外文翻译--股权结构与公司绩效 以印度为例

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1、中文4200字，2650单词，14800英文字符出处：Srivastava A. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from IndiaJ. International Journal of Humanities & Social Science, 2011,7(3):209-233.原文Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from IndiaAuthor: Aman SrivastavaAbstractOwnership structure

2、 of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firms equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has bee

3、n widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. This paper is a moderate attempt to address the relationship of ownership structure of the firm and its performance. It investigates whether th

4、e ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. The 98 most actively listed companies on BSE 100 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India, which constitute the bulk of trading, were chosen to constitute the sample of the study as of end of 2009-10. Th

5、e findings indicate the presence of highly concentrated ownership structure in the Indian market. The results of the regression analyses indicate that the dispersed ownership percentage influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators (i.e. ROA and ROE) but not stock market perform

6、ance indicators (i.e. P/E and P/BV ratios), which indicate that there might be other factors (economic, political, contextual) affecting firms performance other than ownership structure. Keywords: Ownership structure, corporate performance, corporate governance, India1. IntroductionOwnership structu

7、re of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firms equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has b

8、een widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. Though the modern organization emphasizes the divorce of management and ownership; in practice, the interests of group managing the company c

9、an differ from the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. Corporate governance literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the ownership structure of corporations. Shareholders of publicly held corporations are so numerous and small that they are unable to effectively contro

10、l the decisions of the management team, and thus cannot be assured that the management team represents their interests. Many solutions to this problem have been advanced, as stated previously i.e. the disciplining effect of the takeover market, the positive incentive effects of the management shareh

11、olding stake and the benefits of large monitoring shareholders. A different problem, however, arises in firms with large controlling shareholders. Since a large controlling shareholder has both the incentives and the power to control the management teams actions, managements misbehavior is a second

12、order problem when such a large shareholder exists. Instead, the main problem becomes controlling the large shareholders abuse of minority shareholders. In other words, holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors

13、 and to determine the outcome of shareholders votes on other matters, have tremendous power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, the type of owners as well as the distribution of ownership stakes will undoubtedly have an impact on the performance of firms. Most of the

14、 empirical literature studying the link between corporate governance and firm performance usually concentrates on a particular aspect of governance, such as board of directors, shareholders7 activism, compensation, anti-takeover provisions, investor protection etc. This paper is a moderate attempt t

15、o examine the relationship of ownership structure and performance of firms in India.The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses on the literature review, where both theoretical and empirical studies on previous works are looked into. It also incorporates the corporate governan

16、ce mechanism in India. In section 3, the methodology of this study is considered. Empirical results and discussions are made in section 4, while section 5 concludes the study.2. Literature ReviewThe firms equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers fo

17、r decades; however, most of the studies in this context are conducted outside of India. The study failed to document any relevant study on the topic in Indian context. Fama and Jensen (1983 a & b) addresses the agency problems and they explained that a major source of cost to shareholders is the sep

18、aration of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Even in developed countries, these agency problems continue to be sources of large costs to shareholdersl.Demstez and Lehn (1985) argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm specific, and that market competition woul

19、d derive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results. Morck, (1988) by taking percentage of shares held by the board of directors of the company as a meas

20、ure of ownership concentration and holding both Tobins Q and accounting profit as performance measure of 500 Fortune companies and using piece-wise linear regression, found a positive relation between Tobins Q and board ownership ranging from 0% to 5%, a negative relation for board ownership ranging

21、 from 5% to 25%, and again a positive relation for the said ownership above 25%. It is argued that the separation of ownership from control for a corporate firm creates an agency problem that results in conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).The interests of other in

22、vestors can generally be protected through contractual arrangements between the company and concerned stakeholders, leaving shareholders as the residual claimants whose interests can adequately be protected only through the institutions of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Loderer an

23、d Martin (1997) took shareholding by the insiders (i.e., directors ownership) as a measure of ownership. Taking the said measure as endogenous variable and Tobins Q as performance measure, they found (through simultaneous equation model) that ownership does not predict performance, but performance i

24、s a negative predictor of ownership. Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen (1997) examine the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in the largest companies from 12 European nations. According to their findings the positive marginal effect of ownership ties to financial instituti

25、ons is stronger in the market-based British system than in continental Europe. Cho (1998) found that firm performance affects ownership structure (signifying percentage of shares held by directors), but not vice versa. Jurgen Weigand (2000) documented that (1) the presence of large shareholders does

