内内企业时，非非合作税收政政策在国内企企业合并中就就更有效，同同时协同效应应很少。当在在合并前企业业的外资股份份很高时，结结果正好相反反。在过去的十年当当中，合并的的作用十分显显著，跨国并并购的发展也也很快。在11981-119

52、98年期期间，年均企企业并购的数数量增加了55倍以上，跨跨国并购的份份额已达到总总数的四分之之一。企业并并购数量的增增加导致了国内并并购和跨国并购的的直接竞争。最最新的例子就就是西班牙头头号电力供应应商恩德萨公公司招标时，德德国意昂集团团和西班牙天天然气之间的的竞争。西班班牙当局与国国际并购相比比，更偏向于于国内并购，于是从中作梗梗，阻止德国国意昂集团的的接手，这是是意昂集团最最终退出招标标的原因之一一。英国政府采取了了新的措施，使使电力市场在220世纪900年代早期得得到了充分自自由化发展。在这个个过程当中，外外国电力供应应商（其中也也包括意昂集集团）收购了很大一一部分英国电电力企业。英英国

53、政府从中中得到了高额额的利润，其他他的企业则在在1997年专专业部门提出出暴利税后一次性将利润润划归私人所所有。从此，作为完善价价格管理制度度的筹码，价价格权威部门门(天然气部门门和电力市场场)不断地提出出新的税收政政策从上面的例子中中，我们可以以清楚地看到到，政府是如如何处理国内内并购或者跨跨国并购时产产生的附加政政策的。价格规则则在私有的网网络产业中是是一个以共同同利益为代价价增加消费者者盈余的重要要方法，它至少少会增加外国国股东的利润润。如果管理理利润税的部部门以他们的的收入为赔偿偿金再重新分分配给消费者者来提高价格格，这个作用用是微乎其微微的。另一方方面，也有很很多企业为了了提高产品的

54、的竞争力而给给专门的部门门直接发放补补贴。这里有一系列列的例子，比比如说矿业、造造船业、炼钢钢业或飞机制制造业。此外外，一些其他他的部门（如如航空运输），通通过消费税的的折合率给予予直接的补贴贴，尤其在电电力税方面。从从该意义上来来讲，这些生生态税收就相相当于皮古税税，使公司通过税收收减少他们产品品所消耗的社社会成本。这这样的减免税税主要体现在电力和能源源部门上。在在这些例子当当中可以发现现，无论是特特定部门的税税收还是补贴贴政策，都可可以通过调整整国家政策的的方式来适应应并购所带来来的市场结构构的变化。通过我们论证得得出，国家法规当当局用一个全全国性的最佳佳方式来征收收行业标准税税或津贴，对

55、对实行国内并并购或跨国并并购有着重要要的影响。同同时，当决定定在一个特定定的国家进行行企业并购时时，该合并企业可能能需要适应一一个新的政策策。为了分析析税收和企业业并购之间的的相互作用，我我们建立了一个模型。在在该模型内，企企业和国家法法规当局期望望在实现企业业合并后，东东道主国家的的税收会得到到最佳的调整整。更具体的的说，我们要要研究生产性性企业之间的的产量竞争情情况，这四个个企业两两分分布于实力均均衡的国家中。重要的是，这这些企业都可可能有外资股股份，因此，这这也激发了政府利用那那一部分被输输出给国外投投资者的利润润税。从双寡寡头垄断市场场的市场结构构入手，我们们着眼于比较较国内合并和跨国

56、并并购。我们的分析表明明，一个国家家对国际并购购的相对吸引引力，关键取决于于外国企业所所有权的程度度。当所有的的企业在合并并前为纯粹国国内企业时，那那么合并后与与跨国并购相相比将导致更更有效的税收收优惠。对比比之下，当企企业的外资股股份初始水平平很高时，东东道国的非合合作税收政策策在国内企业业合并中将更更加有效。将将该模型允许许企业并购的的协同作用进进行扩展，我我们不难发现，当企业的外资资股份程度较高时，跨国并购购将更容易提提出和采用一一些福利政策策。这些结果果意味着，一一个所有权结构越越分散的企业业和非合作选择的的国家税收政政策相结合，可能能为近期跨国并并购活动激增增提供了一个个解释。我们的

57、分析涉及及文献中的两两个方面。一方面，在最近的文献献中有越来越越多关于对开开放经济中的的合并政策的的理解。然而而，这类文献献通常把控制跨国并购购作为一个政策策问题，还分析出合并控制和和其他政策手手段之间的相互作作用是很少的的，它几乎只只关注额外政政策变量的国国际贸易政策策(理查森，11999；哈哈恩和莱文索索恩，20001；哈克和和康拉德，22004；萨萨基和伊丽斯斯，20066)。相反，到到目前为止，这这种文献尚未未提及合并政政策与国家税税收政策的内容。另一方面，第第二种文献使使得我们的论论文建立在寡寡头垄断市场场中的最优商商品税分析上上（基恩和拉拉希丽，19998；洛克克伍德，20001；

58、基恩恩等，20002；哈夫等等2005；哈希姆扎德德等，20005）。然而而，这种文献献主要集中在在商品统一税税收和外部给给定的市场结结构下商品税税制度选择的问题上上。作为并购购的结果，它它并没有遵从从潜在市场环环境的变化来来处理税收政政策的影响。本文安排如下。第第2节描述我我们分析的基基本框架。第第3节介绍双双寡头垄断市市场。第4节分析析了税收政策策和福利的变变化时，国内内发生的跨国并并购。第5节节进行了一个个跨国并购案案例的分析。第第6节是从跨跨国并购引出出了协同效应应，比较了下一一个或其他类类型的并购提提议，并通过过收购当局的条条件进行兼并并。第7节则则是结论。在实践中得出，能够创造协同

59、同效应是企业业进行并购的的核心动力，也也是一国当局局允许并购的的重要原因。我我们分析了作为国内或或者跨国并购购，为了合并并企业双方的的利益，怎样样去节约大量量的成本。同同样的，我们们又对不同所所有权结构下的国家进行了了分析。由于于所产生的表表达式的复杂杂性，我们在在主文本中只只讨论国家所所有权和完整整的国际所有有权的多样化化。我们应该注意到到，在一个特特定行业中，资资源共享和跨跨国并购的份份额之间有着着积极和系统统的联系。这这确实有一些些基本的提示示性强的理论论在支持这个个观点。在经经济合作与发发展组织成员员国中，总的的企业并购量量中的跨国并并购份额在不不同的经济部部门有着很大大的不同，最最高

60、的是制造造业。与此同同时，至少在在欧洲国家，制制造业也是一一个对待企业业的外资股份份最国际化的的部门之一。同同样的，企业业外资股份较较低的部门，如如建筑行业中中跨国并购量量占并购案例例总量的比例例就很低。一一个详细的实实证研究需要要严格的论证证，比如企业业的外资股份份和跨国并购购份额间拥有有的普遍性是否是是一种正相关关，它是否能被被联系到全国最最佳的互动税税收政策和合合并控制中去去。在市场结构出现现变化之后，在许多行业，政府都有特定部门的税收和管理政策来处理它们对市场产出造成的影响。本文列举一个简单的例子来解释国家是如何通过调整最佳税率来适应国内并购和跨国并购的。再将这个分析延伸到并购的协同作

61、用上。我们还研究了这些税收政策的变化是如何激励公司合并，同时也让合并管理的权威部门收购它。分析结果表明，国国内并购和跨跨国并购对国国家的税收政政策产生了不不同的刺激。一一方面，跨国国并购使得非非合作性税收收政策可以向向外国企业征征收超过它生生产能力部分分的税收。另另一方面，跨跨国并购导致致了本国产品品自产自销，从从而促进了各各国对有效补补贴政策的收收购。这两种种不同的影响响关键取决于于在合并之前前企业的外资资股份的多少少。如果公司司在合并之前前为纯粹国内内企业，那么么国内合并就占了主主导地位，也也就是说它在在提出合并和和被管理机构构解除时需要要比较少的成成本。相反的的，如果企业业外资的股权权份

62、额较大，那那么在提出或或者取消跨国国并购的时候候成本的范围围更广一些。我们认为，国际际投资组合不不断的多样化化有助于跨国国并购和促进进公平。就如如通常说的那那样，外国资资产的增长是是全球经济一一体化的结果果。我们的调调查结果为跨国并并购的不断增增多提供了进进一步的分析析解释。大体体上，我们的的调查与文献献上的跨国并购购，尤其是关关于允许节约约运输成本的的调查是相辅辅相成的。值值得一提的是是，这个论点点并不能说明明跨国并购份份额一直是不不断上升的。随随着时间的推推移，当经济济一体化不断断发展，运输输成本不断下下降的时候，它它也将变的无无足轻重了。我们的分析可以以延伸到多个方面。一一种可能性是是将

63、外国公司司的市场份额额本土化，并并且明确地将将市场份额与与经济一体化化的力量联系系起来。这种种国际证券组组合多样化的的环境将会导导致以更高的的回报或更低低的总风险形形式来获得收收益。但是，它它也可能会产产生更高的信信息获取和交交易成本。如如果经济一体体化缩减了后后者，那么全全球化和跨国国并购之间有有了更好的联联系。无论如如何，我们不不希望结果因因这种延伸而而产生基础性性的改变。另一一个模式的延延伸是考虑连连贯合并或“合并浪潮”。在这种环环境下，对任任何一个外源源模式因素来来说，都会得得到市场结构构的平衡（霍霍恩和帕森，22001）。原原则上这种延延伸会被纳入入我们的模式式当中，但分析析报告一定既要说明明市场结构的的改变，也要要说明随着各各个企业合并并而产生的税税收政策的改改变。我们将将把这个问题题作为今后的的研究任务。出处：安德烈 哈夫.合并政策策和税收竞争争.慕尼黑工作论论文,2007(339)：P25-355。