26、 not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentration seems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations. Their results also imply ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively.Their empirical evidence sug

27、gests that representation of owners on the board of executive directors does not make a difference. Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer (2001) stated with a sample of 637 Japanese firms and confirmed the equilibrium mechanism behind Demstez-Lehn. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) investigated the relation be

28、tween the ownership structure and the performance (average Tobins Q for five years-1976-80) of the corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also treated it as an endogenous variable. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2 SLS) regression model, they found

29、no significant systematic relation between the ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of Australian listed companies. Her OLS results suggest that ownership of shares by the top management is

30、 significant in explaining the performance measured by accounting rate of return, but not significant ifperfOrmance is measured by Tobins Q. However, when ownership is treated as endogenous, the same is not dependent upon any of the performance measures. Lins (2002) investigates whether management o

31、wnership structures and large non-management block holders are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets .He finds that large non-management control rights block holdings (having more control rights) are positively related to firm value measured by Tobins Q. Michae

32、l L Lemmon and Karl V Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the regions financial crisis.The crisis negatively impacted firms investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expro

33、priate minority investors. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders. Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, Beni Lauterbach and Efrat Tolkowsky (2004) find that Tobins Q is maximized when

34、 control group vote reaches 67%, This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. Christoph Kaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer (2005) address the question whether there is any empirical relationship between corporate performance and in

35、sider ownership. Using a data set of 245 Germen firms for the year 2003 they find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price performance as well as by Tobins Q, and insider ownership. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) tried the model

36、of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for 175 Greek firms for the year 2000 and found that higher firm profitability requires less diffused ownership structure He also provides evidence that large non management block holders can mitigate the valuation discounts associated with the expected agency proble

37、m.3. Data and MethodologyThe study aims to explore the disciplinary effect of the market in a context with concentrated ownership structure and weak investor protection. The paper aims to explore if there are dominant certain types of owners of actively listed and traded companies on Indian Stock Ex

38、changes. Further, it investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. It shows that there might be other reasons that have affected the performance of the listed companies of BSE 100, other than ownership structure.The data set co

39、nsists of detailed trading and financial information and indicators about the 98 most actively traded BSE 100 listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange of India (BSE) during 2009-2010. The ninety eight companies cover a broad spectrum of sectors or industries totaling 18, which are: Finance, Oil

40、 & Gas, Information Technology, Metal, Metal Products & Mining, Capital Goods, FMCG, Transport Equipments, Power, Housing Related, Healthcare, Telecom, Diversified, Chemical & Petrochemical, Miscellaneous, Media & Publishing, Transport Services, Tourism and Agriculture. The details and proportion of

41、 these sectors in BSE 100 is given in table 1.The main financial indicators obtained from the companies financial statements included Total Revenues or Turnover, Gross Profit, Net Income or Earnings After Taxes, Current Assets, Fixed Assets, Long Term Debt and Shareholders Equity. Finally, the third

42、 subset consists of companies7 stock performance indicators obtained from CMIE PROWESS database including value traded, volume traded, number of transactions, market capitalization, market price as well as some calculated ratios using both CMIE PROWESS database as well as items reported in financial

43、 statements of sample companies such as debt to equity ratio, return on equity, return on assets, price earnings ratio and price to book value. The empirical investigation is conducted using known Ordinary Least Square Estimation methodology using both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Investment

44、 (ROI) variables - representing accounting performance measures, and Price-Earning Ratio (P/E) and Price to Book Value (P/BV) 一 representing stock market performance measures; separately as dependent variables. The following formula was used for modeling:Yij = a + xff, j + xde,j + xdph,j + xfp,j + x

45、npi,j + xnpni,j + (i)Where ND (0, g2)Yij : i corresponds to ROE, ROI, P/E or P/B for company j (j=1.98)xff, j : represents the percentage of free float in company j capital structure,xde,j : represents the debt to equity ratio for company j,xdph,j and xfp,j : represents the domestic promoter and for

46、eign promoter holding in the companyxnpi,j and xnpni,j : represents non promoter institutional and non promoter non institutional holding of the company.The independent variables are represented by the percentage of Free Floated shares (FF), Debt to Equity ratio (D/E) and four variables representing

47、 promoters and non promoters stake representing the ownership structure in sampled companies, namely; Tables (2) and (3), (4) and (5) in the appendix summarize the regression analysis.4. Results and analysisThe sampled companies of BSE 100 were analyzed on the basis of their free floats and the find

48、ings are given below in table 2. Table 2 clearly depict that majority of the sampled companies have less than 75% of the free float. Even 13% companies have a free float of less than 25%. Only 13% of the companies have a free float of greater than 75%. Table three gives the details about the ownersh

49、ip structure of the sampled firms. Data clearly depicts that the stake of Indian promoters I the sampled company varies from 0% to 99% with a average holding of 41%. That means on an average the sampled companies are dominated by Indian promoters holdings. While the average foreign promoters holding

50、 is just 7.51%. That clearly confirms the belief that the Indian companies are dominated by families and promoters stakes. Data related with debt equity profile of sampled companies is givenThe results clearly indicates that majority of the sampled companies are in first category of 0-2 which clearl

51、y depicts that the majority of the sampled companies are not highly levered.Performance measures in the paper are represented by two sets of variables accounting measures are ROA and ROE while the market measures are P/E and P/BV ratio. Table five depicts that average ROE, ROA, P/E and P/BV values a

52、re 17.36%, 12.77%, 34.8 and 3.8 respectively.The results of OLS regression analysis are given in table 6 below. The empirical results reflect at 5% level of significance the ownership characteristic does not reflect any relationship with either accounting performance measures ROA and ROE or show any

53、 significant relationship between ownership structure and stock market indicators P/E and P/BV ratios, as shown in Table (6) below. But at 10% level of significance all sampled variables shows significant relationship with ROA, ROE, P/E and P/BV for performance of any company. Insert table (6) about

54、 here5. Findings and ConclusionThe significance of ownership characteristics and accounting performance measures i.e. ROA and ROE could be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies, measured by, its financial indicators such as (ROA and ROE) are the most important factors us

55、ed by investors in India to assess companys performance. In India, although earlier investors have culturally placed more emphasis on accounting performance measures, not stock market indicators, due to the inactivity and stagnation of the stock market for a long period (till early 1990s). Furthermo

56、re, Indian investors always favored payment of dividends rather than stock price appreciation, due to inactivity of market. Accordingly, the dividends yield paid by Indian companies are always very high (10%-13%) compared to other emerging and developed markets (3%-5%). Thus the author did not consi

57、der dividend yield in the stock market indicators since it will be a distorted measure since issuers in India always pay a high dividends yield, sometimes, irrespective of earnings, since they are valued by investors according to dividends not price appreciation. Furthermore, the type of ownership h

58、ad an insignificant impact on stock market performance measures, which might imply that the stock performance was mainly affected by economic and market conditions rather than ownership concentration. Furthermore, the results could be related to the market inefficiency of the Indian stock market, gi

59、ven its small and thin characteristics, as well as the lack of prompt disclosure by listed companies, even the active ones, at the Indian stock market. Stock prices therefore may not appropriately reflect the costs and benefits of diversification as shown.References1 Beni Lauterbach, and Efrat Tolko

60、wsky, 2004, “Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak”，Discussion Paper No. 8-2002 Cho M H (1998), “Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 103121.3 Demsetz H and Lehn K (

61、1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6, pp. 115511774 Demsetz H and Villalonga B (2001), “Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”， Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 209-233.5 Erik Lehmann en Jurgen Wei

62、gand, Does the governed corporation perform better Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany, European Finance Review, 2000, no. 4, p. 157-195.6 Fama, E and Jensen, M, 1983a, 1983b. Separation of ownership and control, Journal ofLaw &Economics 26, 301-325 and 327-349.7 Jensen, M and

63、 Meckling, W, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.8 Kapopoulas P and Lazaretou S (2007), “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:Evidence from Greek Firms”，Corporate Governance: An International R

64、eview,V ol. 15, No. 2, pp. 144-158.9 Kaserer Christoph, and Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2005, “Insider Ownership and Corporate Performance -Evidence from Germany”，Working Paper”，Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) and Department for Financial Management and Capital Market10 Lins, K, 20

65、00, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, Working paper, University of Utah.11 Loderer C and Martin K (1997), “Executive Stock Ownership and Performance Tracking Faint TracesJournal of Financial Economics, V)l. 45, No. 2, pp. 595-612.12 Michael L Lemmon, and Karl V Lins, 2003, “Owners

66、hip Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis The Journal of Finance, Vol LVIII No. 4, August 200413 Miwa Yoshiro, and Mark Ramseyer, 2001, “Does ownership matter? Discussion Paper, University of Tokyo14 Morck, R, Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R, 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: